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Note: EU budget contributions include EU receipts to the private sector. This is the main 
reason why the UK’s net contribution is lower than the £9.8bn reported by HM Treasury.  
Sources: Eurostat (social and economy); ONS, Pink Book 2015 (trade); Commons Library briefing, 
EU budget and the UK's contribution; HMRC for exchange rates 
 
Social
Population, 2016 Unemployment rate (%), Q1 2016
million % of EU total % Rank (1=highest)
EU incl. UK 510.1 100% EU incl. UK 8.8 ..
Germany 82.2 16% UK 5.0 25
UK 65.3 13% Greece 24.3 1
France* 63.7 12% Spain 20.4 2
Italy 60.7 12% Germany 4.3 27
Spain 46.4 9% Czech Rep. 4.2 28
Economy
Gross Domestic Product, 2015 GDP growth (annual average, 2010-2015)
£ billion % of EU total %
EU incl. UK 10,625 100% EU incl. UK 1.2
UK 1,870 18% UK 2.0
Germany 2,197 21% Germany 2.0
France 1,583 15% France 1.1
Italy 1,188 11% Italy -0.3
US 12,208 .. US 2.0
Trade
UK's largest export markets, 2014 UK's largest import markets, 2014
£ billion % of total £ billion % of total
Total EU 228.9 44.4% Total EU 290.6 52.9%
USA 88.0 17.1% Germany 70.6 12.8%
Germany 43.3 8.4% USA 51.6 9.4%
Netherlands 34.1 6.6% China 38.3 7.0%
France 30.6 5.9% France 37.0 6.7%
Ireland 27.9 5.4% Netherlands 36.1 6.6%
EU budget contributions
Highest net contributions, 2014 Highest net contributions per head, 2014
£ billion £
Germany 14.2 Netherlands 305
France 6.0 Sweden 218
UK 5.7 Germany 177
Netherlands 5.1 Denmark 143
Italy 4.2 UK 89 (8th highest)
* Figure from 2013, excluding overseas territories
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Trade  
Taken as a group, the EU is by far the UK’s most important trading partner. In 2015 it 
accounted for 44% of UK goods and services exports (£222 billion) and 53% of UK 
imports (£291 billion). The UK imports more from the EU than it exports to it. In 2015 the 
UK’s deficit on trade in goods and services with the EU was £69 billion, while the surplus 
with non-EU countries was £30 billion. The share of UK exports going to the EU has 
declined in recent years. In 2002 the EU accounted for 55% of UK exports. This had fallen 
to 44% by 2015. The share of UK imports from the EU declined from 58% in 2002 to 
50% in 2011, before increasing slightly to 53% in 2015. 
The UK’s new trading relationship with the EU will be the product of negotiation. Options 
range from membership of the European Economic Area (EEA) to trading under World 
Trade Organization (WTO) rules. The EEA option would be the closest to EU membership 
and would largely maintain access to the EU single market but would mean accepting free 
movement of people and contributions to the EU Budget. The UK would have no direct 
influence over EU rules if it were a member of the EEA. The WTO option would be the 
biggest change from the current arrangements. There would be no requirement to accept 
free movement of people or make EU Budget contributions, but trade between the EU 
and UK would be subject to tariffs and other barriers to trade. 
The EU has negotiated an array of preferential trade agreements with other countries. It is 
not yet clear what will happen to these agreements with Brexit but most analysts believe 
they will need to be renegotiated.  
Overall economic impact 
Besides the effect on trade, the long-term impact of withdrawal is likely to be on areas 
such as foreign direct investment (FDI), the UK’s contribution to the EU Budget and the 
effect of immigration on the labour market. The effect on FDI is uncertain, with much 
depending on the trade arrangements reached with the EU and other countries. Access to 
the single market is an important determinant of FDI but by no means the only one. 
Outside the EU, the UK may be able to establish a regulatory regime more favourable to 
overseas investors, which could offset the effect of its departure. 
 
The UK will continue to make contributions to the EU Budget while it remains an EU 
Member State. The UK’s contribution was an estimated £8.5 billion in 2015, around 1% 
of total public expenditure and equivalent to 0.5% of GDP. Any future contributions will 
depend on what arrangements are agreed for the UK’s relationship with the EU after 
leaving. Members of the EEA, for example, contribute to the EU Budget, so if the UK joins 
the EEA, it is likely to pay into the EU Budget. 
 
Possible changes to immigration rules following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU are 
likely to affect businesses and the economy, if it becomes more difficult for employers to 
recruit workers from other EU/EEA countries. The extent to which employers are affected 
will depend on the new rules, but one possibility would be to restrict economic migration 
to high-skilled migrants (via a points-based system). This would reduce the flow of migrant 
workers doing low-skilled jobs. Employers may be able to compensate for any changes to 
immigration rules by recruiting more UK nationals, but this will depend on their ability to 
find workers with the same skills and to attract workers from a smaller pool of potential 
recruits.  
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Although the UK is a net contributor to the EU, certain regions where living standards are 
relatively low receive significant levels of support from the EU Budget through the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF), boosted 
by matched funding from government or the private sector. Withdrawal would leave a 
policy vacuum which the Government would have to fill to avoid certain regions and 
sectors losing out.  
Business and financial services 
The argument centres on whether the benefits of having a more tailored and flexible 
national regulatory regime outweigh the loss of access to the single market that may 
come with pursuing an independent agenda. 
A huge amount of existing financial services regulation is derived from the EU. The UK has 
frequently led reform in this area. It is likely, therefore, that a significant amount of this 
legislation would remain post-withdrawal.  The majority opinion of City firms was that the 
UK should remain in the EU.  The main question financial firms have is over the future of 
‘passporting’ – the ability to sell across the EU with a non EU regulator. 
Employment 
A substantial component of UK employment law is based on EU law.  EU employment law 
often provides a minimum standard below which domestic employment law must not fall.  
In some cases EU law has entrenched at an international level provisions that already 
existed in domestic law: for example, sex and race discrimination and certain maternity 
rights.  In others, new categories of employment rights have been transposed into 
domestic law to comply with emerging EU obligations. Some of these were resisted by the 
UK government during EU negotiations (e.g. agency workers’ rights and limitations on 
working time).  Commentators differ in their opinions on what the Government will do 
with EU employment law, but the Brexit Minister, David Davis, said in mid-July: “All the 
empirical studies show that it is not employment regulation that stultifies economic 
growth, but all the other market-related regulations, many of them wholly unnecessary”. 
 
Agriculture 
Brexit, in all scenarios, means a departure from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and 
its subsidy and regulatory regime. 
EU farm subsidies currently make up to around 50-60% of UK farm income. The UK 
Government has guaranteed the current level of direct subsidies to 2020 “as part of the 
transition to new domestic arrangements”.  
This is in line with the current CAP funding period and hence the timescale over which 
farmers and regulators have already invested and planned.  
However, it is not clear what levels of support the UK Government will be willing to 
provide beyond this, or whether it will target subsidies in a different way.  
Previous Government positions on CAP reform have indicated that the UK Government 
and Devolved Administrations would be unlikely to match the current levels of subsidy and 
would require more ‘public goods’ in return for any support, such as environmental 
protection, which the UK Government views as the overarching market failure in this 
sector. 
Farming organisations are anxious to know what support will be available after 2020, the 
degree of future access to the Common Market and migrant labour, and how imports will 
be regulated. 
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On the positive side, they also see opportunities in UK trade deals outside Europe and a 
simpler farming policy which can focus on UK priorities for a competitive industry. 
Although, under some exit models e.g. EEA, key areas of frustration in the sector such as 
elements of EU pesticide and GM regulation would continue where there are concerns 
that scientific assessment processes have become overtly politicised.  
Meanwhile, environmental groups are concerned about the overall level of funding for 
agri-environment schemes outside CAP and how far future UK agriculture policy would 
support environmental goals. 
Fisheries 
The implications of Brexit for fisheries are highly uncertain. Based on the views of different 
stakeholders and evidence from existing non-EU European countries, they may include: 
• The UK obtaining exclusive national fishing rights over its Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) up to 200 miles from the coast. However, the UK may trade off some of these 
rights in order to obtain access to the EU’s EEZ or access to the EU market for 
fisheries products;  
• Impacts on the UK’s ability to negotiate favourable fish quotas for UK fishers with 
the EU. It is not possible to say whether the UK will be more or less able to obtain 
satisfactory quotas for fishers; 
• The identification of a mechanism to enable the UK to negotiate and agree annual 
fishing quotas with the EU and other countries; 
• The introduction of a UK fisheries management and enforcement system. This in 
many respects may mirror the existing arrangements for managing fisheries, albeit 
with additional resources required; 
• Restrictions on EU market access for fishery products (depending on the outcome of 
negotiations) and less influence in discussions on determining EU market rules for 
fish; 
• Less certainty around public funding of support for fishing communities or 
environmental sustainability; and 
• Challenges related to coordinating the protection of the marine environment with 
the EU. 
Environment 
The environment is an area in which UK and EU law have become highly entwined.  
Depending on the terms of Brexit, it may be easier for future UK governments to change 
environmental standards.  
Some have raised concerns that as a result some environmental standards could be 
lowered. There may be fewer incentives for the UK Government to meet environmental 
standards if EU enforcement mechanisms do not apply to the UK. 
However, some incentives to maintain environmental standards will remain. The 
Government would still have certain international environmental commitments and some 
EU standards may still apply if the UK seeks to keep access to the single market. Future 
governments may also decide to increase standards in some areas. 
A particular challenge following Brexit may be ensuring effective ongoing coordination 
with other countries, as many environmental challenges cannot be tackled in isolation. 
New mechanisms for coordinating with the EU and between the four nations of the UK 
might be needed. 
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Energy and climate change 
EU policy on energy has been to develop a more transparent and open European Energy 
Market. The UK has a competitive and open energy market, with multinational companies 
and investors. Links with the EU market are likely to continue. However, it is uncertain 
how Brexit will affect UK energy policy; emission targets are set into UK law through the 
Climate Change Act 2008, but exit may give the Government more scope in the way it 
meets climate targets and how it ensures UK security of supply. A key issue for the 
industry will be investor confidence in the UK energy market so that capital projects 
continue. The UK is likely to want to ensure the UK industry continues to interact with the 
EU market. 
An exit would affect the UK’s international climate targets under the United Nations 
Conference on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which it currently negotiates as a part of the 
EU block. It was recognised in the Balance of Competences Review that negotiating as 
part of an EU block was beneficial, as it had more influence at an international level than 
if individual Member States acted alone.  Withdrawal from the EU would have to address 
that lack of a UK-specific target under UNFCCC.   
One currently unresolved question is how Brexit would affect the UK’s ratification of the 
Paris Agreement, which the UK signed in April this year.  Recently, ministers have 
reiterated the UK’s commitment to tackling climate change but have made no comment 
on whether, when or how the UK might ratify the Paris Agreement.  Some commentators 
have suggested that Brexit may mean that the Paris Agreement itself has to be 
recalibrated. A recent briefing from the Department for Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) has said “We remain committed to ratifying as soon as possible”.   
The Select Committee on Energy and Climate Change has recently launched two inquiries 
exploring the implications of leaving the EU for UK energy policy  and UK climate change 
policy. 
The new Government announced on 14 July 2016 that the previous Department for 
Energy and Climate Change would become part of a new Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy (DBEIS). 
Transport 
On transport, it is far too early to say what impact Brexit will have on aviation, shipping, 
public transport including rail and bus, and road haulage. Much will hinge on whether the 
UK remains a part of the EEA or whether it concludes bilateral treaties which oblige it to 
apply much of the current framework as regards single transport markets (such as 
Switzerland has). More generally transport prices may be affected by the general 
economic impact of Brexit – for example if inflation rises so will rail fares; and if the 
economy experiences a downturn big expensive infrastructure projects might be more 
difficult to finance. 
Immigration 
The UK already maintains its own border controls. It is not part of the internal border-free 
Schengen Area, and Border Force officers conduct checks on EU/EEA travellers crossing UK 
ports of entry, as well as British citizens and non-EU/EEA nationals.  
The UK has not opted in to EU measures facilitating legal migration of third-country 
migrants, but has recognised that there are benefits to practical co-operation and 
information-sharing with other Member States, for example to strengthen responses to 
organised immigration crime and current and future migratory pressures.   
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At the moment, it is very unclear what kind of future relationship the UK might have with 
the EU and EEA/Swiss states after leaving the EU. A key question, when considering the 
impact of leaving the EU on immigration policy and the immigration rights of British and 
EU/EEA citizens, is to what extent the UK might remain bound by EU free movement of 
people laws post-Brexit. There is unlikely to be any clarity about this until the withdrawal 
negotiations are underway. The legal status of British and EU expats post-Brexit will be 
one of the issues to resolve during the UK’s withdrawal negotiations.  
Leaving the EU does not automatically affect the UK’s border controls in northern France, 
which are based on a bilateral treaty between the UK and France.  
The UK will continue to be bound by the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of 
Refugees and related pieces of international law 
Police and justice co-operation 
The UK currently has an opt out arrangement with the EU on policing and criminal justice 
measures, whereby it can chose which measures to opt in to. The UK has chosen, with 
parliamentary approval, to opt in to a number of measures, the most significant of which 
is the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). Others relate to information sharing and 
participation in EU law enforcement agencies.  
Predictions about the consequences of Brexit are of course speculative at this stage and 
depend on the outcome of negotiations. However, it is likely that the UK would wish to 
recreate at least some of the existing arrangements.  Some matters are covered by Council 
of Europe treaties (e.g. Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons), although in 
practice these are generally less detailed and may prove to be less effective.  In other areas 
it may be possible to negotiate bilateral treaties with individual Member States, or with 
the EU as a whole. It is possible that, without the mutual recognition and trust between 
EU Member States that underpins the EAW and other measures, these arrangements 
would be more complicated, expensive or time consuming.   
 
Human rights 
A UK withdrawal from the EU would mean that the UK no longer has to comply with the 
human rights obligations of the EU Treaties. The controversial EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights would not apply, and the EU Court of Justice would not have jurisdiction over the 
UK (except possibly for transitional cases that arose before withdrawal). 
Withdrawing from the EU does not mean withdrawing from the separate European 
Convention on Human Rights. The Government is planning a British Bill of Rights, but 
Theresa May has said that she does not intend to withdraw from the Convention. 
Social security 
Entitlement to welfare benefits for people moving between EU Member States is closely 
linked to free movement rights.  Brexit could have significant implications both for EU/EEA 
nationals living in or wishing to move to the UK, and for UK expatriates elsewhere in the 
EU/EEA, and those considering moving abroad. 
If Brexit means the end of free movement rights, the UK will be able to impose restrictions 
on access to many social security benefits via immigration law. Entitlement to contributory 
social security benefits could be limited by limiting access to employment.  It will also be 
possible to restrict the ability of EU nationals to apply for social housing.  
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The UK could seek to secure bilateral social security agreements on reciprocal rights with 
individual EU/EEA states, but negotiations could be difficult and protracted.  Alternatively, 
the UK could seek a single agreement with the EU/EEA as a whole.  Such an arrangement 
could, however, end up closely resembling existing provisions in EU law.  Whatever the 
solution, decisions would have to be made on how to protect social security rights already 
accrued at the point of withdrawal from the EU. 
Health 
Although health care systems are a matter of national responsibility, other aspects of 
health care – reciprocal access to healthcare through the European Health Insurance Card 
(EHIC), pharmaceuticals, the working hours of doctors and mutual recognition of 
qualifications, for example - are regulated to a greater or lesser extent by EU law. The EU 
also has a significant role in ensuring a cross-border approach to important public health 
issues, such as preventing pandemics and anti-smoking measures. 
If the UK remains in the EEA it might be able to continue to participate in the EHIC 
scheme, or, subject to negotiation with EU Member States, participate on a similar basis to 
Switzerland. 
Higher education 
Universities are concerned about the impact of Brexit on students and research. Brexit 
could mean the Government will not have to provide student loans or maintenance 
funding for EU students, which would save money. But the loss of funding for EU students 
could have an impact on the numbers of EU students coming to study in the UK and this 
could have a detrimental impact on fee income for universities and on the culture and 
diversity of universities. But it can also be argued that Brexit could increase places for UK 
students and charging EU students higher fees as overseas students could maintain, or 
increase, fee income if UK higher education continued to attract EU students.   
The UK may lose access to EU research funding and there are also concerns that the 
movement of high calibre staff and researchers could be impacted, which could 
detrimentally affect the quality of research projects.  
Consumer policy 
Consumer protection in the UK is currently a complex combination of EU and national 
law. A huge amount of UK consumer protection regulation is derived from the EU. For 
example, directives implemented in the UK protect consumers from unsafe products, 
unfair practices, misleading marketing practices, distance selling etc. It is unclear whether 
any EU-derived consumer laws would need to be repealed or replaced on Brexit because 
that will depend to a considerable degree on what form Brexit takes.  
Foreign and defence policy 
Acting through the EU means a larger aid budget, the promise of access to the largest 
consumer market in the world and a louder political voice. All of these can be significant 
‘soft power’ tools in the pursuit of European interests.  If the UK no longer co-ordinates its 
policy with Member States, it will lose access to these shared tools. However, many UK 
actions are taken in conjunction with the US rather than the EU. Without the UK’s 
defence capacity and foreign policy experience, the EU’s voice in the Middle East, for 
example, could be less influential. But it can also be argued that Brexit will not make much 
difference to the UK’s capacities in this region, that the US remains the most significant 
power there and that the UK could co-ordinate its Middle East policies more closely with 
those of the US. 
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While generally supportive of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 
successive UK governments have been cautious in their approach to greater European 
defence integration, regarding it as entirely complementary to NATO and essential for 
strengthening European military capabilities within that alliance, as opposed to the pro-
European view that the EU should establish an independent military capability outside the 
NATO framework.  
Until the UK formally leaves the EU it will remain part of its CSDP planning structures and 
the EU military operations to which the UK has committed forces.  
The impact of Brexit on the UK’s military is arguably minimal in the near term. However, 
the UK’s ability to influence or shape the CSDP agenda going forward will be significantly 
curtailed. Questions have also been raised over future UK defence spending if economic 
growth predictions fail to materialise in the aftermath of the Brexit vote. The affordability 
of the MOD’s Defence Equipment Plan, should the defence budget be cut at some point 
in the future, could be brought into question. 
The UK’s relationship with NATO will be unaffected.  
International development 
The UK channels funds for development cooperation and humanitarian aid through two 
budget lines, both of them managed by the European Commission: the development part 
of the EU budget, and the European Development Fund. In 2014, about 10% of the UK’s 
aid budget would have required reallocation if the UK had not been an EU Member State. 
 
The devolved legislatures 
With Brexit there could be further policy and legislative divergence in areas of devolved 
competence, as the UK Government and Devolved Administrations will no longer be 
required to implement the common requirements of EU Directives. This will probably be 
particularly noticeable in policy areas such as the environment or agriculture and fisheries, 
which are currently strongly governed by EU policy and legislation.  
Scotland 
Around two-thirds of Scots voted to stay in the EU, and the Scottish First Minister, Nicola 
Sturgeon, would like to find a way for Scotland to remain, despite the overall UK vote to 
leave.  
Scotland has benefited from both pre-allocated and competitive European funds over the 
last four decades. Between 2014 and 2020 Scotland is set to benefit from around a 
further €4.6 billion. During the 2014 to 2020 Multiannual Financial Framework, Scotland’s 
programmes will benefit from a total of €985 million; with match funding from the 
Scottish Government and other public sector organisations, total funding will be around 
€1.9 billion. 
Wales 
Wales has access to considerable funding opportunities from the EU, notably from the 
Common Agriculture Policy and Structural Funds (as well as many other funding streams). 
Between 2014 and 2020 Wales is set to benefit from around £1.8bn European Structural 
Funds investment. Together with match funding, these funds will result in investment of 
at least £2.7bn across Wales. Nevertheless, Wales voted by 52.5% to 47.5% to leave the 
EU.  
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Northern Ireland 
Northern Ireland benefits significantly from EU funding: a total of €1,211 million in EU 
Regional Policy Funding 2014-20.  The impact of a UK withdrawal on Northern Ireland 
would also be different from that in the rest of the UK because NI is the only region of the 
UK to share a land border with another EU Member State. UK withdrawal would mean 
that an external border of the EU would run through the island of Ireland.   
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1. Background 
1.1 Review of the balance of competences 
Following on from a 2010 election and Coalition Government pledge to ‘repatriate’ EU 
competences to the UK, in July 2012 the Government launched a Review of the Balance 
of Competences, which it described as “an audit of what the EU does and how it affects 
the UK”. The Review involved Government Departments collecting evidence from experts 
and interested parties, including other EU Member States and the EU institutions, across a 
range of policy areas. The 32-volume Review was completed in autumn 2014. The Review 
was to form the basis for the Government’s proposed reform of the UK’s relationship with 
the EU. Although it did not identify grossly unacceptable or wide-scale abuse of 
competences, the final reports picked up on a number of recurring themes: 
• Subsidiarity and proportionality are not always sufficiently implemented, EU action is not 
always necessary, is overly harmonising or has resulted in disproportionate costs to 
business or governments.  
• There is a need for greater democratic accountability of EU institutions. The EU Court of 
Justice has too wide a margin over interpretation of competence. Accountability could be 
improved by giving national parliaments a greater role in decision-making. 
• The UK has often been successful in shaping the EU agenda, particularly in the EU 
enlargement process. EU programmes have benefitted the UK. 
• There is a need for less and better EU regulation, and more effective implementation and 
enforcement of existing legislation. The rights of all EU Member States need to be 
protected as the Eurozone integrates further, to ensure the integrity of the single market. 
• The EU should focus on areas where it adds genuine value. Member States should retain 
the ability to take actions appropriate to national circumstances (one size does not always 
fit all), particularly in areas where questions are raised over how far the single market 
provides a rationale for action.1 
1.2 Negotiating a new UK relationship with the EU 
To address these and other UK concerns, in 2015 the then Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, and other members of the Government, held talks with EU leaders to drum up 
support for proposals which the Government said would benefit not only the UK but the 
EU as a whole.2  
David Cameron had pledged in his Bloomberg speech in January 2013 to put the final 
reform package to a referendum by the end of 2017. The European Union Referendum 
Act 2015, which received Royal Assent on 17 December 2015, provided for a referendum 
on continued EU membership to be held on 23 June 2016.   
At the December 2015 meeting of the European Council, Member States agreed to work 
together closely to find “mutually satisfactory solutions” in four broad areas set out in the 
Prime Minister's letter to European Council President Donald Tusk on 10 November 2015. 
                                                                                             
1  From summary of final conclusions, Government press release, 18 December 2014. 
2  The EU-UK negotiations are discussed in Commons Briefing Papers 7311,EU referendum: reform 
negotiations June to December 2015, and 7497, referendum: UK’s EU reform negotiations and the Tusk 
package. 
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On 17-19 February 2016 the Heads of State or Government of the EU Member States, 
meeting within the European Council, considered draft texts submitted by Donald Tusk on 
2 February 2016 to address the UK’s EU membership concerns. 
Agreement was reached on 19 February 2016 on a ‘New Settlement for the United 
Kingdom within the European Union’. The package is set out in Annexes to the European 
Council Conclusions, 19 February 2016, and in the Official Journal of the EU, 23 February 
2016. 
1.3 The New Settlement for the UK within the EU 
The New Settlement contained provisions on economic governance, competitiveness, 
sovereignty, and social benefits in the context of free movement.3  David Cameron, 
satisfied with the New Settlement, announced that “the Government’s position will be to 
recommend that Britain remains in a reformed European Union”.4 
Economic Governance 
There should be no discrimination against non-eurozone countries (such as the UK) 
because they are outside the eurozone. Non-eurozone countries would not impede 
further integration in eurozone matters and would not face financial losses due to 
eurozone ‘bail-outs’. Discussion of matters that affect all EU Member States, such as 
Eurogroup matters, would involve all EU Member States, including non-eurozone 
members. The Bank of England would remain responsible for supervising the financial 
stability of the UK. 
 
Competitiveness 
The aims of the single market and free movement of people, goods, services and capital 
were confirmed. The EU and member States “must enhance competitiveness” and take 
steps to lower the regulatory burden on businesses. The Commission would review the EU 
acquis for compliance with subsidiarity and proportionality and will consult national 
parliaments. 
 
The Commission would introduce by the end of 2016 a new burden review mechanism, 
monitor progress against the targets set and report to the European Council every year. 
The EU remained committed to an “ambitious trade policy”. 
 
Sovereignty 
The UK would not be committed to further political integration in the EU and the concept 
of “ever closer union” would not apply to the UK.  
National parliaments would have 12 weeks in which to object to a legislative proposal on 
subsidiarity grounds. There would be a ‘red card’ procedure: 55% of national parliaments 
would be able to prevent further discussion in the Council of EU legislative proposals, 
where they believed power should lie with national legislatures.  
The UK would retain its opt-out and opt-in arrangements in measures on policing, 
immigration and asylum policy, and national security would remain the sole responsibility 
of the UK Government. 
                                                                                             
3  The New Settlement is discussed in CBP 7524, EU Referendum: analysis of the UK's new EU Settlement, 
updated 26 May 2016. 
4  Commons statement, 22 February 2016. 
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Social benefits and free movement 
There were clarifications of the interpretation of current EU rules, including that Member 
States could take action to prevent abuse of rights or fraud, such as marriages of 
convenience, and that in assessing the potential threat of an individual’s behaviour, 
Member States could take into account the individual’s past conduct and act on 
preventative grounds. The Commission and Member States would improve efforts to 
prevent abuse and fraud. The UK’s position on restricting free movement rights with 
future EU enlargements was acknowledged. 
 
The free movement rights of non-EU family members of EU citizens would be restricted by 
amendments to the free movement directive. Another EU law amendment would provide 
an ‘emergency brake’ to limit full access to in-work benefits by newly arrived EU workers if 
a Member State was experiencing an “exceptional situation” (the UK already met the 
criteria for this). A third amendment would give all Member States an option to index 
exported child benefits to the conditions of the Member State where the child resided.  
The Settlement would come into effect the day after a vote to stay in the EU.5 
1.4 The referendum outcome 
The New Settlement featured little in the referendum campaigns, which focused mainly 
on the economy and EU immigration.  
On 23 June 2016 the UK voted in favour of leaving the European Union. Turnout was 
72.2% and Leave won 51.9% of the vote across the UK. Remain took 48.1% of the vote. 
The New Settlement did not come into effect. 
David Cameron announced on 24 June 2016 that he would step down as Prime Minister. 
He did not think it was right for him “to try to be the captain that steers our country to its 
next destination”.6  
Brexit recriminations gave rise to leadership challenges in both the Conservative and 
Labour parties.  
A debate began over when and how the UK would notify the European Council of the 
UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU).  
There were calls for Parliament to approve triggering the Brexit process rather than the 
Government through Royal Prerogative powers. There have been judicial review claims 
challenging the Government’s ability to trigger Article 50 TEU without recourse to 
Parliament.  A case is being brought by law firm Mishcon de Reya.7 The Divisional Court 
(Lord Justice Leveson and Mr Justice Cranston) has ordered the various claims to be joined 
together and has set a provisional hearing date before the Lord Chief Justice for 15 
October 2016, with a possible ‘leapfrog’ procedure straight to the Supreme Court after 
that, with a view to it being heard by the Supreme Court in December.8  
Remain supporters called for a second referendum. The Scottish First Minister did not rule 
out a second Scottish independence referendum, given that a majority in Scotland had 
voted to stay in the EU. 
                                                                                             
5  Questions were raised as to whether it was legally binding or not. This is discussed in CBP 7524. 
6  Statement in Downing Street, 24 June 2016. 
7  See Mishcon de Reya, 3 July 2016, Article 50 process on Brexit faces legal challenge to ensure 
parliamentary involvement. 
8  See Brexit Law blog, 20 July 2016, Article 50 judicial reviews to be heard this year. 
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The then Home Secretary, Theresa May, became the new UK Prime Minister on 13 July 
2016. She said that Brexit meant Brexit and “As we leave the European Union, we will 
forge a bold new positive role for ourselves in the world”. She said she would not trigger 
Article 50 before the end of 2016, so negotiations will not start until 2017. 
As to whether UK citizens will benefit from leaving the EU, this will depend on how the 
UK Government fills any policy gaps left by withdrawal. In some areas, the environment, 
for example, where the UK is bound by other international agreements, much of the 
content of EU law will probably remain. In others, it might be expedient for the UK to 
retain the substance of EU law, or for the Government to remove EU obligations from UK 
statutes.  
Much will also depend on whether the UK seeks to remain in the European Economic 
Area (EEA)9  with a view to retaining access to the Single Market - but along with free 
movement for EEA nationals; or decides to go it alone and negotiate bilateral agreements 
with the EU along the lines of the Swiss model; or whether it negotiates a different 
relationship altogether. 
This paper looks at the current position of the UK and the EU in a range of important 
policy areas and how this might change with UK withdrawal from the EU (here referred to 
as Brexit).   
1.5 Commons and Lords Library Papers on Brexit-related 
themes 
Constitutional issues 
CBP 7214, Brexit: some legal and constitutional issues and alternatives to EU membership, 
28 July 2016 
Lords Library note (LLN) 2016-0034, Leaving the EU: Parliament's Role in the Process, 4 
July 2016 
CBP 7632, Brexit: what happens next? 30 June 2016 
CBP 7551, Brexit: how does the Article 50 process work? 30 June 2016 
Policy 
CBP 7629, Brexit - implications for pensions, 10 August 2016 
LLN 2016-0043, UK-Commonwealth Trade, 5 August 2016 
CBP 7675, Brexit and UK immigration and asylum policy: a reading list, 2 August 2016 
CBP 7628, Brexit and financial services, 1 August 2016 
CBP 7669, What next for UK fisheries? 28 July 2016 
CBP 7633, Brexit: how will it affect transport? 25 July 2016 
CBP 7659, Impacts of immigration on population and the economy, 25 July 2016 
                                                                                             
9  The EEA consists of all 28 EU Member States, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. The right to free 
movement throughout the EEA is covered by Article 28 of the EEA Agreement, Annex V on the Free 
Movement of Workers and Annex VIII on the Right of Establishment. Nationals of the EEA EFTA States 
have the same right as EU citizens to take up an economic activity anywhere in the EU/EEA without being 
discriminated against on the grounds of their nationality. EU citizens also have the right to work and reside 
in the EEA EFTA States. Non-economically active persons such as pensioners, students and family members 
of EEA nationals are also entitled to move and reside anywhere in the EU/EEA subject to certain conditions 
set out in EU legislation. (From EFTA website, accessed 22 August 2016). 
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CBP 7664, Brexit and local government, 20 July 2016 
CBP 7662, The UK's points-based system for immigration, 18 July 2016 
CBP 7661, The Common Travel Area and the special status of Irish nationals in UK law 15 
July 2016 
Lords Library Note 2016-0039, NHS and Social Care Workforce: Implications of Leaving 
the European Union, 15 July 2016 
CBP 7393, Climate change: Ratifying the Paris Agreement, 15 July 2016 
CBP 7237, Support for science, 15 July 2016 
CBP 7630, UK tax after the EU referendum, 14 July 2016 
CBP 7435, Financial Services: European aspects, 30 June 2016 
CBP 7638, UK economy: information for debate on 29 June 2016, 29 June 2016 
CBP 7525, Leaving the EU: How might people currently exercising free movement rights 
be affected? 27 June 2016 
CBP 6455, EU budget and the UK's contribution, 27 June 2016 
Referendum 
CBP 7678, Referendum campaign literature, 8 August 2016 
CBP 7249, European Union Referendum Bill 2015-16: Progress of the Bill, 7 July 2015. 
CBP 5923, Overseas voters, 4 July 2016 
CBP 7639, Analysis of the EU Referendum results 2016, 29 June 2016 
CBP 7212, European Union Referendum Bill 2015-16, 3 June 2015  
CBP 7486, The EU referendum campaign, 27 January 2016 
CBP 7220, Reading list on UK-EU relations 2013-16: reform, renegotiation, 
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2. Trade relations 
2.1 How does it work at the moment?  
EU Member States are part of a customs union, with no tariffs on goods moving between 
them and a common tariff applied to goods entering from outside the EU. Member States 
cannot operate independent trade policies, for instance by pursuing bilateral free trade 
agreements with non-EU countries.  Instead, external trade relationships are co-ordinated 
at EU level through the Common Commercial Policy (CCP). The EU Trade Commissioner 
acts as the negotiator in multilateral and bilateral trade talks, with the EU Council 
(ministers from the Member States) and European Parliament making certain formal 
decisions regarding the commencement and mandate for the negotiations, and approving 
their final result. The EU recently concluded a trade agreement with Canada and is 
currently negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the 
US.10 
The principle of free trade in services between EU Member States (i.e. that businesses 
should be free to provide services within the EU, either on a cross-border basis or through 
establishing in the countries of their choosing) is also enshrined in the EU Treaties.  
The previous Government noted that less progress had been made in the Single Market 
for services compared with that for goods:  
Services make a very important contribution to the overall EU economy but the trade 
in services within the Single Market is much less integrated than that of goods. 
Notwithstanding the fact that services are typically less tradable than goods, evidence 
submitted to this review attributes this underperformance of the single market in 
services to a number of factors, but particularly to poor implementation of the 
Services Directive, with national restrictions remaining as barriers to trade.11 
The Prime Minister made clear in his statement on the outcome of the referendum that 
there would be no immediate change to these arrangements: “Let me stress that nothing 
changes in the UK’s trading relations with Europe until we actually leave the European 
Union”.12 He emphasised this point: “The true position is that as long as we are in this 
organisation—until we exit—all the rules about trade, services, financial passports and 
access to markets do not change”.13 
2.2 Statistics on UK-EU trade 
Taken as a group, the EU is by far the UK’s most important trading partner. In 2015 it 
accounted for 44% of UK goods and services exports (£222 billion) and 53% of UK 
imports (£291 billion). These figures are shown in the chart and table below.14  
                                                                                             
10  Further information on TTIP is in The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Commons Library 
Standard Note 6688, 4 December 2015. 
11  HM Government, Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union, The Single Market: Free Movement of Services, June 2014, p6. 
12  HC Deb 27 June 2016 c32 
13  HC Deb 27 June 2016 c38-9 
14  ONS Statistical Bulletin, Balance of Payments Jan to Mar 2016, 30 June 2016, Tables B and C. 




These estimates take no account of the ‘Rotterdam effect’. This is the argument that UK 
trade with the EU is overstated by these figures. The UK does a large amount of trade 
with the Netherlands, some of which may ultimately be with countries outside the EU but 
recorded as EU trade. There are no official estimates of how big this effect might be and, 
even making allowance for it, the EU is still the UK’s largest trading partner by a large 
margin.15 
The UK imports more from the EU than it exports to it. In 2015, the UK’s deficit on trade 
in goods and services with the EU was £69 billion, while the surplus with non-EU countries 
was £30 billion. The chart below shows the UK balance of trade since 1999 with EU and 
                                                                                             
15  There is more information on the Rotterdam effect and more detailed statistics on UK trade with the EU in 











UK trade with EU and non-EU countries





UK trade with EU and non-EU countries 2015
Goods and services
Exports Imports Balance 
£ billion % £ billion % £ billion
EU 222 44% 291 53% -69
Non-EU 288 56% 258 47% +30
Total 510 100% 549 100% -39
Source: ONS Balance of Payments Stat Bulletin, 30 Jun 2016, Tables B & C




The share of UK exports going to the EU has declined in recent years. In 2002 the EU 
accounted for 55% of UK exports. This had fallen to 44% by 2015. The share of UK 
imports from the EU declined from 58% in 2002 to 50% in 2011, before increasing 
slightly to 53% in 2015. 
 
2.3 Scenarios for EU exit 
Introduction 
The UK’s new trading relationship with the EU will be the product of negotiation. There 
are a number of different options. These range from membership of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) to trading under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. The EEA 
option would be the closest to EU membership while the WTO option would be the 
biggest break. Most economic analyses published before the referendum found that the 
EEA option would do the least harm to the UK economy, with the WTO option having the 
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The renegotiation of the UK’s trading relationship with the EU will require a number of 
considerations to be balanced. These include access to the single market, free movement 
of people, contributions to the EU budget, the extent to which the UK needs to adopt EU 
rules and the extent of UK influence over those rules. According to a document published 
by the Government before the referendum, “none of the alternative relationships to full 
EU membership offer full access to the Single Market”.16  The EU has said that access to 
the single market depends on accepting all four freedoms – including free movement of 
labour. It has said that “there will be no single market ‘a la carte.’”17  
Theresa May has said the UK’s future relationship with the EU will not necessarily be 
based on the models that already exist.18 
EU exit without a free trade agreement  
Tariff barriers  
The principle of non-discrimination requires WTO members not to treat any member less 
advantageously than any other: grant one country preferential treatment, and the same 
must be done for everyone else. There are exceptions for regional free trade areas and 
customs unions like the EU, but the principle implies that, outside of these, the tariff that 
applies to the ‘most-favoured nation’ (MFN) must similarly apply to all.  
In practice, this would prevent discriminatory or punitive tariffs being levied by either the 
EU on the UK, or vice versa. The maximum tariff would be that applied to the MFN. The 
EU’s MFN tariff has generally fallen over time, meaning that in this particular context the 
‘advantage’ of membership has declined. In 2013 the EU’s trade weighted average MFN 
tariff was 2.3% for non-agricultural products.19 This is an average figure: tariffs on some 
individual products are much higher, however, especially on agricultural goods. The EU 
tariff on cars, for example, is 10%. The average EU tariff on sugars and confectionery is 
nearly 30% and on beverages and tobacco over 20%.20 
However, given that MFN tariffs would be imposed on many of the UK’s goods exports to 
the EU, it would necessarily mean many exporters becoming less price competitive, to 
varying degrees, than their counterparts operating within the remaining EU, and those in 
countries with which the EU has preferential trading relationships.  
The UK would also need to decide the level of tariffs on imports into the UK. Under WTO 
rules, the UK would not be able to discriminate between imports from different countries. 
At the moment, it is not clear whether the UK could simply “inherit” the EU tariff and 
apply these to UK imports (including those from the EU). 21 Setting the level of tariffs 
would involve a trade-off between lower prices for domestic consumers on the one hand, 
and bargaining power in future trade negotiations on the other. Setting relatively high 
tariffs would increase prices for consumers but give a bargaining chip in future 
negotiations. Eliminating or setting low tariffs would tend to reduce prices, but give 
trading partners little incentive to reduce their tariffs in any future negotiations.     
The WTO option would impose the fewest obligations on the UK. There is no requirement 
to implement EU legislation, although UK businesses would still have to comply with EU 
                                                                                             
16  HM Government, Alternatives to membership: possible models for the united Kingdom outside the 
European Union, March 2016, p11. 
17  Remarks by President Donald Tusk after the informal meeting of 27 EU heads of state or government, 29 
June 2016. 
18  UKpolitics.org.uk, Theresa May press statement in Slovakia, 30 July 2016. 
19  World Trade Organization, WTO Tariff Profiles 2015, page 75. 
20  HM Government, Alternatives to membership; possible models for the United Kingdom outside the 
European Union, March 2016, p36, based on WTO data. 
21  Brexit: Silence from leave camp leaves options in the air”, Financial Times, 27 June 2016. 
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rules in order to export to the Single Market. Under the WTO option, there would be no 
obligation to accept free movement of people or make a contribution to the EU Budget. 
The WTO option would give the UK no say over EU decisions.22  
Before the referendum, Roberto Azevedo, the Director-General of the WTO, warned that 
the UK would face “tortuous negotiations” over the terms of its WTO membership. He 
said “pretty much all of the UK’s trade [with the world] would somehow have to be 
negotiated”. The UK joined the WTO as a member of the EU and Mr Azevedo said the UK 
would not be allowed simply to cut and paste those terms. The WTO has never been 
through this kind of negotiation with an existing member and even the procedures for 
doing so are unclear.23 
Non-tariff barriers  
Non-tariff barriers to trade refer to a range of measures that have the effect of reducing 
imports, either intentionally or unintentionally. They include anti-dumping measures that 
prevent goods being exported at a price below production cost (usually by the application 
of an additional duty), and product standards, such as labelling, packaging and sanitary 
requirements. Support to domestic producers and export subsidies, such as those provided 
under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), can also be interpreted as non-tariff barriers 
since they inhibit market access by foreign producers on equal terms. In the context of 
falling tariff barriers, such non-tariff measures have become more widely used as a means 
to protect domestic producers from foreign competition.  
The terms of WTO agreements limit the circumstances in which such measures can be 
applied, and in particular uphold the principle of non-discrimination that would prohibit 
punitive measures against the UK. Many of the EU’s anti-dumping measures are against 
China and other Asian countries. Few are against other advanced Western countries.24 
Just as important in a trade context, however, are the standards required of products 
imported from outside the EU. All UK businesses must comply with these standards 
already, although as in other areas of regulation, withdrawal raises the prospect of costly 
divergences between the UK and EU product standards. On the other hand, some 
proponents of withdrawal argue that leaving the EU would mean only exporters to the EU 
would have to be bound by the EU’s product standards, leaving other businesses free to 
operate under a UK regime.  
Services trade  
Without further negotiation, the UK’s trade in services with the EU would be governed by 
the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Under this agreement, EU 
Member States (and other parties to the agreement) have chosen which sectors they are 
prepared to liberalise, and the timescale over which they wish to do so. As with trade in 
goods, GATS also operates on the principle of non-discrimination, meaning broadly that 
outside preferential agreements, restrictions on market access must be applied uniformly 
across all countries.  
Barriers to services trade are usually in the form of non-tariff barriers, such as domestic 
laws and regulations, also known as ‘behind the border’ measures. In general, services 
markets are more highly regulated than the market for goods. Often, regulation is 
intended to meet social objectives, or to correct failures in supply, rather than directly to 
                                                                                             
22  HM Government, Alternatives to membership; possible models for the United Kingdom outside the 
European Union, March 2016, paras 3.70-71. 
23  “WTO warns on tortuous Brexit trade talks”, Financial Times, 25 May 2016. 
24  European Commission, Anti-dumping, Anti-Subsidy Statistics covering first 11 months of 2015, November 
2015. 
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restrict foreign suppliers, but the effect on market access for foreign companies can in 
some cases be highly restrictive. EU Member States retain considerable national discretion 
over services regulation and supervision. Just as a fully level playing field in services trade 
does not exist within the EU, so exporters from outside the EU face different levels of 
market access in individual Member States. However, the level of market access would 
generally be far more limited for UK exporters under a GATS arrangement than it is 
currently.   
As well as affecting cross-border trade in services, these restrictions could also have 
implications for UK companies providing services through a commercial presence 
(effectively outward direct investment) in other Member States.25 The EU Treaties require 
that a service provider from one Member State be legally free to establish in another, 
while continuing to be regulated by the authorities of its home country. A UK company 
that provides services through establishments in other Member States may find, when the 
UK is no longer a member of the EU, that it has to comply with the requirements of a 
foreign regulatory authority.  
EU exit under a negotiated arrangement  
Beyond the MFN position, there are a host of more preferential trade arrangements 
between the EU and UK that may be negotiated. For example, the UK might be able to 
negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU.26 A free trade agreement would be 
likely to mean less access to the Single Market but also fewer obligations in terms of 
accepting free movement of people and making a contribution to the EU budget. 
Exporters to the Single Market must comply with its rules.27 Unlike a customs union, an 
FTA would allow the UK to set its own tariffs on trade with countries outside the FTA. 
It remains to be seen how keen the rest of EU is to enter into an FTA with the UK, or what 
the terms of such an agreement might be. A comprehensive economic and trade 
agreement between the UK and the EU would need the agreement of all EU Member 
States’ governments (and some parliaments of EU Member States).28 The UK is, however, 
an important market for the rest of the EU.  In 2014 18 of the other 27 EU Member States 
had a trade surplus with the UK. Germany’s surplus was £25 billion. These commercial 
considerations might lead to pressure for a UK-EU FTA. Also, negotiations would start 
from a position of close integration between the EU and the UK. The aim of the 
negotiations would be to loosen this to some extent. As the Treasury Committee noted, 
this is different from most trade negotiations which aim to increase economic co-
operation.29 On the other hand, some EU countries may have domestic political incentives 
to drive a hard bargain with the UK to disadvantage anti-EU parties in their own countries.   
There is, however, likely to be a trade-off between the level of access to the Single Market 
(i.e. freedom from tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade), and freedom from EU product 
regulations, social and employment legislation, and budgetary contributions.  
                                                                                             
25  This is recognised as a form of services ‘trade’ under GATS, but is not measured in trade statistics, which 
are intended to record cross-border trade.  
26  Other European trade groups, such as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European 
Economic Area (EEA) are discussed in Commons Briefing Paper 7214, Brexit: some legal and constitutional 
issues and alternatives to EU membership, 28 July 2016.  
27  HM Government, Alternatives to membership; possible models for the United Kingdom outside the 
European Union, March 2016, para 3.52. 
28  Treasury Committee, The economic and financial costs and benefits of the UK’s EU membership, HC 122, 
27 May 2016, para 141. 
29  Ibid, para 149. 
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Rules of origin  
Because the EU, as a customs union, operates with a common external tariff, goods 
entering from outside can travel freely within the Union once that tariff has been paid 
(e.g. a mobile phone imported into the UK from China can be re-exported to the rest of 
the EU tariff free). The same is not true of goods that enter the EU via the EEA (e.g. a 
mobile phone from China re-exported to the EU from Norway) or via other countries with 
which the EU has a free or preferential trading relationship, because they do not share the 
EU’s common external tariff. Determining where a good originated, and hence whether it 
should attract tariffs, is done through the EU’s Rules of Origin. Given the complexity of 
some global supply chains and the range of preferential trading relationships the EU 
operates, this can be a difficult, time-consuming and often subjective process.30 The costs 
of rules of origin were discussed in research published alongside the Coalition 
Government’s Balance of Competences Review: 
With the UK as a customs union member within the European Union, British firms are 
saved the compliance and administrative costs linked to proving the origin of products 
shipped in the European market. With the UK instead taking direct control over its 
external trade policies, and so operating outside the customs union, rules of origin 
would become necessary under free trade with the customs union. This means British 
firms would be exposed to a combination of administrative and compliance costs 
linked to rules or origin, ranging (based on existing estimates) from 4 percent to 
perhaps 15 percent of the cost of goods sold. For low tariff products, it is therefore 
likely that firms would instead simply opt to pay the common external tariff of the EU, 
and so avoid costs linked to rules of origin. This means that, for low tariff products, 
there would be very little difference between no trade agreement, and one involving 
free trade combined with rules of origin.31 
Anti-dumping and other non-tariff barriers  
Were the UK in the EEA or if it adopted the Swiss model, goods would still be susceptible 
to anti-dumping action by the EU; for instance, in 2005, the EU imposed a 16% duty on 
Norwegian salmon. Membership of the EEA or the negotiation of bilateral agreements 
analogous to those in Switzerland would also require the UK to continue to adopt EU 
product standards (and other regulations) across the whole economy.  
Implications of EU exit for trade relationships outside the EU  
As mentioned above, the UK exports more to non-EU countries than to EU Member States 
and the share of non-EU countries is rising. The UK’s trade relations with countries outside 
the EU are therefore particularly important. 
The EU has negotiated an array of preferential trade agreements with other countries (see 
box below).32 In addition, negotiations for a trade and investment agreement with Canada 
have been completed, although this has still to be ratified. The EU is also negotiating 
seven bilateral trade and investment agreements (with the US, Japan, the Philippines, 
India, Mercosur - a trading bloc made up of a number of South American countries - 
Morocco and Tunisia). Bilateral investment treaties are being negotiated with China and 
Burma. The EU is also involved in two “plurilateral” negotiations: the Trade in Services 
Agreement and the Environmental Goods Agreement.33 
 
                                                                                             
30  In very simple terms, origin is determined on the principle of goods being wholly obtained in the exporting 
country, or substantially transformed there. 
31  Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), Trade and Investment: Balance of Competence Review, 
Project Report, November 2013, p58. 
32  Map of EU trade agreements. 
33  PQ HL601 21 June 2016 
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List of countries with which the EU has Free Trade Agreements 
Mexico, Chile, Peru, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Lebanon, Syria, FYR Macedonia, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Switzerland, 
Korea, Antigua, Barbuda, Belize, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, 
Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Colombia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Guatemala, Papua New Guinea, South Africa, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zimbabwe, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Fiji, Cameroon, Georgia, 
Moldova, Ukraine, EU Customs Union (Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, Turkey), EEA (Norway, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein).34 
 
A number of opinions have been put forward on what will happen to these agreements 
now that the UK has voted to leave the EU. For example, in evidence to the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Sir Alan Dashwood QC, Emeritus Professor of European Law, Cambridge 
University, said: 
Take the example … of the free trade agreement with South Korea, which has been 
very favourable to the UK. […]. The UK will not be able to—well, it could not—stay as 
a part. Although it is a free trade agreement, it is still a mixed agreement because it 
goes a little further than the core area of the common commercial policy. 
Nevertheless, I don’t believe that the UK could retain the rights and obligations that 
apply to it under the agreement. We would have to renegotiate … 35 
The issue was also raised in evidence to the Treasury Committee. Philippe Legrain (LSE 
European Institute) and Simon Tilford (Centre for European Reform) were both of the 
opinion that the agreements would all need to be renegotiated. Roger Bootle (Capital 
Economics), however, was not sure that this was the case and said the Committee should 
investigate the matter further.36 
Also in evidence to the Treasury Committee, the then Chancellor, George Osborne, said 
that in the event of Brexit the UK would no longer be party to some of the EU’s trade 
agreements with other countries. He said: 
those who advocate our exit, without setting out to try to improve arrangements as 
they are, need to explain what the alternative is, not just support for farmers, but also 
the trade agreements that the EU has signed with numerous other countries, some of 
which we would not be party to if we exited from the European Union.37 
A paper by the Institute of Economic Affairs took a different view: 
As a WTO Member and signatory of the EU’s Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) in its own 
right, the UK will continue to be bound by these obligations and should expect other 
countries to reciprocate. 
The UK, like all other EU Member States, is a member in its own right of the WTO. 
Though currently its tariffs and services obligations are incorporated in the schedules 
for the EU, they would still stand as an obligation on the UK if the country exited the 
                                                                                             
34  Source: HM Government, Alternatives to membership; possible models for the United Kingdom outside 
the European Union, March 2016, p45 (based on European Commission data) 
35  Foreign Affairs Committee, Costs and benefits of EU membership for the UK’s role in the world, HC 545, 
Q219 Q217 
36  Treasury Committee, The economic and financial costs and benefits if UK membership of the EU, 27 
October 2015, HC 499, Qq47-51 
37  Treasury Committee, The economic and financial costs and benefits if UK membership of the EU, 1 
December 2015, HC 499, Q372 
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EU. Similarly, the UK signs and ratifies EU trade agreements in its own right, even 
though all negotiation is done by the Commission.38 
The Treasury Committee’s conclusion on this issue was as follows: 
Were the UK to leave the EU, it is very uncertain whether it would be able to continue 
to participate in these agreements. The extent to which the UK would have to enter 
into negotiations to ensure its continued participation would probably depend on the 
attitude of the contracting parties, about which little is known.39 
Unless the UK provided the same level of access to its market as under the current 
arrangements, there is a possibility that the EU would have to pay compensation to the 
affected countries with which it has a trade agreement, as a result of the ‘shrinking’ of the 
market from what was originally agreed. This concern was raised by the European 
Commission in 1983 in the run-up to Greenland’s departure from the EU:  
The free trade agreements concluded by the Community with the EFTA countries, 
which at present enjoy exemption from customs duties and free access without 
quantitative restrictions to the Greenland market, would automatically cease to apply 
to Greenland. The question whether the Community would have to negotiate with its 
partners compensation for the rights and benefits which those countries would lose as 
a result of the 'shrinking' of the Community would not arise if the same rights and 
benefits were granted by Greenland.40 
Any negotiated solution may therefore require the UK to maintain consistency in its trade 
treatment with countries outside the EU, thereby limiting the extent of trade policy 





                                                                                             
38  Iain Mansfield, A Blueprint for Britain: Openness not Isolation, Winner Brexit Prize, 2014, p14 and footnote 
16. 
39  Treasury Committee, The economic and financial costs and benefits of the UK’s EU membership, HC 122, 
27 May 2016, para 226. 
40  European Commission (1983) Status of Greenland: Commission opinion, COM (83) 66 final, Annex A, 
p.22. 
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3. Other economic impacts  
The following sections consider the impact of withdrawal in areas of the economy where 
EU membership currently has the most obvious impact. These include foreign direct 
investment (FDI), the UK’s contribution to the EU Budget, the effect of immigration on the 
labour market and the impact on business. 
3.1 Foreign direct investment  
Broadly speaking, foreign direct investment (FDI) became part of the EU’s Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) under the 2009 Lisbon Treaty.41 The EU has exclusive 
competence over the CCP, meaning that only it, and not the Member States, has the 
power to act in this area.42 
Statistical context  
The UK is a major recipient of inward FDI and also an important investor in overseas 
economies. The UK had the third highest stock of inward FDI in the world in 2014, behind 
the US and China.43 
In 2014 EU countries accounted for just under half the stock of FDI in the UK (£496 billion 
out of a total of £1,034 billion, 48%).44 This compares with 24% from the US and 28% 
from other countries. The share accounted for by the EU has fluctuated between 47% 
and 53% over the last decade. In terms of UK investment abroad, the EU accounted for 
40% of the total stock of UK FDI in 2014.45 
 
Implications of exit  
FDI is important to the economy. As the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) explains: 
Foreign direct investment directly increases national income and can also have 
subsequent beneficial impacts on productivity levels. Investments made in the UK by 
                                                                                             
41  There is a discussion of EU Competence over FDI and the arguments about how far this extends in Chapter 
2 of the Government’s Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union: Trade and Investment, February 2014. 
42  Ibid. 
43  UK Trade and Investment, Inward Investment Report 2014/15, p4. 
44  ONS Statistical Bulletin, Foreign Direct Investment Involving UK Companies 2014, 3 December 2015. 
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entities or companies outside of the UK can raise productivity through bringing new 
ideas and approaches (which may spill over to other firms) or simply being productive 
themselves and raising the overall average.46 
Membership of the EU is one of many factors which may attract foreign investment to the 
UK. The Treasury Committee report explains this as follows: 
Membership might act as a draw for inward investment to the UK because it allows 
multinationals based outside the EU to access EU markets without facing tariff and 
non-tariff barriers. For similar reasons, companies headquartered elsewhere in the EU 
can bring UK-based operations into their supply chain at a lower cost.47  
The IFS points out that the EU does not restrict movement of capital, which might make it 
easier for EU countries to invest in the UK. Exiting the EU might affect future flows of 
investment into the UK or the existing stock of investment, if, for example, a UK HQ was 
relocated overseas.48 
However, many other factors besides EU membership may affect foreign investors. These 
other factors include: the UK’s flexible labour market, the skills of the UK labour force, 
political stability, the rule of law, language, openness of the UK economy, the UK’s 
relaxed attitude towards foreign ownership of assets.49 These reasons for investing in the 
UK will continue even when the UK has left the EU. 
The Treasury Committee concluded that EU membership did help to attract inward 
investment. The Treasury Committee did not attempt to quantify the negative impact of 
Brexit on FDI, saying it would depend on a range of factors: 
How far FDI was negatively affected by Brexit would depend both on the extent of 
market access that the UK negotiated on leaving the EU, and how far it was able to 
increase its attractiveness to foreign investors by changing its regulatory framework 
and striking trade deals with non-EU countries. It is beyond the scope of this report 
accurately to assess or predict the size of the impact.50 
Outside the EU, the UK may be able to establish a regulatory regime more favourable to 
overseas investors that could offset the effect of its departure. In particular, the UK would 
regain competence to negotiate international agreements on foreign direct investment 
with other countries, something which it has not been able to do since the Lisbon treaty 
entered into force in 2009. 
3.2 EU Budget contributions 
The UK will continue to contribute to the EU Budget until it 
departs the EU 
Whilst the UK remains a member of the EU, until the day of its departure, it will continue 
to contribute to the EU Budget. Following a negotiated departure, the UK may still make 
contributions to the EU Budget.  
Any future contributions will depend on what arrangements are agreed for the UK’s 
relationship with the EU after leaving. EEA Members, for example, contribute to the EU 
Budget, so if the UK joins the EEA, it is likely to pay into the EU Budget. There is more on 
                                                                                             
46  IFS, Brexit and the UK’s public finances, IFS Report 116, May 2016 p39. 
47  Treasury Committee, The economic and financial costs and benefits of the UK’s EU membership, HC 122, 
27 May 2016, para 205. 
48  IFS, Brexit and the UK’s public finances, IFS Report 116, May 2016 p40. 
49  Treasury Committee, The economic and financial costs and benefits of the UK’s EU membership, HC 122, 
27 May 2016, paras 206-7. 
50  Ibid, paras 213. 
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alternatives to EU membership the Library briefing Brexit: some legal and constitutional 
issues and alternatives to EU membership, 28 July 2016. 
The UK’s contribution 
The UK’s budgetary contribution to the EU is one of the more quantifiable costs of its 
membership. Net of receipts under the Common Agricultural Policy, EU regional funding, 
and the Budget rebate, the Government contributed an estimated £8.5 billion to the EU in 
2015, around 1% of total public expenditure and equivalent to 0.5% of GDP.51 
The EU’s Budget is used to pay for policies carried out at a European level, including 
agricultural subsidies via the CAP, regional funding to assist poorer parts of the EU, 
research, and some aid to developing countries. 
The basis for budgeting in the EU is a financial framework set for a period of years. The 
current framework runs from 2014 to 2020 and was agreed in 2013. The framework sets 
out annual expenditure ceilings, and allocates spending to broad priorities. A separate but 
concurrently negotiated decision sets out the limits and sources of revenue for the Budget. 
Year-to-year expenditure and revenue are set through an annual budgeting process that 
takes place within the limits set by the financial framework. 
Contributions by Member States to the Budget consist of four elements, called ‘own 
resources’. These are described in more detail in Commons Briefing Paper EU budget and 
the UK's contribution. By far the most important element, accounting for around 75% of 
total revenue, are GNI-based contributions, which are calculated by taking the same 
proportion of each Member State’s Gross National Income (0.7481% in 2015).52  
Around 6% of the EU’s budget is spent on administration and a further 5% on the EU’s 
foreign policies, international development, and pre-accession aid. The remainder is 
redistributed back to Member States in the form of agricultural and regional funding. 
Depending on its standard of living in relation to the EU average, and depending on the 
size of its agricultural sector, a Member State may get more or less back than they ‘put in’. 
In 2014, 10 of the EU Member States, including the UK, were net contributors to the 
Budget. Per capita, contributions ranged from net receipts of €569 in Hungary to net 
contributions of €378 in the Netherlands. The UK’s per capita contribution was €110.53 
The UK has been a net contributor to the EU Budget in 42 out of its 43 years of 
membership (the exception being 1975), contributing a total of £496 billion in real terms 
gross, and £177 billion net of receipts and the budget rebate. The chart below illustrates 
the trends in the UK’s contribution since it joined. The UK has received an abatement, or 
rebate, on its budget contribution since 1985, worth £4.9 billion in 2015 and £116 billion 
(in real terms) since it was first agreed;54 this was originally negotiated due to the high 
proportion of EU expenditure that went towards the CAP, and consequently benefitted 
the UK, with its smaller farming sector, less than other Member States. Details of the UK’s 
contribution since accession are shown in the chart.55 
                                                                                             
51  HM Treasury Annual Statement on EU Finances 2014; Office for Budget Responsibility Public Finances 
Databank Table 4.1; ONS National Accounts Series YBHA. 
52  OJ L 69, 13 March 2015, Chapter 1.4. 
53  European Commission Interactive: EU expenditure and revenue. These figures exclude Luxembourg as 
administrative expenditure significantly effects their figures.  
54  Before this, refunds to the UK were negotiated annually. 
55  All statistics in this paragraph and the chart are based on HM Treasury European Union Finances (various 
editions). 
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3.3 Immigration and the labour market 
Possible changes to immigration rules following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU would 
be likely to impact upon businesses and the economy. 
Currently, the UK is unable to impose limits on immigration from within the EU, as the 
free movement of labour, one of the four fundamental principles of the EU, entitles 
citizens of Member States and their families to reside and work anywhere in the EU. This 
right also applies to citizens of EEA Member States not part of the EU, and Switzerland.56  
Should the UK wish to remain in the Single Market but outside the EEA, it would probably 
have to accept certain EU rules. Whether these would include the free movement of 
people would depend on the outcome of UK-EU negotiations. If the UK did not sign up to 
the free movement of people principle, it could impose its own controls on EU/EEA 
immigration as it currently does on non-EU/EEA nationals.57  
The extent to which employers are affected by controls on EU/EEA immigration will 
depend on the new rules. If the Government wishes to introduce a more restrictive 
immigration system for EU/EEA nationals, one option would be to simply extend current 
rules for non-EU/EEA nationals to all non-UK nationals. This would largely restrict 
economic migration to high-skilled migrants (via a points-based system) and reduce the 
flow of migrant workers doing low-skilled jobs. 
The Social Market Foundation estimates that if EEA employees had to meet the visa 
requirements that currently apply to non-EEA workers, only 12% of EEA employees 
currently working in the UK would qualify.58 The London Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (LCCI) has previously warned of the possibility of labour shortages in such a 
scenario: 
                                                                                             
56  Subject to a few exceptions and the possibility of transitional arrangements for new EU members (such as 
Bulgaria and Romania). 
57  Irish nationals may be affected differently from other EU/EEA nationals in this scenario as they have a 
special status in UK immigration and nationality law that predates EU membership. 
58  N Broughton, N Keohane and T Ketola, Working Together? The impact of the EU referendum on UK 
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Such an approach could lead to a shortage of low- and high-skilled workers that a lot 
of businesses are dependent on, affecting the economy and businesses’ ability to 
trade both nationally and internationally.59 
A more restrictive system would also place an additional burden on businesses recruiting 
workers from the EU, who would have to spend time arranging visas and ensuring they 
complied with immigration rules. Employers may be able to compensate by recruiting 
more UK nationals, but this would depend on the extent to which they are able to find 
workers with the same skills and are able to attract workers from a smaller pool of 
potential recruits. The Federation of Small Businesses highlighted access to skills as a key 
concern for small business in a letter to then Cabinet Office Minister Oliver Letwin 
following the referendum:  
Free movement of people has enabled small firms to access the skills they need, 
shoring up the UK’s ever growing skills gap and retaining our competitive advantage. 
Without the need to engage with the UK’s costly and complex immigration system, 
small firms have been able to hire from an EU wide talent pool, and to obtain low 
skilled labour, a category currently excluded from the UK’s immigration system.60 
Whatever the change in policy, the impact would likely be felt most strongly in sectors 
which currently employ a higher share of EU migrants in their workforce (even assuming 
existing EU workers can continue to work in the UK as before), as they might be more 
likely to hire EU workers in the future.61 Impacts would also be likely to vary by geography: 
areas such as London with relatively high concentrations of workers from elsewhere in the 
EU are more likely to be affected than areas with low shares of EU workers.  
The sectors with the highest proportion of workers from other EU countries are 
accommodation and food services (13% at Q1 2016 – see table below) and 
manufacturing (10%). The sector with the lowest share of EU workers is public 
administration and defence (3%), while EU workers also form a relatively small proportion 
of the total workforce in education (5%) and health and social work (5%).  
                                                                                             
59  LCCI, Help or hindrance? The value of EU membership to London business, April 2013, p23. 
60  Letter from Mike Cherry FSB Chairman to Rt Hon Oliver Letwin MP, 5 July 2016. 
61  The immigration status of existing EU migrants in the UK would have to be resolved at the time of EU 
withdrawal. Sudden large scale expulsions of EU workers from the UK would cause large-scale disruption 
to businesses that employed them. 
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3.4 Business 
The EU has various powers that affect businesses directly. Through successive EU Treaty 
amendments, the policy areas in which the EU has competence to legislate have been 
gradually expanded, although the volume of new ‘hard’ law (regulations and directives) 
emanating from the EU has declined from a peak in the early 1980s.   
New EU aims and areas of activity, for example in social protection and sustainable 
development, have raised concerns about the impact of EU membership on business and 
the wider economy. Regulation in these areas, some argue, has little to do with the EU’s 
founding purpose of establishing a common market between Member States, imposing 
burdens that offset the trade benefits of membership. 
EU powers 
The EU legislates in a number of areas that impact directly on businesses. These include: 
• Product specifications, e.g. Directive 2000/36/EC on cocoa and chocolate products 
intended for human consumption 
• Competition, e.g. Council Regulation 139/2004 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings (also known as the merger regulation) 
• Employment terms, e.g. Directive 2008/104/EC on temporary agency work 
• Health and safety, e.g. Directive 2009/148/EC on exposure to asbestos at work 
• Consumer protection, e.g. Directive 93/13/EC on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts. 











Accommodation & food services 222 13%
Admin & support services 135 9%
Transport & storage 141 9%
Information & communication 97 8%
Finance & insurance 90 7%
Professional, scientific & technical 147 7%
Wholesale & retail 261 6%
Health & social work 225 5%
Education 159 5%
Arts, recreation & other services 77 5%
Public admin & defence 56 3%
Total 2,197 7%
Source: ONS Labour Force Survey microdata, January-March 2016
Employment of people born elsewhere in EU working in 
the UK, by industry, Q1 2016
Note: Total includes agriculture, extraction and utility sectors not listed in the 
table. Arts, recreation & other services includes Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes R and S.
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Specific areas are discussed in more detail elsewhere in this paper.   
Costs and benefits of regulation to business 
There is no definitive picture of the overall costs and benefits of EU regulation on 
businesses in the UK.    
Various studies have attempted to estimate the total cost of EU law using impact 
assessments prepared by the Government.  These estimate the potential costs and 
benefits associated with particular measures, generally ahead of implementation. In the 
UK, impact assessments are usually published in response to EU Directives (where the 
Government will have some discretion over how EU requirements will be transposed into 
national law), but not Regulations or Decisions, which do not trigger a new piece of 
domestic legislation.  
Costs come from administrative burdens on companies (e.g. notifying the authorities 
about the possible presence of asbestos dust before commencing work) and from the 
additional practical obligations of putting the policy of the regulation into practice (e.g. 
providing employees who may come into contact with asbestos with relevant training). 
There may also be wider consequences arising from regulation, though these are less 
often quantified; benefits to groups other than businesses tend to be less often estimated.   
In one study of impact assessments, Open Europe estimated that the cost to the economy 
of the 100 “most burdensome” EU regulations that could be analysed was £33.3 billion a 
year. The associated benefits were estimated as £58.6 billion a year in total, but Open 
Europe claimed that certain of the largest of these regulations had had their benefits 
vastly over-stated.  The individual measures with the highest recurring costs were the UK 
Renewable Energy Strategy (£4.7 billion a year), the Capital Requirements Directive IV 
package for banking (£4.6 billion a year) and the Working Time Directive (£4.2 billion a 
year).62  
A sense of the costs solely from more recent EU regulation can be found in the UK impact 
assessments checked by the independent Regulatory Policy Committee.  In 2013 and 
2014, they found that £1.6 billion per year in net costs to business – costs minus benefits 
– came from two new pieces of regulation, the Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
Directive and the Bank and Recovery Resolution Directive, which were introduced to 
protect against financial systemic risk. Other EU measures led to an estimated total of 
£730 million per year in net costs on UK business, including £400 million from the Air 
Pollution from Shipping Directive.63 
The CBI have pointed to the negative effects on business of EU legislation, both 
individually and in total:  
… the impact of poorly thought-out and costly EU legislation is a major issue for 
businesses: 52% of businesses believe that, were the UK to leave the EU, the overall 
burden of regulation on their business would fall. Areas where UK firms are frustrated 
with EU regulation include labour market regulation, highlighted by nearly half of 
                                                                                             
62  Open Europe, Top 100 EU rules cost Britain £33.3.billion, 16 March 2015. See other sections of this 
briefing paper for more detailed discussions of individual policy areas.   
63  Regulatory Policy Committee, Securing the evidence base for regulation: Regulatory Policy Committee 
scrutiny during the 2010 to 2015 parliament, March 2015. 
 Note that these figures only cover impacts that have been checked by the Regulatory Policy Committee, 
that have an implementation date from 1 January 2013 onwards and that were submitted for scrutiny 
after October 2012.  They do not include “gold plating”, where the UK government goes beyond 
minimum EU requirements when implementing European legislation. 
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businesses as having had a negative impact – with particular frustrations around the 
Temporary Agency Workers Directive and Working Time Directive. 64 
According to the Federation of Small Businesses, regulations on employment, health and 
safety and data protection are said to be particularly burdensome for small businesses.65 
There is work to reduce business burden from EU regulations, some driven by the UK 
Government and others by the EU. 66 
It is worth noting that EU-level rules create benefits for British businesses, for example by 
removing barriers and creating common standards.  In November 2013, the CBI said that: 
Competitive and respected EU rules can also open up new markets to UK firms 
without having to duplicate standards as other regions often design their own rules 
around EU benchmarks. Despite frustrations, over half of CBI member companies 
(52%) say that they have directly benefitted from the introduction of common 
standards, with only 15% suggesting this had had a negative impact. 67 
UK withdrawal 
The Single Market was itself established through a vast legislative programme to remove 
technical and legal barriers to trade, and current models of non-EU access to the Single 
Market involve acceptance of associated EU law to some degree, often without a say in 
shaping it. There is more generally a trade-off between ‘national sovereignty’ and the sort 
of integration and harmonisation necessary to achieve completely free trade.  
If the UK withdrew completely from the EEA, and shunned bilateral negotiation on access 
to the Single Market, it would be free to regulate largely as it saw fit.  Because the 
Government would undoubtedly decide to retain the substance of at least some EU law, 
and because the costs of EU regulations are (at least partially) offset by benefits, the costs 
of regulation given above are emphatically not equivalent to the economic benefit of 
withdrawal.  Overall, regulation in the UK is already fairly favourable to business, relative 
to other countries.68  
Those in favour of withdrawal argue that the UK would be better able to balance the 
costs and benefits of regulation according to its own domestic priorities; and that it would 
be easier to amend the regulatory regime in response to changing circumstances.  
Whatever the future arrangement, businesses that export to the EU would still have to 
comply with many EU product standards. 
The argument over the effect of withdrawal in this context, then, boils down not to the 
size of the ‘burden’ on businesses, but to whether the benefits of having a more tailored 
and flexible national regulatory regime outweigh any loss of access to the Single Market 
that may come with pursuing an independent agenda. 
 
                                                                                             
64  CBI, Our Global Future – The Business Vision for a reformed EU, November 2013. A separate section of 
this briefing paper discusses EU influences on employment law. 
65  Federation of Small Businesses, FSB Manifesto European Elections 2014, February 2014. 
66  See for example:  
- BIS Press Release, Hancock hails boost to economy as UK cuts EU red tape, 6 November 2014;  
- European Commission, Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT): State of Play and 
Outlook, COM(2014)368, 18 June 2014. 
- European Commission, REFIT: Making EU law lighter, simpler and less costly, January 2016. 
67  CBI, Our Global Future – The Business Vision for a reformed EU, November 2013. 
68  Based on OECD, Indicators of Product Market Regulation 2013 – these figures measure the degree to 
which policies promote or inhibit competition in areas of the product market where competition is viable. 
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3.5 Public procurement 
Much UK public procurement is regulated by EU rules, which are set out in the core EU 
Treaties, in EU directives and in UK regulations that implement the directives.  These rules 
are controversial because they are often seen as overly bureaucratic and because they limit 
the ability of public bodies to ‘buy British’. They do, however, offer UK firms the 
opportunities to supply the public sectors of other countries, as well as making it easier for 
the UK public sector to reach a wider range of potential suppliers, potentially increasing 
value for money in its purchases.    
In practice, the extent of direct cross-border public procurement is limited.  An estimated 
1.3% of the value of larger UK public sector contracts was awarded directly abroad in 
2009-2011.  Some 0.8% of the value of larger public contracts secured by UK companies 
was directly from abroad.69  
Alternatives and withdrawal 
At present, the EU rules that apply to public procurement in the UK also apply to other 
EEA countries, under the EEA agreement.  Switzerland is subject to a separate 
arrangement.   
If the UK were to leave the EU and the EEA, it would ultimately need to decide whether it 
wanted agreements with other countries to mutually open up their public procurement 
markets.  This could be done through individual trade agreements, or the UK could 
participate as an individual country in the WTO’s General Procurement Agreement (GPA) 
for certain goods and services.  However, this would mean that the UK would have to 
allow suppliers in other countries to bid for some UK public procurement opportunities, 
and the WTO route would mean that the UK had to follow certain procedures in its 
procurement processes – potentially doing away with some of the reduction of burden 
that could follow from no longer having to apply the EU rules.70 
3.6 Financial services 
Background 
A huge amount of existing financial services regulation is derived from the EU. Because of 
its size and influence, the UK has frequently led reform of financial services, particularly 
since the financial crisis, with retrospective checking for alignment with EU requirements. 
Where it has not been ahead of the EU it has played a significant part in the 
determination of EU legislation.  The Commissioner for Financial Stability, Financial 
Services and Capital Markets Union was, until he resigned on 25 June 2016, Jonathan Hill, 
the ex-Conservative Minister in the former Coalition Government. 
The concern of the financial community and of UK regulators and the Government is not 
what changes they want to make to existing EU legislation; it is likely that a significant 
amount of this legislation would remain post-withdrawal, though not necessarily in the 
same form or to the same extent.  
                                                                                             
69  Source: Study for European commission, DG Internal Market and Services, SMEs' access to public 
procurement markets and aggregation of demand in the EU, February 2014. 
 Note that figures are for direct cross-border procurement only, where the single contractor or a leader of a 
joint bid is located in a different country. They are also restricted to procurement over certain values, 
where the EU procurement directives apply.    
70  Michael Bowsher QC’s blog on Procurement law after Brexit? (16 March 2016) is an interesting discussion 
of the issues and options for the future. 
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The issues now 
Although it is always well to remember that there can be conflicting interests in the ‘City’ 
– what suits a fund management firm may be of less concern to an insurance house - but 
there is a pretty broad consensus on what the main worry is: access.   
The primary concern, across all financial institutions, is the future status of the country in 
terms of access to the EU financial markets.  This is a concern for many parts of the 
economy, but for few can it be as critical as in financial services, where the universal 
requirement to be authorised places a premium on the ability of firms to have 
‘passporting’ rights to other jurisdictions (see below). 
Put simply, to function in EU countries, financial firms carrying out authorised activities 
have to be regulated.  If they are headquartered and regulated in one Member State, they 
can operate in and sell to, other Member States without getting authorisation from each 
one.  Hence, given its attractive location, the size and liquidity of its markets, the depth of 
skills and infrastructure, London is a very attractive place to establish an HQ if one is, for 
example, a large American bank.  With a UK authorisation, an American/Japanese/Chinese 
bank can establish operations in all other Member States.   
If the UK is outside the EU, it remains an attractive place to set up in, but it could mean 
that an overseas firm might need to choose between a centre with natural and historic 
advantages (London) and one with a regulatory advantage (EU).  Authorisation of a big 
organisation is a complex and costly matter and there is no certainty that firms would 
simply carry on as before with a main operation in London.   
This is called ‘passporting’.  The Bank of England described passporting in its booklet 
about EU membership: EU Membership and the Bank of England. 
A pro-market think tank, New Capital, set out the implications (from its pessimistic 
viewpoint) that City firms will generally be considering in the aftermath in a report, 
Beyond Brexit: what happens next for European capital markets?  In summary they 
include: 
1) Pulling the trigger: The decision by David Cameron not to pull the trigger on 
Article 50 means that capital markets will be in limbo for at least the next few months 
until a new government or Parliament start the clock on the formal two year process 
of leaving the EU. 
2) First mover advantage: Banks and asset management firms cannot afford to 
wait. They have to assume the worst case scenario of complete separation with no 
access to the single market and start the process of relocating legal entities, 
operations and staff immediately. 
3) Relocation, relocation, relocation: In order to future proof their business, banks, 
asset managers and other market participants will need to have a separately 
authorised subsidiary with a sufficient management presence inside the EU. Dublin, 
Frankfurt, Paris and other cities will be vying for that business. 
4) An acrimonious divorce (and a protracted custody battle): Most firms seem to 
be planning for an acrimonious divorce. While the divorce process itself may be 
reasonably swift, the separate negotiations to establish the terms of the future 
relationship between the UK and the EU will be slowed down by the competing 
domestic political imperatives in all 28 member states and could take years. […] 
6) A regulatory backlash?: Brexit could trigger a concerted regulatory backlash in 
the rest of the EU against elements of the single market and capital markets union 
that are seen to play to the UK’s advantage, such as the location of euro-
denominated clearing. 
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7) A loss of influence: Whatever the outcome, the UK will lose influence over the 
future direction and nature of EU regulation that it may have to implement. The 
departure of Lord Hill will significantly change the tone of the future regulatory 
dialogue. 
8) Equivalence vs divergence: In order to retain access to the single market from 
outside the EU, the UK would have to retain an ‘equivalent’ regulatory framework. 
While it would be equivalent on day one, over time changes to EU legislation may 
lead to costly regulatory divergence. 
9) The future of EU citizens: In some sectors of the capital markets EU27 citizens 
account for as much as a quarter of all staff in the UK. Assurances over their future 
legal status have so far been too vague to instil confidence [Note there have been 
several statements subsequent to this publication which have addressed this 
question]. […] 
The issue that it takes time (in years) for large organisations to complete authorisation and 
establish a new HQ abroad, and that this timetable appears to be at odds with the more 
‘slowly, slowly’ approach of some politicians and ministers, has been highlighted in several 
commentaries.  Few international offices seem prepared for a delay of indeterminate 
length before they begin to act. An article in the Financial Times71 estimates that there are 
about 70,000 overseas banks’ employees in London  
In terms of current issues, a large number of initiatives are being discussed at EU level, 
notably the Capital Markets Union and a wide review programme of the workings of the 
roughly 40 measures passed but only now being implemented.72  All of these will have an 
impact on the UK and work will continue on implementing these until such time as the UK 
is no longer in the EU.  
The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is the main regulator of financial conduct in the 
UK. On the day after the EU referendum it put out the following statement: 
The FCA is in very close contact with the firms we supervise as well as the Treasury, 
the Bank of England and other UK authorities, and we are monitoring developments 
in the financial markets.  
Much financial regulation currently applicable in the UK derives from EU legislation. 
This regulation will remain applicable until any changes are made, which will be a 
matter for Government and Parliament.  
Firms must continue to abide by their obligations under UK law, including those 
derived from EU law and continue with implementation plans for legislation that is still 
to come into effect.  
Consumers’ rights and protections, including any derived from EU legislation, are 
unaffected by the result of the referendum and will remain unchanged unless and 
until the Government changes the applicable legislation. 
The longer term impacts of the decision to leave the EU on the overall regulatory 
framework for the UK will depend, in part, on the relationship that the UK seeks with 
the EU in the future. We will work closely with the Government as it confirms the 
arrangements for the UK’s future relationship with the EU. 
An alternative relationship? 
There are various different models of interaction between non-EU Member States and the 
EU and it is not obvious which of these models, if any, would apply. A possibly informative 
comparator is the relationship between Switzerland and the EU. 
                                                                                             
71  Financial Times, 26 June 2016 
72  Details are in Commons Briefing Paper 7435, Financial Services European Aspects. 
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Financial services trade is an area that could be particularly affected by a ‘Swiss’ approach. 
Currently, non-EEA financial services providers must generally establish a subsidiary or 
branch in the EU in order to provide cross-border services. The precise requirements are 
currently a matter for national regulators in individual Member States, but developments 
in EU-level financial regulation, and in particular the forthcoming implementation of the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II), due to come into effect in January 
2017, make the provision of financial services to the EU from outside the EEA increasingly 
difficult.  A non-EU firm will still be able to incorporate an EU subsidiary, as now, but new 
rules will apply to the provision of services into the EU or through an EU branch. The new 
rules do not prevent a non-EU firm from providing services to EU clients or transacting 
with EU counterparties at the “own exclusive initiative” of a prospective EU 
client/counterparty.73  However, the requirements for registration, according to a briefing 
note by KPMG, will be “strict and difficult to fulfil”.74 
The 2013 study Switzerland’s Approach to EU Engagement notes that, to date, the Swiss 
have largely circumvented any disadvantages caused by non-EU/EEA membership by 
establishing subsidiaries within the EU, most notably in London, and where problems have 
arisen, they have benefited from a degree of EU ‘goodwill’. The study agrees that new EU 
financial regulation could put the sector under pressure:  
The prevailing situation now seems under threat, as the Swiss financial sector faces 
tougher EU rules on third country operations. These can be discriminatory. MiFID II is 
seen as creating new barriers for Swiss firms by forcing more of them to open (larger) 
subsidiaries in the EEA and to obtain authorisation from an EEA Member State in 
order to gain an ‘EU passport’.  
Hence, once the new EU legislation is fully in force and the four new supervisory 
agencies operational (the European Banking Agency, the European Securities and 
Markets Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and 
the European Systemic Risk Board), the problem for Swiss-based financial institutions 
will be two fold. First, to access the EU market, an equivalence certificate is needed. 
To obtain this, the Swiss authorities must demonstrate that not only are they able to 
supervise their own, but that they can also control EU-based businesses. Second, there 
are at least 20 different equivalence requirements in place, due to the (sub) sector 
specific approach of EU regulation. Both factors make obtaining equivalence a 
burdensome process.  
Hence, the financial industry in particular will be faced with a choice of fully adapting 
to EU standards, once they are in place, or simply being shut out of the EU market. 
The ‘letterbox’ provision in AIFMD, according to which hedge funds have to locate 
significant management functions in the EU, might have similarly far-reaching 
consequences. If Swiss firms can no longer provide cross-border services into the EU, 
this could be very damaging in terms of job losses, decreasing tax revenue and 
prestige. For example, unofficial estimates from the Swiss banking sector speak of up 
to 29,000 jobs that could be lost in this way.75  
Brexit might mean the UK will be in the position of participating in setting the new rules 
and negotiating a position to operate outside them. This would give the UK a different 
perspective from that of the Swiss, and given London’s enormous financial market, 
possibly a greater degree of ‘clout’. The study above notes “Swiss relationships with the 
EU are not a formal model and the Swiss approach does not lend itself to being readily 
replicated”.  
                                                                                             
73  Travers Smith Briefing, Financial Services and Markets MiFID II – A Short Introduction for Asset Managers, 
30 April 2015.  
74  KPMG, Provision of services by financial intermediaries from third countries in EU financial markets 
regulation, May 2015. 
75  University of Kent, Switzerland’s Approach to EU Engagement: a financial services perspective; April 2013. 
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The majority opinion of City firms has been that the UK should remain 
within the EU.  TheCityUK, a representative body of a range of London 
financial firms, said in a report in 2014: 
Given this environment, the new Commission’s strategy for a Capital 
Markets Union in Europe is highly significant and we strongly welcome it. 
This is a strategy which is in the vital interests of all twenty eight Member 
States. We believe there can be no question of opt-outs or exceptionalism. 
On the contrary, the City as Europe’s financial centre has a central role to 
play in working with the authorities both in Brussels and with the Member 
States to achieve a single capital market. London’s capital market is a 
European asset that benefits the whole EU.76 
TheCityUK accepted that there is a long way to go and that for a real 
single market in capital to exist, some surrendering of national control is 
inevitable: 
Much of the work required to fully realise a Capital Markets Union will be detailed 
and technical. For example, it will involve working to reduce the extent to which 
bankruptcy laws and procedures differ from one Member State to another. We are 
under no illusions about the complexity of the challenge: but we are convinced of its 
overwhelming importance. It will take many years to fully develop capital markets in 
Europe. There will be no overnight transformation of Europe’s growth 
prospects but the achievement of a single capital market would make the 
financial system more resilient in the event of another crisis. And there will 
be important policy decisions to be reached: it is inevitable that a real single 
capital market will need strong regulatory coordination at the EU level.77 
In written evidence to the Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards, Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan (as overseas investors) both 
noted the importance of EU membership to the UK financial services 
industry:  
We believe that a key risk to London’s retaining its status as a financial hub is an exit 
by the UK from the European Union. In common with financial institutions across the 
City our ability to provide services to clients and engage in investment activities 
throughout Europe is dependent on the passport that London-based firms enjoy to 
operate on a cross-border basis within the Union. If the UK leaves, it is likely that the 
passport will no longer be available, thereby forcing firms that wish to access EU 
markets to move their operations to within those markets.78 
And: 
We value the flexibility London offers as a platform for access to the single market in a 
variety of formats. Our trading activity in London benefits from an EU passport across 
the EU.79  
Just after the 2015 General Election result became clear, a representative of the City of 
London commented in the Financial Times that “None of the alternatives to EU 
membership look particularly palatable”.80 
Despite much comment about leaving and threats to leave, no big commercial institution 
has announced any significant departures. The one definite statement of intent has come 
from the European Banking Authority which is the regulator for the euro-zone area.  It has 
                                                                                             
76  TheCityUK; EU Reform: A view from TheCityUK; November 2014, p4. 
77  Ibid, p8. 
78  Written evidence to Banking Standards Commission. 
79  Ibid.  
80  Financial Times quoting Mark Boleat of City of London Corporation, 8 May 2015.  
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announced that it will move from its current London headquarters within the next two 
years.81 
3.7 Restructuring and Insolvency  
The EU Regulation on insolvency proceedings (EC) 1346/2000 (known as the ‘Insolvency 
Regulation’) came into force on 31 May 2002.82 It is directly applicable in all EU Member 
States, excluding Denmark.  
On 20 May 2015, the European Parliament approved the new European Insolvency 
Regulation (EIR) in the text adopted by the Council at first reading on 12 March 2015.83 
This marked the end of a revision process which started with the Commission proposal of 
12 December 2012 (COM/2012/744 final). The recast Regulation will apply to insolvency 
proceedings commencing on or after 26 June 2017 and will apply in Member States 
except Denmark.  
The current Insolvency Regulation established procedural rules on jurisdiction and 
applicable law in relation to insolvency proceedings. The aim is to facilitate the mutual 
recognition of cross-border insolvency proceedings in EU Member States and to deter 
parties from ‘shopping around’ within the EU for the most beneficial insolvency 
proceedings. It is important to note that the Insolvency Regulation does not harmonise 
substantive insolvency law between EU member States.  
With Brexit the ‘Insolvency Regulation’ will no longer automatically apply to the UK. What 
this will mean for the treatment of UK insolvency proceedings in the courts of the 
remaining Member States (and the treatment of EU insolvency proceedings in the UK 
courts) is unclear. One option may be for the UK to adopt a similar regime to the current 
Insolvency Regulation, but to achieve this the Government would need to come to 
agreement with the EU.84 A second option may be to rely on other mechanisms already in 
place in English law, intended to assist cross-border insolvency proceedings outside the 
EU. Notably, the ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency’ has been adopted in 
national law in the UK as well as in other jurisdictions such as Australia, the US, and some 
EU Member States.  
3.8 Taxation 
Taxation is very largely a Member State competence. The implications of the UK lying 
outside the EU are likely to be less significant for taxation compared with other policy 
areas. 
The major exception to this generalisation is indirect tax: primarily VAT – for which there is 
a substantive body of EU law establishing common rules across Member States – and, to a 
lesser extent, excise duties. It has long been recognised that the harmonisation of indirect 
taxes across Member States is an essential element in the achievement of an effective 
Single Market. Unlike most internal market measures, which use qualified majority voting 
(QMV), the harmonisation of taxation is decided by unanimity. The consequences of the 
EU’s shared competence in indirect tax is most frequently discussed in the context of the 
UK’s limited discretion in setting the rates of VAT on individual goods and services. In 
addition, many commentators have raised concerns about the UK’s ability in the future to 
                                                                                             
81  Financial Times, 30 June 2016. 
82  OJL 2000 160/1  
83  OJL 2015 141/19 
84  Any agreement may need to be amended each time the ‘Insolvency Regulation’ is amended. 
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maintain its existing range of VAT reliefs (such as the zero rates of VAT which apply to 
food and children’s clothes) from any further harmonisation of VAT law.85   
However, the relative importance of VAT to the Exchequer – accounting for around 17% 
of all government receipts – suggests that future governments would be unlikely to 
substantially increase these reliefs or abolish the tax, even though leaving the EU would 
give them this power.86 Writing in the Tax Journal before the referendum, Ben Jones, 
partner at Eversheds LLP, noted: “there is no practical likelihood that VAT will be 
abolished by the UK following Brexit. It is not even the case that it would be necessary to 
take significant legislative steps to preserve VAT in the UK, given that the EU VAT rules 
have been mainly implemented by UK legislation”. Mr Jones went on to note: “UK 
governments would have greater flexibility to use changes to the VAT system to further 
political objectives“ (e.g. by widening zero-rating, exemption rules or the use of lower 
rates).87 Indeed, during the referendum campaign it had been argued that Brexit would 
enable the Government to introduce a zero rate of VAT on domestic supplies of fuel and 
power.88 
There are no equivalent provisions with regard to other taxes, though all national 
legislation has to comply with the overarching provisions of the EU Treaty, guaranteeing 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital across the Single Market and 
prohibiting discrimination. There is a substantive body of case law where the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU) has ruled that individual provisions of a Member State’s tax code 
fail this test. Member States’ powers to act in relation to taxation must also be exercised in 
accordance with State aid rules.  
Finally, there are a number of EU instruments relating to administrative cooperation to 
exchange information and help tackle tax evasion. In the latter case it seems likely that 
outside the EU the UK will seek to maintain some form of bilateral agreement akin to 
these provisions, given the growing consensus between governments that there is a very 
important international dimension to taxing multinational corporations fairly, and 
effectively tackling tax avoidance.89  
In July 2013, as part of its Balance of Competences Review, the Coalition Government 
published a report on the respective powers of the UK and the EU with regard to taxation. 
This report found that:  
… respondents and interested parties were content with the current balance of 
competence on taxation, taking account of the protections offered by unanimity 
voting. Whilst individual respondents suggested areas where existing measures could 
be updated to reflect modern business practice and development, no respondents 
identified any major gaps in the existing tax legislation.90  
Some respondents to the review cited proposals for an EU-wide financial transactions tax 
as an area “where they questioned the appropriateness and utility of EU-level action”. The 
European Commission had proposed an EU-wide tax on financial transactions in 
September 2011. As this failed to attract unanimity, in January 2013 eleven Member 
                                                                                             
85  For details see, VAT : European law on VAT rates, Commons Briefing Paper SN2683, 20 May 2016. 
86  VAT receipts are projected to be £116 billion in 2015/16. Public sector receipts are set out in table 4.6 of 
the Office for Budget Responsibility,  Economic and Fiscal Outlook, Cm 9212, March 2016. 
87  “Brexit: the tax issues at stake”, Tax Journal, 15 June 2016. Mr Jones concluded, ““the conclusion is that 
no conclusions can be drawn at this stage.” 
88  “EU Referendum: Vote Leave wants power to axe fuel VAT”, BBC News online, 31 May 2016. 
89  This issue is discussed at length in, Corporate tax reform (2010-2016), Commons Briefing Paper 5945, 20 
June 2016 (see sections 5.3 & 6.2). 
90  HMG, Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union: 
Taxation, July 2013 p6. 
  Number 07213, 26 August 2016 46 
States, excluding the UK, agreed to pursue this option on a smaller scale. Negotiations 
have continued, although there has never been any question of the UK having to take 
part.91  
Details of the areas of EU competence in taxation are given on the site of the 
Commission’s Taxation & Customs Union Directorate.92  
Reaction to Brexit vote  
Following the referendum vote, there have been a number of statements by relevant 
organisations – such as the Bank of England – as well as some speculation about the 
possible impact of Brexit on the tax system.93 No immediate changes have been made to 
taxes, as HM Revenue & Customs have been advising taxpayers on their helpline.94 
On 27 June the then Chancellor, George Osborne, suggested that there was likely to be a 
Budget statement this autumn. Prior to the vote Mr Osborne had indicated that in the 
event of a vote to leave the EU, the Government would have to make immediate changes 
to its tax and spending plans.95  In a statement Mr Osborne said:  
… as I said before the referendum, this will have an impact on the economy and the 
public finances – and there will need to be action to address that. Given the delay in 
triggering Article 50 and the Prime Minister’s decision to hand over to a successor, it is 
sensible that decisions on what that action should consist of should wait for the Office 
for Budget Responsibility (OBR) to assess the economy in the autumn, and for the new 
Prime Minister to be in place.96  
Subsequently Mr Osborne argued that as part of its ongoing strategy to attract business 
investment, the Government should aim to cut the rate of corporation tax further to its 
existing plans for a 17% rate from 2020.97 
However, the new Chancellor, Philip Hammond, in his first interview ruled out an 
emergency Budget, while confirming that he would set out the Government’s revised 
economic strategy in the Autumn Statement.98  
Beyond this, there does not appear to have been any substantive discussion of the 




                                                                                             
91  For more details see, The Tobin tax: recent developments, Commons Briefing Paper, SN6184, 15 May 
2014. See also, PQ22411, 18 January 2016. 
92  European Commission, EU Tax Policy Strategy [accessed 14/7/2016]. The site also provides a full list of EU 
tax legislation. 
93  In the latter case see, “20 questions on Brexit”, Tax Journal , 1 July 2016 & “Breaking away”, Taxation, 30 
June 2016. 
94  “EU referendum: HMRC issues 'carry on' message“, BBC News online, 27 June 2016. 
95  See, for example, “George Osborne: vote for Brexit and face £30bn of taxes and spending cuts”, 
Guardian, 15 June 2016. 
96  HM Treasury press notice, Statement by the Chancellor following the EU referendum, 27 June 2016. 
97  “Osborne puts corporation tax cut at heart of Brexit recovery plan”, Financial Times, 2 July 2016. In answer 
to an urgent question on his plans, Mr Osborne said, “we should aim for a rate of 15% and preferably 
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Deb 4 July 2016 c622). 
98  “Philip Hammond: Financial markets 'rattled' by Out vote”, BBC news online, 14 July 2016; “New 
chancellor Philip Hammond to scale back austerity”, Financial Times, 14 July 2016. 
47 Brexit: impact across policy areas 
4. Employment 
4.1 Introduction 
A substantial component of UK employment law is grounded in EU law.  EU employment 
law provides a minimum standard below which domestic employment law must not fall.  
In some cases EU law has entrenched at an international level provisions that already 
existed in domestic law: sex and race discrimination and certain maternity rights, for 
example.  In others, new categories of employment rights have been transposed into 
domestic law to comply with emerging EU obligations. These new rights were often 
resisted by the UK Government during EU negotiations; for example, agency workers’ 
rights and limitations on working time.99  Indeed, due largely to this resistance, proposals 
to expand the EU’s competence to legislate in the social sphere were removed from the 
main body of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and placed in a separate ‘Social Chapter’,100 
which did not apply to the UK until it was later incorporated into the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, which came into force in 1999.  While any analysis of EU employment law or 
its history can provide only limited instruction as to what might happen to employment 
rights post-Brexit, the forgoing shows that EU law exhibits two broad modes of influence 
on domestic employment law - underpinning rights and creating new ones - by reference 
to which we can assess the potential implications of leaving the EU.   
4.2 Underpinning rights 
Subject to the provisions of the withdrawal arrangements or subsequent trade agreement, 
withdrawal from the EU will mean that UK employment rights currently guaranteed by EU 
law would no longer be so guaranteed; a post-Brexit government could seek to amend or 
remove any of these.  The precise mechanism by which this could be achieved would vary 
depending on the right in question:  
• some rights are enshrined in primary legislation, alterable only by primary legislation 
(e.g. discrimination law, codified in the Equality Act 2010);  
 
• some EU-derived rights are located in secondary legislation, and are therefore 
susceptible to revocation by secondary legislation;  
 
• some EU rights have direct effect, meaning that individuals can rely directly on EU 
law (for example the right to equal pay contained in the EU Treaty).101 These rights 
would automatically cease to apply upon exit from the EU, absent any domestic 
legislation saving them, or new international obligation to maintain them.   
 
The only relatively clear conclusion that can be drawn at this stage is that Brexit will allow 
for change to the following areas of employment law, which are underpinned by EU law:  
• annual leave 
• agency worker rights 
• part-time worker rights 
• fixed-term worker rights 
                                                                                             
99  Having negotiated concessions in the proposal that became the Working Time Directive and then 
abstaining in the final vote, the UK challenged the Directive’s legal basis; see: Case C-84/94 UK v. EU 
Council [1996] ECR I-5755.   
100 The unofficial name for the Social Policy Agreement and Social Policy Protocol. 
101  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 157. 
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• health and safety obligations 
• state-guaranteed payments upon an employer’s insolvency 
• collective redundancy rights 
• information and consultation rights 
• the right to a written statement of terms and conditions 
• posted worker rights 
• paternity, maternity and parental leave 
• protection of employment upon the transfer of a business 
• anti-discrimination legislation 
EU employment rights contained in primary legislation would be relatively insulated from 
the effect of leaving the EU, but would be newly susceptible to the possibility of change.  
This is because leaving the EU would not automatically repeal provisions in Acts of 
Parliament.  Much greater uncertainty surrounds the implications of Brexit for secondary 
legislation, in which much employment law is contained.   
4.3 Case law 
A somewhat thornier but important question concerns the status of CJEU case law.  There 
is a sizeable body of CJEU case law interpreting EU employment rights, which domestic 
courts are currently bound to follow.  In many cases, the CJEU has enlarged the scope of 
rights beyond the limits that would have been set by domestic courts.  Post-Brexit, UK 
courts may no longer be required to follow existing and future CJEU decisions, and may 
merely regard them as having persuasive force.  An inevitable consequence of that 
approach would be the re-litigation of settled principle – for example, whether holiday pay 
needs to take account of non-guaranteed overtime and commission payments, or whether 
sleep-in shifts count as working time.  Commentators have voiced uncertainty as to how 
best to prevent this.  Some suggest that transitional legislation, dealing with the issues 
discussed above, could also freeze in place principles derived from case law.  For example, 
Stephen Laws (First Parliamentary Counsel 2006-2012) wrote: 
How far should UK law originally deriving from EU law, so far as it survives, continue 
to be construed in its EU context? What relevance should ECJ judgments, past and 
future, continue to have on the construction of law with an EU inspiration? 
A single Bill could apply a transitory patch - keeping most things in place, with general 
transitional modifications - until later primary or secondary legislation can produce 
more comprehensive solutions. But there will undoubtedly be demands for more of 
the detail to be settled early. It will be difficult, in practice to prevent a consideration 
of the issues involved in any later legislation from arising during the passage of a 
paving, patching Bill; but, if the legislation is not to become totally unwieldy, some 
matters are bound to have to be postponed and so patched in the meantime.102 
4.4 Creation of new employment rights 
Once the UK withdraws from the EU it will no longer be required to transpose new EU law 
into domestic law.  This, again, would be subject to the terms of any future legal 
relationship with the EU.  The employment law implications of this are twofold.  First, the 
UK will not be required to implement new EU laws promulgated in the employment 
sphere.  Secondly, new CJEU decisions interpreting Directives that have already been 
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implemented in the UK will have no binding effect on UK law.  In consequence, UK 
employment law and that of EU Members States could follow gradually diverging paths. 
4.5 Comment 
Prior to the referendum commentators took varying positions on the consequences of 
Brexit for employment law.  While there was consensus as to the potential scope of 
change (i.e. all EU employment rights could be removed), views differed as to its likely 
magnitude.  Some took the view that UK employment rights in many cases predate 
comparable EU rights and often exceed the minimum floor that they set, indicating that 
Brexit would be unlikely to result in a diminution in rights other than, perhaps, at their 
margins.  Others argued that a deregulatory-minded UK government might seek to 
remove or limit certain rights, substantiating this view by reference to examples of the UK 
Government’s resistance to new EU rights and hostility towards CJEU case law.  These 
commentators tended to single out agency worker rights, working time rights and 
uncapped discrimination compensation as being likely candidates for change.103   
The Leader of the Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn, suggested that Brexit might lead to a 
“bonfire of rights” for workers.104  Others still argued that, on balance, the potential for 
reducing employment rights following Brexit pales in comparison to the impact of changes 
permissible under purely domestic legislation and already enacted, such as employment 
tribunal fees and the increased qualifying period for unfair dismissal claims.105   
Inevitably, all these views were speculative and generally based on predications as to the 
political complexion of a post-Brexit government.  The most recent indication from the 
Government as to the approach it might take came from David Davis MP, who wrote: 
At the moment all businesses in the UK must comply with EU regulation, even if they 
export nothing to the EU.  This impacts on our global competitiveness.  Instead, we 
should look to match regulation for companies to their primary export markets. 
To be clear, I am not talking here about employment regulation.  All the empirical 
studies show that it is not employment regulation that stultifies economic growth, but 
all the other market-related regulations, many of them wholly unnecessary.  Britain 
has a relatively flexible workforce, and so long as the employment law environment 
stays reasonably stable it should not be a problem for business. 
There is also a political, or perhaps sentimental point.  The great British industrial 
working classes voted overwhelmingly for Brexit.  I am not at all attracted by the idea 
of rewarding them by cutting their rights. This is in any event unnecessary, and we 
can significantly improve our growth rate by stopping the flood of unnecessary 
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5. Agriculture 
5.1 Brexit: key issues 
Agriculture and Brexit: Key Issues for the food and farming industry 
Main areas of uncertainty  
• Levels of direct financial support and rural development funding after 2020 
• Trade models and level of continued access to the Common Market, degree of protection from 
cheap imports 
• Provision of market safety nets 
• Access to labour 
• Overall national farm policy and regulation and approach across the Devolved Administrations 
• Food labelling requirements 
• Pesticides and GM food and crops approval approach 
• What kind of future CAP UK farmers will be competing with as the policy is currently being 
simplified and will be reformed for 2021. 
 
Potential areas of opportunity 
• A simpler and more targeted approach to agricultural policy and support, incentivising farmers to 
UK priorities 
• Potential for greater deregulation and innovation outside CAP. 
• New trade deals 
• New agri-environment schemes, tailored to UK needs and environmental priorities. 
• No disallowance fines for incorrect CAP payments 
 
 
For agriculture, the key impact of Brexit is the departure from the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). This will occur whichever trading arrangement is sought with the EU. 
Almost 40% of the EU’s budget is related to agriculture and rural development through 
the CAP.  It provides an EU framework of regulation for direct payments to farmers, 
market support measures and rural development programmes to support the wider rural 
economy.  
House of Commons Library Briefing Paper EU Budget and the UK’s contribution (August 
2016) provides further details and trends. 
In the UK, EU farm subsidies currently make up around 50-60% of farm income.107 So the 
big question for farmers is the nature and scale of any further financial support for their 
industry. 
The terms of a UK exit will also affect pesticides approval, approval for genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) and plant and animal health regulatory regimes. All of these 
are currently harmonised at an EU level.  
This section sets out some of the current thinking that has been emerging since the EU 
referendum.  
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House of Commons Library Briefing Paper EU referendum: Impact on UK agricultural 
policy (May 2016) sets out the thinking and analysis that was available prior to the vote 
and further detail on the operation of CAP. 
There is to some extent a blank page to be filled for UK agriculture policy and UK farming, 
and landowning bodies are starting to set out their wish list for the future.  They are 
asking the Government to act quickly to reduce uncertainty and take the opportunity to 
devise simpler approaches to farming regulation which support competitiveness. 
Before the referendum, the UK Government was clear that it had no ‘Plan B’ for 
agriculture and that EU exit was a “leap in the dark” for UK farmers.108  The previous 
Prime Minister, David Cameron, had committed to ensuring that an agricultural support 
system is “properly maintained” in the event of a UK exit, but said that he could not make 
the same guarantee for future governments.109 
More recent comments by farming Minister George Eustice indicate that the UK 
Government is considering a more outcome-focussed and targeted support system. 
Farming unions across the UK had, pre-referendum, council resolutions supporting a 
‘remain’ stance because the uncertainties on the ‘leave’ side were too great in terms of 
the future level of support for UK agriculture and the basis of future UK trade with the EU.  
However, their members seemed to be more evenly split. A Farmers Weekly survey in April 
2016 found that 58% of farmers planned to vote to leave and only 31% were planning to 
vote to remain.110 This is in contrast to CBI reports at the same time that almost 80% of 
UK businesses wanted to remain in the EU.111 
Although there is as yet no UK vision for an agricultural sector operating outside the CAP, 
successive UK governments have consistently sought to reduce the overall CAP budget 
and levels of direct subsidies, and to ensure that direct subsidies are linked to the delivery 
of wider public goods such as environmental protection to give value for money to the tax 
payer.112 
Farming organisations are now taking a proactive approach to setting out their aims for a 
competitive and sustainable UK agricultural policy outside the EU. 
The House of Lords debated the impact of Brexit on farming on 21 July 2016. 
5.2 What does CAP currently provide? 
The CAP gives direct support to UK farmers through the Basic Payment Scheme (Pillar 1 
funding) and the wider rural economy through Pillar 2 funding for Rural Development 
Programmes.  
Over 2014-2020 the UK is expected to receive €25.1 billion in direct payments (Pillar 1) 
and €2.6 billion in rural development funds (Pillar 2) for the environment and rural 
development.  
This represents a reduction in real terms of 12.6% and 5.5% respectively compared with 
CAP payments to the UK in the period 2007-2013. 113 
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The table below shows how the total UK CAP allocations for 2014-2020 have been 
allocated across the UK. 
UK CAP allocations 2014-2020 
 Pillar 1 
€ million (approx. 
non-inflation 
adjusted) 
% share Pillar 2 




England 16,421 65.5 1,520 58.9 
Northern Ireland 2,299   9.2    227   8.8 
Scotland 4,096 16.3    478 18.5 
Wales 2,245  8.96    355 13.7 
Total UK allocation 25.1 billion 
 
 2.6 billion 
 
 
Note: Figures are in nominal terms (i.e. they have not been adjusted for inflation over the period). 
Source: UK Government, November 2013.114 
Depending on how the UK Government chooses to continue and phase in its support to 
agriculture, leaving the regime would probably reduce farm incomes in the short term. 
This is because, based on past CAP reform negotiating positions, the UK Government and 
Devolved Administrations would be unlikely to match the current levels of subsidy and/or 
would require more ‘public goods’ in return for support, e.g. in environmental protection, 
which the UK Government views as the “overarching market failure in this sector”.115 
The Country Land and Business Association's March 2016 report, Leave or Remain: The 
decisions that politicians must make to support the rural economy suggested that the 
£3.87bn EU CAP spend in the UK in 2013 resulted in a £10bn contribution to the EU 
economy, including more than 350,000 jobs and £3.5bn in tax revenue.116 
Rural Development Programmes 
The EU CAP subsidies are made up of direct payments (Pillar 1 funding) and payments for 
rural development programmes which benefit the wider rural economy (Pillar 2 funding).   
Across the UK, a large component of these Pillar 2 Rural Development Programmes is 
directed at agri-environment schemes where farmers receive additional payments for 
practices which especially protect and enhance the environment. It is very likely that these 
would continue in some form across the UK outside a CAP regime, as they are well-
established mechanisms to promote environmental policy objectives.  The UK Government 
has opted to transfer almost maximum funds from the direct subsidies allocation (Pillar 1) 
for England to the Rural Development Programme for England (Pillar 2).  
The RDP programmes in the UK also support the wider rural economy with priorities 
relating to tourism, rural broadband and SMEs. The Pillar 2 funding will be supporting 
various growth programmes across the UK for 2014-2020 with little additional Exchequer 
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funding. For example, the £3.5bn RDP for England has around 15% Exchequer funding.117  
Thus, without CAP funding and a required RDP approved by the EU, it is not clear how 
much specific support would be prioritised and directed to rural areas. 
5.3 Impacts of losing the CAP 
The loss of the CAP and a future EU/UK trading relationship raise lots of uncertainties for 
farmers in terms of income, tariffs, commodity and consumer prices and environmental 
management requirements in the future. The likely impacts, trade-offs and potential 
scenarios are complex.  
House of Commons Library Briefing EU referendum: Impact on UK agricultural policy (May 
2016) discusses these topics in more detail.  
A snapshot of some of the key analysis of Brexit's impact on farming is provided below: 
Worshipful Company of Farmers’ analysis (February 2016)  
Professor Alan Buckwell produced a report for the Worshipful Company of Farmers, 
Possible Agricultural Implications of Brexit (February 2016). 
He concluded that the EU trade question was fundamentally a choice between remaining 
close to the EU single market and therefore having to retain most existing EU regulation, 
or leaving the single market in order to allow some deregulation.  
Whatever the outcome of the referendum, he predicts more customs controls and thus 
higher trading costs than now on trade with the EU (both ways). This could depress UK 
farm prices and raise some consumer costs. If the UK then chooses lower protection levels 
on agriculture with the rest of the world, this would also depress some UK farmer prices, 
but reduce consumer costs. Therefore, together, farmers might face weaker prices, whilst 
consumer food prices, on balance, may not be much affected. 
LEI for the NFU (April 2016)  
Detailed analysis was commissioned by the NFU before the referendum from a leading 
agricultural research institute, LEI at Wageningen University (The Netherlands).  
This analysis, Implications of a UK exit from the EU for British Agriculture (April 2016) 
looked at three trade scenarios with different levels of agricultural support: 
1) UK-EU Free Trade Arrangement (FTA)  
2) WTO default position; and,  
3) UK Trade Liberalisation (TL) scenario  
In each of these scenarios the effects of three different levels of agricultural support were 
estimated:  
• status quo, i.e. a continuation of all direct payments  
• 50% reduction of direct payments and  
• no direct payments  
It was assumed that there was no change in the level of environmental (Pillar II) payments 
to farmers.  
The researchers found that: 
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• for most sectors the biggest driver of UK farm income changes was the level of 
public support payments available. The loss of these support payments offset 
positive price impacts in all of the scenarios.  
• The positive price impacts seen through both the FTA and WTO default scenarios 
were offset by the loss of direct support payments.  
• A reduction of direct payments, or a complete elimination, exacerbated the negative 
impact on farm incomes seen under the UK TL scenario.  
• The UK TL scenario implied a lowering of the UK’s external import tariffs by 50%. 
This scenario was found to have significant impacts on UK meat and dairy prices as 
current import rates are higher for these products. Consequently, the overall effect 
of the TL scenario was a price decline for animal products which leads to a reduction 
in meat and milk production in the UK.118  
Agra Europe Analysis (October 2015)  
Agra Europe, an EU agriculture and food publication, prepared a detailed analysis of the 
impact of Brexit and likely farm policies on EU exit: Preparing for Brexit: What UK 
withdrawal from the EU would mean for the agri-food industry (October 2015). 
This report highlights how an EU exit would be “traumatic” for the farming industry, with 
large cuts in farm incomes, bankruptcies, falling land prices and the elimination of small 
and medium sized farms, as well as increased barriers to exports and lost markets.119 
IEEP: environmental concerns 
Although environmental NGOs have often been critical of the CAP and especially the 
latest reforms in terms of environmental benefits, there is also some concern that support 
for agri-environmental schemes and wider rural development funding will be reduced 
outside the EU.  
The Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP) has said that it is “far from clear 
whether the UK environment would be better serviced by a new set of national agriculture 
policies which would follow from an EU Brexit”, especially as there would be major 
variations across the UK administrations.120 
 The IEEP highlights the following key environmental factors: 
• Established UK policy, strongly supported by the Treasury, is to cut expenditure on 
agriculture. Consequently, there are major questions about how far a future 
government would maintain funding for managing the rural environment as well as 
for agriculture.  
• The majority of experts on the topic are sceptical and expect significant cuts.  
• Incentives for greener farming could decline, and there are also concerns about the 
extent to which governments would be willing to impose environmental obligations 
on a sector subject to competition from more subsidised counterparts in the 
remaining EU Member States.  
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Campaign to protect rural England 
The Campaign to Protect Rural England is highlighting the need for farming in England to 
become more diverse, in terms of farm size and production and demographics, in order to 
prove environmentally resilient and publicly accessible in the future. Its August 2016 
report, New Model Farming: Resilience through Diversity, advocates that the Government 
should encourage a mix of farms. It advises:121 
• redirecting funding to help smaller, more innovative and mixed farms;  
• making land available for new farmers to enter the market; 
• encouraging more dynamism and diversity in farming through a community right to 
bid, and a transparent register of landholdings; 
• encouraging the use of low cost technologies and techniques to benefit all farmers; 
• ensuring that a much higher proportion of public funds are directly linked to 
delivering public benefits.  
The report has had a muted response from farming and landowner bodies. The CLA 
disputed the assumptions that smaller, mixed farms would have more positive 
environmental impacts.122 
5.4 What has the UK Government said about EU exit and 
agriculture so far? 
The UK Government has not yet given many clues as to how it is likely to approach UK 
agriculture policy outside the CAP.  
However, in terms of financial support, the Chancellor of the Exchequer has given farmers 
a level of certainty by guaranteeing the current level of agriculture funding under Pillar 1 
to 2020 as part of the “transition to new domestic arrangements”.123 This has been 
welcomed by farming organisations.124 
HM Treasury has also given assurances that all structural and investment fund projects, 
including agri-environment schemes, signed before the Autumn Statement will be fully 
funded, even in cases where these projects continue beyond the UK’s departure from the 
EU.125 
In July 2016 Lord Gardiner of Kimble gave some idea of the overall elements of the UK 
Government’s future ‘vision’ for farming. Responding to the most recent parliamentary 
debate on agriculture and Brexit, the Defra Minister said that the Government was 
“committed to working with the industry and to developing an exciting new vision for 
British agriculture—a vision based on sustainable, productive and competitive industry”.126  
Defra's proposed 25-Year Food and Farming Plan is currently on hold following the 
referendum. George Eustice set out further detail in answer to a written question in July 
2016:  
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We now have an opportunity to consider our long term vision for food and farming 
outside of the EU. We look forward to continuing to work with a wide range of 
interests to develop that vision and to work together to deliver it. 
It remains essential that the UK has a thriving food and farming industry with high 
animal welfare and environmental standards, access to international markets and a 
long term commitment to boosting productivity through innovation and skills. We are 
now focused on taking forward the actions that support these objectives, and 
continuing to develop our long term vision, in a different context.127 
In relation to a replacement for the CAP specifically he has said: 
Defra is currently working on a range of proposals to inform discussions about the 
shape of a future agricultural policy to replace the CAP and we will be involving 
stakeholders in those discussions.128 
At the Livestock Event in July 2016, George Eustice gave an indication of Defra's thinking 
so far. He said that the goal was to "unbundle farm policy objectives" so that it was clear 
which policies are required to deliver a productive, competitive and sustainable agricultural 
industry. 
He identified the need to reassure people that the UK would not leave the EU's Single 
Market until a free trade agreement was in place.   
He emphasised that the final shape of farm policy would be a matter for the new Prime 
Minister but that options already being discussed included: 
• market measures 
• renewed focus on agri-environment schemes with a more holistic approach to 
protecting the environment, perhaps on a catchment management basis to join up 
soil management with the UK's existing approach to managing water.129 
He also said that Defra officials were looking at risk management tools such as futures 
markets and crop insurance.   
The Rural Payments Agency has confirmed that the EU referendum result “does not mean 
there will be immediate changes” and that “until the UK formally leaves the EU, it still has 
a legal obligation to comply with the Common Agricultural Policy and all BPS scheme rules 
and regulations will apply”.130 
Past CAP negotiating positions and comments on future reform are the only other clues to 
the possible principles and overall approach that the UK Government might adopt given a 
free rein in agriculture.  
UK policy over successive governments in the last 20 years has been to seek to reduce 
CAP direct subsidies in EU negotiations on CAP reform and to shift any support to farmers 
towards provision of public goods to provide more value for money for the UK tax payer, 
e.g. environmental benefits and services through habitat and farm management. 
Overall, regardless of the referendum outcome, farming unions had been expecting 
support for farming to fall as a result of reducing budgets and changing policy thinking on 
subsidies at both EU and UK level.131 
In the last CAP round (2014-2020), which was agreed at EU level in 2013, the UK sought 
cuts in the overall EU budget supporting the CAP. It also made clear that it wanted to see 
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a more market-orientated policy with competitiveness at its heart, to ensure that farmers 
can prepare for a future without income support.  
In January 2015 the UK Government’s response to a written parliamentary question 
reiterated a commitment to moving away from farming subsidies in the long run:  
We continue to believe that expenditure on market price support and direct payments 
to farmers under Pillar 1 of the CAP represents very poor value for money. The UK has 
always made clear that we would like to move away from subsidies in the long run. 
However, we recognise that there is scope for using taxpayers’ money to pay farmers 
for public goods that the market otherwise would not reward, such as protecting the 
natural environment, supporting biodiversity and improving animal welfare.132  
Northern Irish Farming Minister Michelle O’Neill also said in February 2016 that she did 
not believe the current UK Government would match the current level of subsidies if there 
was an EU exit: 
The British Government have consistently pushed for reductions in the support going 
to farmers and rural development under the CAP. They do not regard that spending 
as value for money, so I believe that the Treasury would be unsympathetic to our calls 
for some of the money saved from withdrawing as a member state from the EU to be 
used to maintain support to farmers and rural communities. A significant reduction in 
direct support would leave many of our farmers in real and long-term financial 
difficulty. A reduction of funding for farmers and rural communities would have 
knock-on effects for the environment.133 
In the last CAP round, the UK Government also secured the flexibility for the UK to 
effectively devolve CAP arrangements across the UK administrations. However, this 
devolution brings its own complications, as currently the Devolved Administrations shape 
their own CAP implementation decisions within the EU rules and have chosen very 
different paths. It is not clear how the UK would approach farming policy without 
common EU rules as the overall working framework for the UK Government and the 
Devolved Administrations. 
5.5 EU Commission views 
The NFU met EU Agriculture Commissioner Phil Hogan at the end of June 2016, seeking 
assurance that farmers would have the full CAP subsidies until 2020 - the end of this 
‘round’.134  
Commissioner Hogan has clarified the Commission’s position in a number of areas:  
• The UK will have all CAP benefits until Article 50 negotiations are concluded.135 
• Market access negotiations and negotiations for a bilateral trade agreement 
between the EU and UK will not commence until exit negotiations are 
completed.136 
It is this potential gap between leaving the Single Market and starting a new free trade 
agreement which is of concern to farmers and economists alike. 
5.6 Farmers want a “new vision for British Agriculture” 
The NFU has called for Theresa May to “back a new vision for British agriculture”. A letter 
to the new Prime Minister in July 2016 stressed the “historic opportunity to shape the 
                                                                                             
132  HC Deb Written Answer 221523, 27 January 2015.   
133  Northern Ireland Assesmbly, Agriculture Questions, 2 February 2016.   
134  NFU Online, Commissioner Hogan’s clarity for UK farmers, 4 July 2016. 
135  NFU Online, Commissioner Hogan’s clarity for UK farmers, 4 July 2016. 
136  UK is likely face tariffs on trade, warns EU, Farmers Weekly, 15 July 2016, p.6. 
  Number 07213, 26 August 2016 58 
future of British farming and food production” for generations to come and underlines 
the importance of the sector to the economy.137 The NFU has described farming as “the 
bedrock for a vibrant supply chain” and “essential” for the UK’s £108bn food and drink 
industry.138 The farming union launched its biggest consultation of members “in a 
generation” in August 2016, which will conclude on 14 September 2016 after 50 
meetings across the country.139 
In a joint statement, the Scottish Land and Estates and Country Land and Business 
Association (CLA) have called for immediate action from all levels of government to 
provide some certainty and clarity for farming and other rural businesses.140 
The CLA has expressed concern that agriculture was not mentioned in the new 
Department for International Trade’s announcement of its responsibilities.141 The 
Department has since clarified that agriculture would be part of Parliamentary Under 
Secretary Mark Garnier’s portfolio, but the CLA is concerned that agriculture is being 
treated as an “after thought”.  
The CLA has acknowledged that leaving the EU creates a “chance for rural businesses to 
thrive” but highlights that it is “notoriously difficult to establish open trade deals for 
farming products” and that there was a history of agriculture being treated as a “low 
priority or excluded from international trade negotiations altogether”.142 
The NFU has set out its wish list for EU exit terms and the union has launched a 
consultation with their members about what the new UK farming policy should look 
like.143 
The NFU is keen for the UK to take the opportunity of leaving the EU's “over-politicised 
approach and excessive use of the precautionary principle” in relation to product 
approvals, e.g. GM crops and pesticides. 
The key asks 
Farming and landowning organisations realise that they need to have some commonality 
in their proposals if they are to get traction with Defra and the Treasury.  Some common 
themes have been emerging and it has been reported that there are “fledgling” talks of 
farming organisations forming a coalition to support the Government's Brexit policy-
making.144 
So far farming and landowner bodies have been seeking the following outlook and 
reassurances from the UK Government:145 
Farming support and regulation 
• Swift action to develop a new domestic agricultural policy, with a long term 
approach, adapted to farmers’ needs; easy to understand and administer. 
• Guarantees that support given to UK farmers is on a par with that given to farmers 
in the EU, who will still be the UK's principle competitors. 
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• Ensuring that future arrangements for pesticide and GM approvals are 
proportionate and based on sound science. 
• A UK-wide policy to be developed with all of the UK devolved administrations to 
take into account the differing characteristics and needs of the rural sectors in 
each country. Each administration would implement it in accordance with their 
own needs and aspirations, and there should be sufficient funds for the policy 
across the whole of the UK. 
• Careful transitional arrangements to ensure that the uncertainty of future incomes 
does not lead to problems with lending and succession of ownership. 
Trade and markets 
• Best possible access to markets in the rest of Europe. 
• Similar level of trade agreements as currently with the rest of the world (EU 
farmers benefit from over 50 such agreements at present). 
• Assurances that the UK will not be open to imports which are produced to lower 
standards. 
• Ensure that British agriculture does not become the lever used to develop export 
markets in non-farming areas by granting unfavourable market access deals which 
will impact upon domestic markets in agricultural produce. 
Labour 
• Access to migrant labour, both seasonal and full-time.  
Rural Development Programmes 
• A rural development policy which focuses on enhancing UK competitiveness, 
taking the opportunity to devise better agri-environment schemes. 
Suggested alternative models for farm support 
Before the referendum farming minister, George Eustice, set out how a fresh approach to 
farm support and policy could look outside the EU.146 UKIP did the same.147 Both of these 
positions suggested maintaining some level of subsidies. Mr Eustice suggested that the UK 
Government could invest £2bn, compared with the £3bn that UK farmers receive today, 
towards a new policy because of the budget savings of leaving the EU. 148 He also 
suggested a more targeted policy focused on outcomes rather than blanket subsidies. 
The Tenant Farmers Association has now also put forward a proposal for a three-pillar 
farm support. This assumes current levels of support, although these cannot be 
guaranteed if the UK Government maintains its last CAP reform negotiating position of 
wanting to reduce subsidies. 
The Tennant Farmers Association has updated a plan for farming and agricultural policy in 
a leave scenario which it published before the referendum. Its proposal abolishes basic 
support for all farms and splits the current funding between: 
• an outcome-focused agri-environment scheme 
• an infrastructure grant scheme to encourage the development of farm businesses 
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• public funding to develop and promote British food both at home and abroad 
through market research and development and technology transfer.149 
5.7 Wider EU agricultural policy issues 
Although the CAP is a key feature of UK farming policy, there are a number of other 
important areas of EU regulation that will be affected by Brexit.   
• The UK Government’s Review of the Balance of Competences between the UK and 
the EU (Summer 2014) highlighted pesticides regulation and plant and animal 
health regulation as key areas of interest from stakeholders. The NFU has also 
highlighted EU funding of agricultural research and development.150 
• Farmers for In argued before the referendum that it is “pointless” trying to tackle 
environmental threats, and animal and plant diseases at country level. The group 
highlighted that EU common standards and thresholds give farming the security that 
it needs in “today’s uncertain landscape”.151 
Pesticide Regulation 
The regulation and licensing of pesticides has a major impact on agricultural and 
horticultural businesses and is currently undertaken on a pan-European basis, sharing the 
burden of evaluating scientific evidence through the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA) and through different Member States taking the lead in evaluating different 
applications.   
The EEA agreement includes Directive 91/414/EC on the placing of plant protection 
products on the market.  However, other trade deals may not. 
Even under current EU arrangements, the UK has its own machinery to provide consent 
for products containing EU approved active ingredients with a national risk assessment 
process. This could be used for a UK approach to pesticides regulation and approval. 
The UK’s pesticide authority is the Health and Safety Executive’s Chemicals Regulation 
Directorate. The Expert Committee on Pesticides provides the Government with advice on 
this process. 
Ultimately, the evaluation of an approval for a pesticide at EU level gets put to a vote by 
all Member States in the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health. It is 
this politicisation of a science-based assessment that has frustrated the NFU. 
Differences in opinion at this stage have delayed recent decisions on key pesticides (see 
below). 
Implications of Brexit 
The NFU has raised concerns that UK crop production is “flatlining” because EU regulation 
is steadily reducing the range of crop protection products that farmers can use.152 
The EU approval and assessment process has recently received a great deal of attention 
because of the European Commission's introduction of restrictions on a number of the 
most commonly used neonicotinoid insecticides, due to their negative impact on bees.  
The UK Government does not agree that the scientific evidence supports the restrictions 
but the Commission had sufficient support to introduce them. These restrictions are 
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currently being reviewed by the EFSA, which is expected to provide an assessment by 31 
January 2017.153 
In addition, the renewal of the approval for the herbicide glyphosate has been delayed at 
EU level after conflicting scientific assessments. It now has approval for 18 months 
pending a further study by the EU Chemicals Agency. The UK is arguing that the scientific 
assessments carried out so far do not suggest that certain uses of glyphosate should be 
restricted at EU level, and that it should be for Member States to consider whether 
restrictions are needed as part of their national re-approval processes.154 
The UK resistance to these decisions indicates that there would be a very different 
approach to pesticides approval with more UK autonomy. Before the referendum, farming 
Minister George Eustice said that the EU's precautionary principle needed to be reformed 
in favour of a US-style, risk-based approach, allowing faster authorisation.155 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) 
Outside the EU, the UK’s regulation of genetically modified crops and products would 
depend on its future arrangements with the EU. For example, the EEA Agreement covers a 
wide range of food law, including biotechnology and GMOs.156 
The UK regulatory process for approving GM crops is also part of an EU-wide system of 
evaluation and authorisation for Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) based on 
scientific evidence and evaluation. However, the final decision on authorisation rests with 
Member States in a vote which somewhat politicises the process (as per pesticides 
approval), as such votes can reflect the Member States’ overall position on GM rather than 
the specific authorisation being considered.   
Since 1990 only three GMOs have been authorised for cultivation in the EU and only one 
product (MON810 maize) is currently authorised. It is cultivated in five Member States (not 
the UK) on an area representing only 1.5% of the total area of maize production in the 
EU.  This has implications for EU trade and innovation.  
The European Commission has acknowledged this shortfall in the authorisation process 
and has been seeking to address it. For example, since April 2015 Member States have 
had more discretion to restrict or prohibit the use of GM crops in their own jurisdiction, 
even if EU-authorised, without having to vote against the whole authorisation of a 
particular GM crop to achieve this. The EU Commission has also reviewed the whole 
decision-making process for authorising GMOs and has proposed that this approach 
should also be taken for GM food and feed (which is more widely authorised).157 
However, in October 2015 the European Parliament voted against these plans on the 
grounds that they were unworkable and could lead to border controls between countries 
that disagree on GMOs, which would affect the internal market. The EP asked the 
Commission to come forward with new ideas.158 
Plant and Animal Health and Food Safety 
As noted by the UK Government’s 2013 Balance of Competences Review, there is an 
extensive body of EU legislation on animal health, veterinary medicines, medicated feeding 
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stuffs, animal welfare, food and feed safety and hygiene, food labelling and compositional 
standards. This is mainly to facilitate trade and to provide the EU with comprehensive 
disease and food safety alert systems.159 
Many of these areas have international standards, food for example, where an EU exit 
would not greatly change standards. Some also already allow Member States to maintain 
stricter rules if they have them, e.g.UK slaughter rules and animal welfare.  However, 
Member States also share expertise, intelligence and resources to support these systems.  
Without access to such resources the UK will have to replicate some of the services 
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6. Fisheries policy 
This chapter describes the views of different stakeholders on the implications of Brexit for 
UK fisheries. It also seeks to draw on evidence from non-EU European countries, such as 
Norway, to give an indication of possible outcomes for the UK. 
It is important to note that the outcomes will in large part depend on the nature of the 
UK’s withdrawal and the negotiations that will take place.  
There is significant uncertainty. 
6.1 The Common Fisheries Policy 
Fisheries in the EU are managed under the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The policy aims 
to ensure that fishing is “environmentally, economically and socially sustainable” and to 
allow fair competition between fishers.160 
The CFP covers a number of policy areas including: 
• Fisheries management: controls on how fish can be taken, with the goal of 
ensuring that fish stocks are healthy enough that the maximum sustainable 
amount of fish possible can be caught. The measures include technical regulations 
on what kinds of gear can be used and quotas for the amount of fish landed. 
• Funding: The CFP provides funding to fishers and fishing communities for a 
number of purposes including supporting sustainable fishing and helping coastal 
communities to diversify their economies. The UK was allocated €243.1 million in 
fisheries funding from 2014-2020.161 
• Market organisation: the CFP puts into place measures such as common 
marketing standards, common consumer information rules and competition rules, 
and provides market intelligence via the European Market Observatory for Fishery 
and Aquaculture Products. 
• Import tariffs: the CFP allows for import tariff reductions for certain fish and fish 
products from outside the EU to help increase supply at times when EU supply 
cannot meet the demand of fish processors.  
6.2 Fisheries post-Brexit  
The analysis below seeks to consider the main CFP policy areas and how they might 
change in the UK post-Brexit. 
Fisheries management 
Brexit will have a number of implications for fisheries management. While it is possible to 
identify some possible broad implications, the specific outcomes are highly uncertain.  
The following issues are likely to be important during and after the negotiations: 
• Control over a greater area of sea 
• Renegotiating the UK’s share of fish quotas 
• The power to walk away from negotiations 
• The degree to which the UK could exclude non-UK vessels 
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• Cooperation with the EU and other countries on setting quotas 
• UK influence on the management of stocks shared with the EU, and 
• A new UK fisheries policy and management system. 
These points are elaborated on below. 
Control over a greater area of sea 
Norway and Iceland are responsible for fishing in their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) up 
to 200 nautical miles from the coast. This is the norm in international law.  
This contrasts with the situation in the EU, where Member States share access to fishing 
grounds from 12-200 miles from the coast (see box 1 below). 
Following Brexit the UK could take full responsibility for fisheries in the UK’s EEZ. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that the UK will as a result have greater access to 
fish. This point is elaborated on below. 
In addition, there could be legal arguments under international law about the extent to 
which the current fishing rights of foreign fishers could be abolished.162   
Box 1: Why do we not control fisheries out to 200 miles from the UK coast? 
When the UK joined the EEC in 1973 the Member States agreed to exclusive national fishing 
rights to 12 nautical miles, unless another Member State could prove historic fishing activity 
between 6 to 12 miles.163 This was broadly in line with international law at the time. As a 
result, UK fishing fleets have access to some fishing grounds within 6-12 miles of four other 
Member States, and five Member States have access to fishing grounds within 6-12 miles of 
the UK.  
The seas further than 12 miles from the coast were considered ‘high seas’, and not under the 
control of anyone. However, this changed in the late 1970s, when it was agreed under 
international law that countries had rights over the sea up to 200 nautical miles from their 
shores.164  
When these new Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) were introduced, EU competence for 
fisheries was extended to 200 miles off the coast. The principle of equal access was applied to 
this new area.  
 
Renegotiating the UK’s share of fish quotas 
George Eustace, arguing for Brexit, stated that “outside the EU [we would be] in the 
strongest possible position to re-open the issue of ‘relative stability’ and argue for a fairer 
share of quota allocations in many fish stocks”.165  He said that this could be conducted 
on the basis of an “assessment of spawning grounds and this science would help inform a 
new settlement”.166  
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Mr Eustace said that Brexit would enable the UK Government to represent itself at quota 
negotiations. This would mean that UK interests could not be bargained with in order to 
“give advantages to other EU countries”.167   
The current agreement between the EU and Norway provides that quotas are shared on 
the basis of ‘zonal attachment’. This is the extent to which a stock is distributed in an area 
over time.  
However, changes in “fish distribution, abundance and migration patterns can be caused 
by changing environmental conditions and increases or decreases in spawning stock 
biomass (among other factors)”. This fact can “cause problems for agreements based on 
zonal attachment” as disagreements can occur over the sharing of fish stocks as they 
change.168  
Others have questioned the extent to which the UK will be in a position to renegotiate 
greater quotas outside the EU.169 Elizabeth Truss MP, who was Secretary of State for 
Environment at the time and who campaigned to remain, questioned the impact of losing 
“the collective bargaining power of the EU”. She believed the UK “would be hard-pressed 
to get agreements as favourable as those we currently enjoy with third countries like 
Norway, Iceland, Russia, the Faroe Islands and Greenland”.170 
The National Federation of Fishermen's Organisations noted that “we can certainly seek to 
renegotiate quota shares as well as access arrangement but it is realistic to expect that 
there will be a price of some sort. Who will pay that price is a critical question”.171  
The power to walk away from negotiations 
Perhaps an additional bargaining tool available to the UK post-Brexit will be the ability to 
“walk away” from negotiations if it is unhappy with its share of quota.  
Dr Bryce Stewart from the University of York said that “although this may sound 
appealing, it is likely to result in the setting of unsustainably high catch limits, as occurred 
during the recent ‘Mackerel Wars’ when Iceland, Norway and the Faroes all argued for 
(and set) a higher quota / share of the catch than that advised by the EU”.172  
If the UK chose to walk away from negotiations, and unilaterally set higher quotas, the EU 
could respond harshly. For example, when a dispute emerged between the EU and the 
Faeroes regarding herring quotas, the EU responded with trade sanctions, introduced a 
ban on Faeroese herring imports and prohibited the entry into European ports of Faroese 
fishing vessels.173 
Ultimately the Faeroes agreed to reduce its quota from 100,000 tonnes to 40,000 tonnes 
(albeit up by 9,000 tonnes from a previous agreement).174 This was much less that the 
Faroese believed they should have been entitled to on the basis of the science related to 
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the distribution of herring in its waters, and in spite of the Faeroese Government claiming 
that the EU’s actions were illegal under international law.175 
There appears to be significant uncertainty about the implications of Brexit in terms of the 
UK’s bargaining power in fish quota negotiations.  
Box 2: Relative stability 
In 1983, after seven years of negotiations, it was agreed that fisheries and quotas in the EEZ would be 
shared on the basis of who was already fishing in those areas (the principle of relative stability). This 
meant that when the EEZ was introduced, there would not be any dramatic consequences for any 
Member State.176 It was also felt that this would help to “prevent repeated arguments over how quotas 
should be allocated, and to provide fishers with an environment which [was] stable relative to the 
overall state of the stock in question”.177 
Relative stability also gave certain fishing-dependent communities in the UK and Ireland special 
protection in the form of additional quotas that would be taken from other Member States in the event 
of quotas falling below certain levels.178  
In retrospect it could be argued that this situation disadvantaged the UK, which might have asserted 
control over a greater proportion of the EU’s catch through enforcement of a 200-mile EEZ. However, 
the UK government may have accepted the terms because:  
• the agreement had little effect on UK fisheries at the time, as the UK fleet was focused on other 
areas (see Library briefing on the Cod Wars for more information);  
• enforcing the EEZ might have led to significant conflict with other Member States;  
• enforcing the EEZ might have been incompatible with EU membership;  
• some UK fishing communities were given special protections.179 
 
Excluding foreign vessels from UK waters 
Aside from giving the UK the ability to walk away from talks, an argument for Brexit has 
been that it would enable the UK to exclude EU fishers from the UK’s EEZ.180  
Some have questioned the extent to which that option would be feasible. Issues that 
might arise include: 
• increased political tensions during a time when the UK will be negotiating EU 
market access. The Danish fish producer organisation stated that the UK should only 
be granted access to the EU market on the basis that it still permitted access to UK 
waters;181 
• the possible retaliatory exclusion of UK vessels from EU waters. That could be “a 
major concern in the fishing industry as 20% of the fish caught by the UK fleet is 
landed elsewhere in the EU”, and because the UK fleet currently has access to areas 
outside the UK’s EEZ; 
• a ban possibly contravening international law; 
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• the implications of damaging fish trading relationships with Europe, as “at present 
the UK exports around 80% of its wild-caught seafood, with four of the top five 
destinations being European countries”.182 
Other non-EU European countries have granted access to EU vessels (including UK vessels) 
to their EEZ as part of negotiations on fisheries. For example, when Greenland left the 
European Economic Community in 1982 it negotiated “tariff-free access to the EEC 
market for fisheries products” and in return “it allowed continued European access to its 
waters”.183  
Norway also has mechanisms for allowing access to its EEZ by EU (and therefore UK) 
vessels. These long-standing arrangements were put into place to enable fishers from both 
the EU and Norway to maintain access to historic fishing grounds in each other’s EEZ.184 
185 
It therefore seems possible that some form of agreement on continued EU access to UK 
waters, and vice versa, could be part of a post-Brexit negotiated settlement.  
Cooperation with the EU and other countries on setting quotas  
After Brexit the UK would need to cooperate with the EU on quota setting. Cooperation 
on sharing stocks is required, as many fish stocks are migratory and therefore cross EEZ 
boundaries. Fish populations could be damaged if countries failed to coordinate on fishing 
effort. 
Such cooperation is enshrined in international law. The UN Agreement on Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 
1996186 require cooperation on the conservation and management of fish stocks that 
straddle national jurisdictions. The UK has ratified these agreements.  
This kind of cooperation is currently seen in Norway and other non-EU European 
countries. Around 90% of Norway’s fisheries are shared with other countries,187 even 
though it is much more geographically isolated than the UK. The Norwegians set fish 
quotas and management strategies for important fish stocks in negotiation with other 
countries, including the EU and Russia. Norway and the EU have developed management 
strategies for several joint stocks including cod, haddock and herring.188  
The EU cooperates and negotiates with non-EU countries on behalf of Member States. 
The outcome of negotiations on one stock may be influenced by negotiations on 
another.189  
Following Brexit the UK will have to: 
• maintain a close working relationship with the EU to enable the effective 
management of fisheries; 
• agree a mechanism for agreeing quotas and management measures with the EU 
and other countries. This could be a bilateral mechanism between the UK and EU 
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“Managing cod 
stocks is not rocket 
science—it is much 
more complicated 
than that.” 
“in the case of stocks that are shared only between the EU and UK”, or through the 
North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) for stocks shared with other 
countries “as is currently the case with mackerel, which is negotiated between the 
EU, Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands”.190 
A new UK fisheries policy and management system 
George Eustace, arguing for Brexit, thought the UK Government would 
seek to retain a number of fisheries management measures, such as fishing 
within sustainable limits through a quota system, and that the UK “would 
still strive to eliminate the wasteful practice of discarding dead fish back 
into the sea”.191  
Brexit could also help to address cases where it is argued that the EU has 
taken decisions on fisheries management that may be inappropriate to UK 
circumstances.192 
The experience from Norway and other countries would suggest that the UK will need to 
introduce a potentially complex system of fisheries management.193  
Management will need to be well-coordinated with the EU, given the extent to which 
stocks are shared. But the UK might have less influence over the management measures 
of some stocks, as it may be less able to participate in discussions with EU Member States. 
A Norwegian marine scientist commented that “managing cod stocks is not rocket 
science—it is much more complicated than that”.194 In many cases the management 
system may need to be negotiated and agreed with the EU. Key elements of the 
Norwegian approach to fisheries management include: 
• limiting access to fisheries; 
• basing quotas on scientific evidence about the maximum amount of fish that can be 
sustainably caught; 
• reducing overcapacity in the sector (i.e. limiting or reducing the number of vessels); 
• abandoning subsidies for fishing; 
• controls on the types of fishing gear permitted; 
• a discard ban; 
• control and enforcement measures at port and at sea to ensure compliance; 
• measures to protect marine habitats and biodiversity.195  
It seems likely that the UK will develop a domestic system for managing fisheries, which 
will broadly reflect the system adopted in Norway and which may largely reproduce the 
existing EU arrangements.  
Funding 
The CFP provides funding to fishers and fishing communities for a number of purposes, 
including supporting sustainable fishing and helping coastal communities to diversify their 
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economies. The European Commission consulted in early 2016 on a possible post-2020 
fisheries fund, although no decision has yet been made. 
The UK was allocated €243.1 million in fisheries funding for 2014-2020.196 These funds 
are then matched by the UK Government. The Government’s strategy for spending these 
funds can be found here. The strategy provides for funding to be available for a range of 
projects, including those related to: 
• innovation and training; 
• economic growth; 
• environmental sustainability; 
• port and equipment upgrades; 
• health and safety on vessels; and 
• financing of small and medium enterprises. 
Questions have been asked as to whether future UK governments would continue to 
make these funds available after Brexit.197 If as a result of Brexit there is a contraction in 
the economy, fewer funds may be available for fisheries.198  
The EU provides substantial scientific funding, of which the UK is one of the largest 
recipients, and also supports joint marine science activities. Dr Bryce Stewart from the 
University of York indicated that the “UK’s involvement in such programmes would likely 
be limited after a Brexit”.199  
Following Brexit, spending decisions on fisheries support or science would become a 
decision solely for the UK Government. 
Market access 
The EU is “the largest single fisheries market in the world and a net importer of fish and 
fish products”.200 Tariffs on fish imports are applied on a range of fisheries products from 
non-EU European countries such as Norway.  
According to the think tank Civitas, while Norway does not benefit from completely free 
trade in fisheries products, it has managed to agree “preferential or tariff-free access to 
EU markets” for many of its products. As a result, Civitas argued that Norway had 
successfully defended its interests and market access, even though it is outside the EU.  
However, the CBI noted that tariffs have had an impact on fish processing in Norway. It 
stated that tariffs had led to “most of Norway’s fish-processing industry relocating within 
the EU, principally to Scotland, to continue to benefit from full market access”.201  
It is also relevant to note that Norway has provided reciprocal access to its waters and 
contributes to the EU Budget. In order to negotiate reduced or tariff-free access to the EU, 
it is possible that the UK would need to make concessions on fisheries or in other areas 
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unrelated to fisheries.202 The Danish fish producer organisation has stated that the UK 
should only be granted access to the EU market on the basis that it still permits access to 
UK waters for EU vessels.203  
Outside the EU the UK may no longer have tariff-free access to the EU market, although 
access to the market would depend on the negotiations and the future nature of UK-EU 
relations. The UK, as in other trade areas, would still in all likelihood have to comply with 
any EU market regulations to export fishery products to the EU. But the UK may have less 
influence over what those regulations would be. 
Environmental management 
A number of EU laws relate to the protection of the marine environment. The protection 
of the environment can deliver benefits to the management of fish stocks.  
For example, the Birds and Habitats Directives have contributed to the creation of a 
network of marine protected areas around the UK. According to Dr Bryce Stewart, such 
areas can “have a direct influence on fisheries (by restricting where they can operate) but 
are also likely to be beneficial to fisheries in the long run”.204 Such European protected 
areas “have generally offered much higher levels of protection” than marine protected 
areas created by the Government under domestic legislation.205  
If the UK negotiates membership of the EEA, it may be required to continue to apply the 
Marine Strategy Framework Directive and Water Framework Directive, but not the Birds or 
Habitats Directives.206 The Government’s nature conservation advisors, the Joint Nature 
Conservation Committee, have said that the Birds and Habitats Directives have helped the 
UK to effectively coordinate with other EU countries on conservation action and science.207 
The extent to which Brexit will effect coordination on marine conservation is not clear.  
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7. Environment 
This section describes broad environmental issues possibly arising from Brexit. More 
detailed consideration of specific environment-related issues is given in following chapters. 
7.1 The environment and EU law 
The environment and energy are two key areas of competence where either the EU or 
Member States may act. The EU was given authority to legislate in this area “in the 
recognition that there were significant benefits to solving some environmental problems 
multilaterally”.208 The EU has legislated on a range of environmental issues including air 
quality, climate change, water quality, species protection and habitats protection. 
The environment was added specifically as an EU competence in the Single European Act 
of 1986, and energy in the Lisbon Treaty of 2008.   However, the EU adopted many 
environmental measures before there was any specific legal base, in order to facilitate the 
operation of the Common Market.209  
The environmental principles enshrined in the Single European Act are now central to EU 
environmental law and provide that environmental action by the EU aims “to preserve, 
protect and improve the quality of the environment; to contribute towards protecting 
human health; and to ensure a prudent and rational utilization of natural resources”.210 In 
addition, EU law provides that “preventive action should be taken, that environmental 
damage should as a priority be rectified at source, and that the polluter should pay... [and 
that] environmental protection… shall be a component of the Community’s other 
policies”.211 
Concerns that environmental standards may be lowered after 
Brexit 
Following Brexit it may be easier for the government of the day to lower environmental 
standards. 
Evidence was given to the Environmental Audit Committee in which stakeholders said that 
the UK Government had sought to slow or block EU environmental protection legislation 
where it considered that it was not in the UK’s interest.212 Some witnesses thought, 
therefore, that “if the UK were free to set its own environmental standards, it would set 
them at a less stringent level than has been imposed by the EU”.213  
It has also been noted that EU enforcement mechanisms provide a strong incentive for the 
UK Government to take action on the environment where it might otherwise not.214 
Similar concerns were raised by a number of Members during an Opposition Day debate 
on 12 July 2016. Some Members asked for guarantees from the Government that 
environmental standards would not change following Brexit. Geraint Davies MP, for 
Labour/Co-operative, said that the Government should “give a cast-iron guarantee that 
they will honour, post-Brexit, the environmental standards and undertakings that we have 
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made in the EU to date”.215 Calum Kerr for the SNP said that “Ministers must do 
everything in their power to clarify how they will take forward the protection of the UK’s 
environment in this new political situation. There is so much about the EU that we do not 
want to abandon”.216 
Environmental standards may remain the same or increase 
During the Opposition Day debate on 12 July 2016, the then Secretary of State for Energy 
and Climate Change, Amber Rudd, said that the Government’s commitment to “protect 
the environment, tackle climate change and provide homes and businesses across the 
country with secure and clean energy… has not changed and will not change”. She went 
on: 
While much remains the same, there is no point pretending that the vote to leave the 
EU is not of huge significance. There are risks for us to overcome, but this 
Government will continue to do our part to deliver on the energy and environmental 
challenges our country faces.217 
Some commentators have made the case that future governments could increase 
standards in comparison to the EU. A witness to an Environmental Audit Committee 
inquiry noted that in the past the UK had pushed the EU to adopt tougher environmental 
standards in some areas.218 A commentator noted that Brexit may create “opportunities” 
to improve water management in a replacement for the CAP.219 Peter Lilley MP said that 
EU biofuels subsidies had had a negative environmental impact and that outside the EU 
the UK would “probably abandon this policy”.220 
There are other reasons why a post-Brexit government may not reduce environmental 
standards in comparison with the EU. These include: 
• If the UK remains in the EEA, it may need to comply with elements of EU 
environmental law, such as the Water Framework Directive.221 The UK would have 
less influence over the determination of such standards, as it would be obliged to 
accept EU standards in order to obtain access to the internal market;222 
• The UK is a signatory to a number of international agreements. EU and UK law 
reflect these agreements. The UK would still be bound to meet its international 
obligations following Brexit, and therefore certain standards may not change;223 
• Many environmental measures pre-date EU legislative arrangements, which may 
indicate broad political and public support for the maintenance of some 
environmental standards;  
• The desire to maintain policy stability for business. Stability has benefits related to 
investor confidence and it can enable “a degree of long-term planning”.224 
Updating the UK legislative framework 
Questions have been raised about how the UK environmental legislative framework will be 
updated following Brexit, and how laws would be consistent with the UK’s position 
outside the EU.  
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Kerry McCarthy MP for Labour said that EU Regulations posed a particular challenge: 
Many EU directives have been transposed into UK law through primary or secondary 
legislation under Acts other than the European Communities Act 1972, and that 
legislation would continue to apply until it was changed by Parliament. EU regulations 
would present a different problem for the Government, however. They are directly 
applicable in the member states, so they could immediately cease to apply.225  
She called for “a thorough audit” of the legislation to be carried out and “clear guidance 
given to the House and the general public” on this matter.226 DEFRA faced challenges in 
conducting this work as a result of large budget and staff cuts.227 
Enforcement of EU law 
Following Brexit there may be a less far-reaching judicial process to enforce the 
implementation of environmental policy and to challenge its interpretation. The CJEU can 
issue fines to Member States that fail to comply with EU laws.  
In the debate on 12 July Rachael Maskell MP, Shadow Secretary of State for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs, asked: “how will we regulate, police and enforce the new UK-
based law system as it affects the environment in respect of what currently occurs in the 
EU courts?”228 Caroline Lucas, for the Green Party, said that following Brexit “we will 
need to create a new enforcement mechanism that is as rigorous as possible”.229 
Coordination on transboundary issues 
Barry Gardiner MP, Labour, highlighted the importance of the EU in coordinating the 
management of transboundary environmental issues: 
The fact is that fish and birds and insects do not carry passports; pollution is oblivious 
to the strictures of national airspace or inshore waters. If we wish to manage all of 
these, whether as pests, problems or resources, then it is better to do so in concert 
with our regional neighbours. The vote to leave the EU has made that harder.230 
Two examples of the role of the EU in coordinating action are the Birds and Habitats 
Directives. These have helped to coordinate the creation of a pan-EU network of protected 
areas. The Government’s nature conservation advisors, the Joint Nature Conservation 
Committee, have said that the Birds and Habitats Directives have helped the UK to 
effectively coordinate with other EU countries on conservation action and science.   
The extent to which Brexit will effect coordination on these matters is not clear. Barry 
Gardiner MP called on the Government to “outline how they propose to overcome that 
problem”.231 
In addition to EU coordination, coordination between the four UK nations would need to 
be considered. Various aspects of environmental policy, such as waste, have been 
devolved from Westminster. The different governments across the UK could take distinct 
approaches in future, without the more uniform approach provided under an EU 
framework. 
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7.2 Air Quality 
EU legislation sets limits for a range of air pollutants and requires Member States to have 
plans in place setting out how they will be met. They are required to prepare adequate 
plans to reduce NO2 to acceptable levels by 2010, or 2015 at the latest. The UK failed to 
do so. Currently, legal limits for NO2 will not be met in 16 of the UK’s 40 air quality zones 
until after 2020, including Greater Manchester and Leeds. In London the limits will not be 
met until after 2025.  The Government’s failure to meet NO2 targets led to a unanimous 
judgement of the Supreme Court that the Government had to submit new air quality 
plans to the European Commission no later than 31 December 2015.232  The Government 
has published a new plan233 but a further legal case was launched this year by the 
organisation ClientEarth, with support from the Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan.234  This 
challenges the Government to change its plans in order to reduce air pollution more 
quickly.    
The UK is not the only country struggling to meet targets and the air quality agenda has 
been strongly driven by the European Commission rather than Member States.  The 
impact of leaving the EU on air quality regulation will depend on negotiations, including 
whether the UK remains in the EEA.235  An EU exit could allow the UK to relax air quality 
standards and review any deadlines for meeting them. The UK is currently subject to CJEU 
infraction proceedings but following Brexit (and not becoming part of the EEA), the threat 
of fines for non-compliance will be removed. However, the increasing awareness in the 
UK of the broad range of adverse health effects and increased mortality resulting from air 
pollution exposure could make any substantial watering down of targets politically 
sensitive.   
Following the referendum result, some Members of Parliament from each side of the 
House have highlighted the importance of improving air quality, and have called on the 
Government to uphold standards.  The Chair of the Environmental Audit Committee, 
Mary Creagh, reported that EU membership had been key for air quality, and had allowed 
campaigners to hold the Government to account.  She said there were “question marks 
about what will happen to air pollution standards in the brave new Brexit world”.236 The 
then Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Amber Rudd, stated that the 
Government remained committed to a clean environment and its climate change 
commitments.237 
Some environment and health organisations have expressed concerns that policies on air 
pollution could be weakened following Brexit.  ClientEarth has challenged the 
Government to affirm its commitment to environmental laws such as those on air 
pollution.238  The Institute of Environmental Management and Assessment has reported 
that a poll of their members prior to the referendum showed that: 
Half of environment and sustainability professionals believe that legal standards for 
UK air quality would be reduced if the UK were to leave the EU.  88% of respondents 
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think that the EU policy approach is needed to complement and support national level 
policies in addressing air pollution.239 
Emissions Trading Scheme 
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) sets a decreasing cap for emissions from energy 
intensive sectors, and allocates or auctions EU Emissions Allowances (EUAs), which can be 
traded on the open market. Phase II, which imposed reductions of 6.8% compared to 
2005 emissions, ended in 2012. Phase III will run from 2013 to 2020, when over half of 
allowances will be auctioned, and will set an overall reduction in emissions of 1.74% per 
year compared to Phase II levels. This will represent a 21% reduction by 2020 in emissions 
for all sectors in Europe covered, compared to 2005 levels. 
The last recession and over-allocation of allowances in phase 2 resulted in a collapse of 
the price of EUAs. As a result the EU is taking several measures to reduce the supply of 
allowances going forward, including removing surplus allowances from the market. In the 
meantime, the UK introduced a floor price for carbon in April 2013 by amending the 
climate change levy to apply to fossil fuels used for energy generation, which applies 
when the EUA price falls below a certain level.  The projected increases in floor price were 
reduced in the 2014 UK Budget and the price was set at £18 per tonne until 2020. At 
Budget 2016 the Government stated the £18 per tonne would be maintained and then 
uprated by inflation in 2020-21. Budget 2016 also stated that the Autumn statement 
would set out the ‘long-term direction’ for the Carbon Price Support rate.240 
Revenue from both EUAs and the Carbon Floor Price are retained by the Treasury, which 
could be viewed as an incentive to continue with both measures.  Receipts from ETS 
auctions were £0.6 billion in 2014-15, but this is expected to fall to £0.5 billion in 2015-
16 and 2016-17, and to £0.4 billion in the years that follow through to 2020-21.241  
Leaving the EU does not automatically remove the floor price, as this is a UK measure; 
neither would it necessarily mean the UK would have to leave the EU ETS, but it would 
depend on the approach to exit the UK chooses to take. EU Membership is not a 
prerequisite of participation: Switzerland is in negotiations to join the scheme, as was 
Australia until there was a change of government.  Following the Paris Climate Agreement 
in December 2015, there is an added impetus for the expansion of emissions trading.  The 
UK has been directly involved in this process, with the announcement in January 2016 
that UK Government officials are working with China to ensure the Chinese carbon cap-
and-trade system is compatible with the EU ETS. 
Following the referendum the price for carbon allowances fell; BusinessGreen reported 
this was due to uncertainty over UK policy towards the ETS in the future.242 
7.3 Habitats Protection 
The UK is currently subject to the requirements of the Habitats Directive  and Wild Birds 
Directive, collectively known as the ‘Nature Directives’.  
• The ‘Habitats Directive’ (92/43/EEC) aims to ensure the protection of species and 
habitat types of EU conservation concern. 
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• The ‘Birds Directive’ (2009/147/EC) is the codified version of Directive79/409/EEC 
as amended. This Directive provides a legal framework for the conservation of all 
wild bird species naturally occurring in the EU. 
The Commission has described these as the “cornerstone of Europe’s nature conservation 
policy”.243 They provide protection for designated sites and can require mitigation 
measures in terms of alternative habitats for development on or near these sites. These 
requirements can be a deal-breaker in small and large development projects, but a 
government review found that the requirements have largely worked well in the UK.  
The Nature Directives represent a significant EU environmental policy instrument and one 
which is not covered by the EEA Agreement.244 
Outside the EU, the UK would not be bound to continue these requirements which are 
implemented in UK law via a range of regulations. It is also unlikely to be a requirement of 
any UK trade deal with the EU. 
So far the UK Government has given little indication of how far it might maintain the 
protections and processes currently required by these Directives but has said that they 
would be considered as part of a long term vision for the environment.  
However, the UK has a strong legislative framework for wildlife and habitat protection 
and not all protection is completely entangled with EU requirements; e.g. the UK system 
of Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs). The UK is also a signatory to the Bern 
Convention, an international agreement on nature conservation across Europe. 
What protection do the Nature Directives currently provide? 
The Nature Directives provide for a network of Member State designated conservation 
areas across Europe relating to specified habitats and birds known as Special Areas of 
Conservation (SACs) and Special Protection Areas (SPAs) respectively.245 
In the UK, SACs and SPAs correspond to domestic Sites of Special Scientific Interest 
(SSSIs). The Directive requires these sites to be suitably managed and protected by 
Member States, and certain assessments have to be carried out if there would be any 
significant impact on such a site from a proposed plan or project. If there would be, 
mitigation measures have to be put in place before plans or projects can proceed. If such 
measures are not possible, the project can only proceed if there are ‘Imperative Reasons of 
Overriding Public Interest’ (IROPI), and then compensatory measures are required, such as 
the creation of an alternative habitat elsewhere. Meeting these requirements is often a 
major consideration in large infrastructure projects such as the High Speed Two rail 
network (HS2) and potential tidal barrage schemes, as well as smaller, localised 
development proposals. 
EU Fitness Check of the Directives 
The European Commission is currently undertaking an in-depth evaluation of the Habitats 
Directive and the Birds Directives, as part of its Smart Regulation policy and its Regulatory 
Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT).246  The review – known as a ‘fitness check’ -
started in January 2015 and is due to conclude in the last quarter of 2016.247 
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The Commission will be assessing the potential for merging the Directives into a more 
modern piece of legislation, but it is not yet clear whether this is going to lead to any 
major changes in the detail of the Directives’ requirements.248 
An initial evaluation report for the Commission, drawing on Member State input and that 
of wider stakeholders, has indicated that the principles and approach of the Directives 
remain valid and in line with EU objectives on biodiversity and wider economic objectives. 
However, it also highlights that implementation is complex and challenging. It shows that 
businesses and environmental groups differ in their views about whether the associated 
administrative burdens are unnecessary, but share the view that burdens are often caused 
by “inefficient implementation at national, regional and local level”.249 
The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) is among 100 organisations across the 
UK who are collaborating, along with international networks such as the European 
Environmental Bureau, to warn that this review is the “single biggest threat to UK and 
European nature and biodiversity in a generation’.250These organisations are concerned 
that a Commission focused on growth and jobs will be seeking to weaken the Directives. 
How are the Nature Directives currently enshrined in UK law? 
The Nature Directives have been transposed into UK law by a range of regulations 
since1994.  
The Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC), the Government’s nature conservation 
advisor in European and global fora, oversees their implementation and reports to the 
European Commission on UK compliance with the Directives. If the UK leaves the EU, 
these laws will remain part of UK legislation until or unless they are revoked, replaced or 
amended.  
UK domestic laws refer to the Directives in references to lists of protected species in 
Annexes to the Directives. After Brexit the laws will need to be updated to be consistent 
with the UK’s position outside the EU. 
If the UK wishes to keep the definitions and EU terms in the Directives, the wording could 
be taken from the Directives and put into UK legislation. This happens with legislation 
implementing international treaties, which are not automatically part of UK domestic law. 
In England and Wales, the Nature Directives have been implemented mainly by the 
Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2010 (the Habitats Regulations) and The 
Conservation of Habitats and Species (Amendment) Regulations 2012, which consolidate 
earlier legislation. The Wildlife & Countryside Act 1981 (as amended) also implements the 
Wild Birds Directive across the UK, as amended – in particular by various orders and 
regulations in Northern Ireland.  
In Scotland, the Habitats Directive is transposed through this combination where there are 
reserved matters. This is the same for Northern Ireland, where these regulations update 
The Conservation (Natural Habitats, &c) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1995 (as 
amended). 
For UK offshore waters (i.e. from 12 nautical miles from the coast out to 200nm, or to the 
limit of the UK Continental Shelf Designated Area), the Habitats Directive is transposed 
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into UK law by the Offshore Marine Conservation (Natural Habitats & c.) Regulations 2007 
(as amended). 
A very wide range of other statutory and non-statutory activities also support the 
implementation of the Birds Directive in the UK. This includes national bird monitoring 
schemes, bird conservation research, and the UK Biodiversity Action Plan which involves 
action for a number of bird species and the habitats which support them. 
What is the UK Government’s Brexit position on the Nature 
Directives? 
The UK Government has said that until the UK leaves the EU “current arrangements for 
our environment remain in place” and that “Defra will continue to ensure the right 
policies are in place for a cleaner, healthier environment for everyone”.251 
In terms of the sites protected by the Nature Directives, the UK Government has said: 
The Government will wish to consider the Impacts of the decision to leave the EU, 
including for the UK’s Natura 2000 and other protected sites, We have a manifesto 
commitment to produce a 25 Year Plan for the Environment. We all now have an 
opportunity to consider our long-term vision for the environment following the 
referendum vote.252 
Past evaluation of the Nature Directives from a UK perspective provides some evidence 
base for future approaches. 
A Coalition Government implementation review of the Habitats and Wild Birds Directives 
(November 2011 - March 2012) found that implementation generally works well with 
minimal burdens, whilst maintaining environmental integrity. It identified necessary 
improvements relating to facilitating nationally significant infrastructure projects, data 
sharing and quality, streamlining guidance and generally improving the customer 
experience.   
A key outcome of the review was the establishment of the cross-Government Major 
infrastructure and Environment Unit (MIEU) to help to quickly resolve any issues arising 
from the Directive at pre-application stage. 
The UK Government’s contribution to the EU review (April 2015) supported continued EU 
habitats legislation as a helpful means to ensure parity across Member States and co-
ordinated action. It indicated that there could be scope for greater flexibility in how 
Member States achieve the required outcomes and also that the legislation could be 
updated to account for new approaches being pursued under the Water Framework 
Directive and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD).253 
Impact of Brexit 
Potential change in the UK’s approach to wildlife and habitats protection 
It is not clear how far the UK might withdraw from the Nature Directives’ requirements 
outside the EU because the UK has a heritage in this policy area and the UK Government 
has previously expressed “strong support” for its aims.254 
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The Coalition Government’s Habitats and Wild Birds Directives Implementation Review 
found that implementation generally works well with minimal burdens, while maintaining 
environmental integrity.  
When the EU requirements were introduced, the UK was one of only a few Member 
States which already had a long legislative history of designating and protecting specific 
areas dating from1949. Hence, although the Habitats Directive introduced some new 
concepts and higher protection levels for species, the UK’s existing legislative 
arrangements for Sites of Special Scientific Interest and Town and Country Planning 
already imposed specific management requirements and restrictions on development in 
protected areas.  
In the last 15 years a number of Member States, including the UK, have been challenged 
domestically and in the CJEU regarding their interpretation of the Directive. These 
challenges have usually been brought on grounds of alleged insufficient protection of 
wildlife under the Directive. UK cases have concerned the responsibilities of planning 
authorities to account for the requirements in considering planning permission and 
economic trade-offs - areas where the UK Government might perhaps like greater 
freedom.255 
The Review of the balance of competencies between the UK and EU: Environment and 
Climate Change (February 2014) set out examples of where business found that the costs 
of meeting the Directives has been disproportionate to the environmental benefits. The 
requirements relating to bat and newt relocation were identified as being particularly 
difficult. Outside the EU, the UK will be freer to decide how to respond to these practical 
issues. 
Depending on the terms of exit, the UK will no longer face the potential for infraction 
proceedings from the EU for failing to comply with the Nature Directives. While the UK 
will still be subject to international conservation and biodiversity conventions, these tend 
not to have associated enforcement processes.  
The UK has a strong international reputation for ratifying international environmental 
requirements. However, it is not clear how far the considerable threat of EU fines has 
previously ensured relatively strong compliance. 
Countries that are only signatories to Bern have been found to have less successfully 
implemented its provisions.256 
New approach to conservation co-ordination with the EU 
The continued protection of UK and Europe-wide wildlife and habitats will require some 
future co-ordinated conservation action with the EU, not least to meet international 
commitments, e.g. the Bern Convention to which the UK is a signatory. Conservation is 
more successful with a network of habitat and species protections over a large range of 
countries and this is the basis of current UK, EU and international conservation policy. 
The Birds and Habitats Directives help the EU to meet its obligations under the Bern 
Convention and Norway already co-ordinates on nature conservation with the EU under 
this convention.257 
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The European Commission’s current fitness check of the Nature Directives may lead to key 
changes in their form and implementation. The UK has contributed to this review process 
so far but may have limited influence now and in the future, and this will affect its own 
conservation efforts and approach if European conservation policy starts to diverge greatly 
from the UK’s preferred direction. 
Revision of role of the UK Major Infrastructure and Environment Unit (MIEU) 
The UK Major infrastructure and Environment Unit (MIEU) was set up specifically to resolve 
issues relating to the Habitats Directive at infrastructure projects pre-application stage. Its 
future role will depend on how much of the Nature Directives the UK maintains. 
7.4 Water quality 
Water quality legislation and policy in the UK is largely driven by EU law. Of particular note 
are the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive and the Water Framework Directive, but a 
large number of other areas are also regulated at EU level, including drinking water, 
bathing water and priority substances. Some key examples are discussed below: 
• The Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive (91/271/EEC) (UWWTD) aims to 
protect the environment from the adverse effects of discharges of urban waste 
water from public sewers and treatment plants. In March 2016, the European 
Commission referred the UK to the CJEU over failures to meet the UWWTD in 17 
areas and this case is ongoing.258 Separately, in 2012, the CJEU found that the UK 
was in breach of the UWWTD as a result of frequent and large spillages of waste 
water in London. In order to address the infractions in London, Defra is currently 
involved with the Thames Tideway Tunnel – a large sewer running under the River 
Thames.  The project has been underway for a number of years with preliminary 
construction planned for 2016. The project aims to tackle the problem of waste 
water overflows for the next 100 years.  
• The European Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) (WFD) provides a common 
framework for water management and protection in Europe. The WFD established 
a system for the protection and improvement of all aspects of the water 
environment including rivers, lakes, estuaries, coastal waters and groundwater. 
The Directive requires all inland and coastal waters to reach at least “good status” 
by 2015 (or later if relevant waivers are relied on). In 2012 only 36% of water 
bodies in the UK were classified as ‘good’ or better.  More information is set out in 
the Library Briefing Paper on the EU Water Framework Directive: achieving good 
status of water bodies.  
• The EU has had rules in place to safeguard public health and clean bathing waters 
since the 1970s. The revised Bathing Water Directive (2006/7/EC, replacing 
Directive 76/160/EEC) requires the UK to monitor and assess beaches and inland 
sites used by large numbers of bathers (referred to as bathing waters) for certain 
parameters of bacteria. It includes a classification and notification system so the 
public are aware of the status of the bathing water. In 2015 the UK reported 
4.9% (31) of bathing water were in poor quality and 0.5% (3) were not possible 
to classify. All others were of sufficient, good or excellent quality.259 
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The impact of Brexit on water quality 
In general, the impact of Brexit on water quality will depend on the deal that is negotiated 
by the UK Government, in particular whether the UK negotiates membership of the EEA.  
Most EU water legislation would continue to apply if the UK remained in the EEA.260 Any 
infractions would be subject to EEA enforcement processes. However, the Bathing Water 
Directive is excluded from the EEA agreement, so the UK Government would be able to 
amend or repeal the domestic legislation that implements its requirements. Opposition 
Members have urged the Government to clarify whether the UK’s beaches and bathing 
water quality will still receive the same standard of protection after Brexit.261 
If the UK does not stay in the EEA, then the Government and devolved administrations will 
be able to amend and/or repeal the domestic legislation that gives effect to the full range 
of EU water legislation. However, as the majority of EU water law has been transposed 
directly into domestic law, the relevant legislation will not be automatically or immediately 
affected by Brexit.  Any potential amendment or repeal of domestic law is likely to be very 
complicated and prolonged.  
Outside the EEA the UK will no longer be subject to a threat of large infraction fines. In 
addition, different governments across the UK could take even more distinct approaches 
without the uniform approach of the EU framework, as water is largely a devolved area. 
This would require discussions regarding any diverging approaches and possible cross-
border impacts. 
Some are concerned that exit from the EU and the EEA might result in a loss of impetus 
for action on improving water quality in the UK. The Government will be able to relax 
water quality standards and/or review any deadlines for meeting them. EU reporting 
requirements will fall away and this could mean that less information is available in the 
public domain. Since the referendum, ClientEarth has warned that bathing water and 
waste water regulations could be “scrapped or weakened”.262  
Specifically in relation to the Thames Tideway Tunnel, its scale and importance could mean 
that Brexit will not impact its future, particularly as it is already a major ongoing project. 
However, the former Prime Minister warned that its financing may be impacted, on the 
basis that Brexit would terminate Britain’s link with the European Investment Bank, which 
had confirmed a £700 million injection of loan finance.263  
But leaving the EU and the EEA will not necessarily mean action taken at a national level 
will be halted or reversed. Any such decisions may be met with political resistance, given 
the importance of good quality water across many sectors, including health, farming, food 
and leisure. Following the referendum, the RSPB’s Chief Executive called on the UK 
Government to “improve the implementation of existing legal protection and, where 
necessary, to increase it”.264 In some cases (such as drinking water standards) existing UK 
requirements are stricter, or in addition to those required by the EU, which may make it 
difficult for the UK to retreat too far from these requirements.   
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International guidelines will continue to apply to the UK following Brexit. For example, the 
World Health Organisation publishes international guidelines on water quality (specifically 
for drinking water). But these are guidelines rather than legal requirements and not 
subject to the same enforcement or compliance standards as the EU Directives. 
7.5 Waste 
UK waste policy and legislation is largely driven by EU law, which seeks to prevent the 
production of waste where possible and to reduce its overall environmental impact.  
The key piece of EU waste legislation is the Waste Framework Directive (2008/98/EC), 
which includes key definitions, sets a hierarchy for how waste should be managed, 
introduces the “polluter pays principle” and “extended producer responsibility”, and sets 
targets for recycling by 2020. There is a suite of EU waste legislation which supplements 
the framework Directive, including Directives on packaging and packaging waste, landfill, 
end-of-life vehicles, waste batteries, and waste electrical and electronic equipment. This is 
an area which has also been the subject of a great deal of case law, both in European and 
domestic courts. Until the date of a formal exit from the EU, the UK remains subject to EU 
requirements and any relevant court judgments.  
The impact of Brexit on waste 
The majority of EU waste management law has been transposed into domestic law in the 
UK. This means that the relevant legislation will not be automatically or immediately 
affected by the UK’s exit from the EU.  As almost all UK waste law derives from the EU, 
any potential amendment or repeal of domestic law is likely to be very complicated and 
prolonged. As with the other areas of environmental policy, the impact of Brexit will 
depend on the deal that is negotiated by the UK Government, in particular whether the 
UK negotiates membership of the EEA. Most waste management legislation will continue 
to apply if the UK remains in the EEA265 and any infractions will be subject to EEA 
enforcement processes. 
Outside the EU and the EEA, the UK Government and devolved administrations will be 
able to amend and/or repeal the domestic legislation that gives effect to EU waste 
legislation.  As waste is largely a devolved area, different governments across the UK could 
take distinct approaches without the uniform approach of the EU framework.   
The benefits of effective waste management to both the environment and the economy 
may mean that an EU exit will not lead to a substantial change in approach by the UK 
Government. Global law firm Norton Rose Fulbright suggests that there are “very few 
positive messages central Government could make for moving significantly away from EU 
targets in [waste] without impacting on other environmental policies”.266  
However, the referendum result has raised questions about the longer-term approach to 
waste policy in the UK. Leaving the EU and the EEA could reduce the impetus to meet 
legislative targets within clear timeframes, as the threat of legal challenge for any failure 
will be removed. Commentators have suggested that in this scenario it is likely that 
legislators would repeal or weaken EU requirements with the objective of reducing the 
regulatory burden on businesses.267 
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In 2013 an economist from the Environmental Services Association (ESA) stated that an EU 
exit “would leave a huge void for the industry as it would be unclear to what degree we 
would retain any elements of the European path towards higher levels of environmental 
sustainability” and “billions of pounds of fresh investment in green jobs and growth 
[could dry] up overnight”.268 Brexit could therefore undermine economically efficient 
decision-making in the sector due to the long term planning needed for investment in 
waste infrastructure and innovation.   
In a press statement following the referendum result, the ESA’s Executive Director warned 
that “the danger now is that the waste and recycling sector is placed at the bottom of the 
Government’s in-tray”.269 Recent analysis has identified recycling policy as an issue which 
may be weakened at a domestic level following Brexit, which in turn could “blunt the 
incentive for UK firms to develop programmes” in this area.270 The Guardian also reported 
that “two-thirds of the professionals” in the sector think progress in recycling and waste 
will “go into reverse, with 30% saying it will stay the same and just 4% thinking it will 
improve”.271  
In relation to future policy, the waste debate in Europe has shifted to keeping resources in 
use for as long as possible and reducing waste’s negative implications for the environment 
and the economy (a ‘circular economy’ rather than a traditional ‘linear economy’). The 
European Commission adopted a new Circular Economy Package in December 2015 to 
stimulate and harmonise the transition towards a circular economy across Europe.272 The 
Commission stated that the measures could bring net savings of €600 billion or 8% of 
annual turnover for businesses in the EU and would reduce total annual greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2-4%. The package includes a number of new EU legislative waste proposals, 
an Action Plan and funding support at both EU and national level. These proposals will be 
agreed at EU level over the coming years.  
The waste industry has called on the UK Government, in the absence of an EU framework, 
to put in place a long-term framework of policy and legislation consistent with circular 
economy principles, so that the industry can invest in waste and resource management.273 
Opposition Members have also called for the Government to reassure Parliament that 
Brexit will not derail progress on the circular economy.274 This may be an area where 
different governments across the UK diverge to a greater extent in future approach - for 
example, the Scottish Government introduced its own national circular economy strategy 
in February 2016 in advance of any EU-wide approach.275  
7.6 Chemicals regulation 
Regulating the safe use of chemicals is undertaken at EU level. The REACH (Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorisation and restriction of Chemicals) Regulation, which came into force 
on 1 June 2007, provides the over-arching framework. REACH applies to substances 
manufactured or imported into the EU in quantities of 1 tonne or more per year and 
generally applies to all individual chemical substances on their own or in preparation. It 
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requires that substances are registered and tested and evaluated for safe use. A major part 
of REACH is the requirement for manufacturers or importers of substances to register 
them with a central European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) which administers much of the 
registration process. 
Some substances, such as human medicines (see section 16.6), are covered by specific 
legislation. Pesticides and other products that protect plants/crops are regulated by 
Regulation (EC) 1107/2009. Biocides (wood preservatives and insect repellent, for 
example) are regulated by the Biocidal Products Regulation (EU) 528/2012. Other 
legislation requires that food additives must be authorised, following advice by the 
European Food Standards Authority (EFSA), before they can be used in foods.  
The Classification, Labelling and Packaging Regulation (CLP) provides a standardised 
system for classifying and labelling chemicals in the EU. The Regulation adopts the United 
Nations’ Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS) 
across all EU Member States, including the UK.276 The CLP Regulation ensures that the 
hazards presented by chemicals are clearly communicated to workers and consumers in 
the EU through the classification and labelling of chemicals. As a result, standard systems 
are in place that Member States rely on to ensure chemicals are safe for use. If the UK no 
longer participated in these systems, the burdens applied to industry might be reduced, 
there might be more flexibility in testing the risks presented by some substances and a 
reduction in the administrative burden of registering these with the European Agencies. 
However, some form of safety testing would probably have to take its place. Any benefits 
would have to be balanced against the inconvenience both to local and international 
industry caused by a UK withdrawal from these established systems. A substantial 
investment has been made by industry during the transition to the new harmonised 
European systems. Further changes, and in particular any reversal, might prove unpopular. 
The most realistic result of EU withdrawal would see the UK adopting similar positions to 
Norway, Iceland and other non-member States which have chosen to adopt EU REACH 
legislation independently.  
Considering health and safety legislation more generally, it is the case that over the last 
quarter century much of this has originated in the form of EU Directives – Article 118A of 
the Treaty of Rome gave health and safety prominence in the objectives of the EU. These 
Directives have built on the pre-existing UK safety systems underpinned by the Health and 
Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and associated secondary legislation. Over the years there 
have been concerns over the potential for overzealous application of modernised health 
and safety law, be it the result of “gold-plating” when transposing the Directives into UK 
law or of misunderstandings as to what the law actually requires. These concerns 
prompted reviews by Lord Young of Graffham and Professor Ragnar Löfstedt, and 
subsequent reforms by the Coalition Government.277 In his report, Löfstedt commented: 
“Many of the requirements that originate from the EU would probably exist anyway, and 
many are contributing to improved health and safety outcomes. There is evidence, 
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8. Energy and Climate Change 
8.1 Government energy policy 
The Coalition Government said that one of its priorities was to widen and deepen the 
single market in energy.279 The larger the market and the fewer the barriers to trade, in 
theory the higher the level of competition and the lower the prices for consumers should 
be. A single market in energy and greater harmonisation would be likely to increase 
security of supply, as would greater physical interconnection. Many of the UK’s large 
suppliers are multinationals and they are also looking for a stable investment regime. 
Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) sets out EU 
competence for energy policy, which includes the functioning of an Energy Market, 
security of supply, energy efficiency and promoting interconnection.  These are all subject 
to a Member State’s right to “to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy 
resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its 
energy supply”. 
The report by the House of Lords EU Sub-Committee D, No Country is an Energy Island: 
Securing Investment for the EU's Future, considered the role of an EU market and 
concluded that there are “clear benefits to be derived from working within the EU on the 
energy challenge”.280 Prior to the referendum, companies in the energy industry indicated 
elements of the industry would see negative impacts from an exit.281 After the vote The 
Guardian reported that a number of industry commentators and companies felt that an 
exit may damage investment in the sector and that the impact would depend on the UK’s 
future involvement in the Internal Energy Market (IEM).282  
During the campaign it was suggested that leaving the EU could cost consumers £500 
million a year in rising energy bills. This was examined by Full Fact which found that this 
estimate might not be accurate, that any cost depended on the reaction to Brexit of 
investors in the UK energy sector and the position within the IEM.283 Leave campaigners 
suggested energy bills may fall as a result of changing energy policy and potential 
reductions in VAT on domestic energy.284 
8.2 EU energy policy 
EU energy policy is currently being implemented by the Commission’s Third Energy 
Package (2009) and the Commission’s 2015 Energy Union Package. The framework has 
five elements: energy security, a fully integrated European energy market, energy 
efficiency, carbon reduction, and research, innovation and competitiveness. This 2015 
framework follows three liberalisation packages since the 1990s.285 Ofgem set out on its 
website how European policy impacts on UK policy.286 In withdrawing from the EU, the 
UK will need to consider how the UK energy market interacts with the EU’s internal 
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energy market. Examples of policy that would need to be considered are interconnector 
regulation and energy efficiency labelling and eco-design. 
The impact of withdrawal depends on the relationship formed with the EU. Given the 
increasingly multinational nature of energy markets and companies, withdrawal from the 
EU would probably not affect the direction of travel towards a more integrated energy 
economy, although differences in approach may emerge. Energy projects are typically 
capital intensive, and following the Brexit vote, investor confidence and access to finance 
will be key issues for the industry in the coming years. For example, the Financial Times 
raised the potential for uncertainty over future energy investment in the UK, particularly 
for renewables, but reported that projects were continuing after the vote, noting the 
argument that investment was driven by the UK’s need for new generation capacity.287 
There have been some suggestions that uncertainty in energy markets since the 
referendum could increase prices.288 
The Select Committee on Energy and Climate Change has recently launched an inquiry 
exploring the implications for UK energy policy of leaving the EU. 
8.3 Impact of Brexit 
The impact of withdrawal depends on the future relationship formed with the 
EU. Given the increasingly multinational nature of energy markets and 
companies, withdrawal from the EU will probably not affect the direction of 
travel towards a more integrated energy economy, although differences in 
approach may emerge. Energy projects are typically capital intensive, and 
following the Brexit vote, investor confidence and access to finance will be 
key issues for the industry in the coming years. For example, the Financial 
Times raised the potential for uncertainty over future energy investment in 
the UK, particularly for renewables, but reported that projects were 
continuing after the vote, noting that some argued that investment was 
driven by the UK’s need for new generation capacity.289 There have been 
some suggestions that uncertainty in energy markets since the referendum 
could increase prices.290 
The Select Committee on Energy and Climate Change has recently launched 
an inquiry exploring the implications for UK energy policy of leaving the EU. 
Energy security and supply 
The EU Large Combustion Plants Directive (2001/80/EC – LCPD), and its successor the 
Industrial Emissions Directive (2010/75/EU – IED) require new power plants to comply with 
stricter emission limits on pollutants, while older plants have to close or clean up (by 2015 
under the LCPD and by 2023 for the IED). The Directives are transposed into UK law via 
Environmental Permitting Regulations. The closure of plants coincides with warnings from 
Ofgem on the UK’s decreasing capacity margins (the surplus of energy supply over 
demand); the closures thus have implications for UK energy security as generating plants 
come to the end of their life under the Directives. 
Power stations are shortly due to close in many Member States, but since coal is attractive 
at the moment,291 some still have new coal fired plants under construction. These will 
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need to be ‘clean’ coal. Outside the EU, the Government might choose to allow longer 
lifetimes, given falling capacity margins and, to date, no demonstration of carbon capture 
and storage at scale. 
Beyond determining environmental standards for generation, the EU plays a broader role 
in determining the security of the UK energy supply. At one level, government support for 
generation technologies must be approved under state aid rules. More broadly, responses 
in the Energy Report of the Review of the Balance of Competences demonstrated the 
complexity of EU energy policy and the conflicts with external policies. For example, in the 
petroleum sector stakeholders were split on the role of the EU. Respondents from the oil 
sector considered that EU legislation had been unnecessary and duplicative of world-
leading UK controls. On shale gas exploitation, whilst some stakeholders felt there was no 
need for additional EU legislation, others representing environmental groups suggested 
that existing national or EU controls were not sufficient to mitigate the potential 
environmental impacts.292 An EU exit will need to take these views into account, 
depending on the shape of any trade deal with the EU. 
A further dimension is the flow of oil and gas imports into and within Europe. The EU 
imports over half of the energy it consumes and dependency is particularly high for oil and 
gas. Many countries are also heavily reliant on Russia for their natural gas. In response to 
concerns, the European Commission released its Energy Security Strategy in May 2014. In 
terms of UK security of supply, a report for the National Grid on Brexit in March 2016 
found that in the near-term there were unlikely to be issues for UK gas as it has strong 
security of supply from diverse sources; there could be ‘exposure’ to greater risks in the 
longer run.293 
Renewable Energy  
The UK’s existing renewables targets are set by the 2009 Renewables 
Directive.294   
Some statistics: 
• In 2008 renewables constituted 2.25% of energy sources in the UK.  
• Under the Directive, we have a target for renewable energy use of 
15% by 2020, to fit within the EU’s overall target of 20%.   
• In 2015 renewable energy use in the UK increased to 8.3%, up from 
7.1% in 2014.295 
• The renewable electricity share of total generation in 2015 (measured on the basis 
required by the 2009 Renewables Directive) was 22.3%, up from 17.9% in the 
previous year.296 
For a realistic chance of meeting the EU target, this last figure will need to rise to around 
30% by 2020.  The previous Government was confident of meeting these targets and 
identified nine renewable technologies that it considered would help achieve the target in 
the Renewable Energy Roadmap.297   
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Emissions Trading Scheme 
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) sets a decreasing cap for emissions from energy 
intensive sectors, and allocates or auctions emissions allowances (EUAs), which can be 
traded on the open market. Phase II, which imposed reductions of 6.8% compared to 
2005 emissions, ended in 2012. Phase III will run from 2013 to 2020, when over half of 
allowances will be auctioned, and will set an overall reduction in emissions of 1.74% per 
year compared to Phase II levels. This will represent a 21% reduction by 2020 in emissions 
for all sectors in Europe covered, compared to 2005 levels. 
The last recession and over-allocation of allowances in phase 2 resulted in a collapse of 
the price of EUAs. As a result the EU is taking several measures to reduce the supply of 
allowances going forward, including removing surplus allowances from the market. In the 
meantime, the UK introduced a floor price for carbon in April 2013 by amending the 
climate change levy to apply to fossil fuels used for energy generation, which applies 
when the EUA price falls below a certain level.  The projected increases in floor price were 
reduced in the 2014 Budget and was set at £18 per tonne until 2020. At Budget 2016 the 
Government stated that the £18 per tonne would be maintained and then uprated by 
inflation in 2020-21. Budget 2016 also stated that the Autumn statement would set out 
the “long-term direction” for the Carbon Price Support rate.298 
Revenue from both EUAs and the Carbon Floor Price are retained by the Treasury, which 
could be viewed as an incentive to continue with both measures.  Receipts from ETS 
auctions were £0.6 billion in 2014-15, but this is expected to fall to £0.5 billion in 2015-
16 and 2016-17, and to £0.4 billion in the years that follow through to 2020-21.299  
Leaving the EU would not automatically remove the floor price, as this is a UK measure; 
neither would it necessarily mean the UK would have to leave the EU ETS, but it would 
depend on the approach to exit the UK chooses to take. Membership of the EU is not a 
prerequisite of participation: Switzerland is in negotiations to join the scheme, as was 
Australia until there was a change of government.  Following the Paris Climate Agreement 
in December 2015, there is an added impetus for the expansion of emissions trading.  The 
UK has been directly involved in this process, with the announcement in January 2016 
that UK government officials are working with China to ensure that the Chinese carbon 
cap-and-trade system is compatible with the EU ETS. 
Following the referendum the price for carbon allowances fell; BusinessGreen reported 
this was due to uncertainty over UK policy towards the ETS in the future.300 
Climate targets 
An EU exit would not remove the legally binding UK climate targets under the Climate 
Change Act 2008, but it could increase the focus on all aspects of UK-based generation, 
especially if exit resulted in poorer security of supply through decreased interconnectivity 
to Europe, reduced harmonisation of EU energy markets or less investment into the UK by 
multinational companies.  
Brexit would also affect the UK’s international climate targets under the United Nations 
Conference on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Currently the UK negotiates as a part of the 
EU block and has internally set targets that together with those of other Member States 
aim to meet the EU’s overall target.  An EU withdrawal would have to address that lack of 
a UK-specific target under UNFCCC. It was also widely recognised in the Competency 
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Review that negotiating as part of an EU block was beneficial, as the EU had more 
influence at an international level than individual Member States acting alone.301 
More recently, ministers have reiterated the UK’s commitment to tackling climate change 
but giving somewhat mixed messages about whether Brexit will make any difference at 
all. 
The former Secretary of State for energy and climate change, Amber Rudd, was quoted as 
suggesting that Brexit would not lessen the UK’s commitment to tackling climate change, 
but may make it more difficult for the UK to act internationally.302  Andrea Leadsom, the 
then energy minister, took a different view, arguing that nothing would change.303 
The UK Government has also expressed strong ambitions for the growth of sectors such as 
offshore wind to 2020 and beyond.304  An EU exit could create further uncertainty in the 
renewables sector, following early closure of the Renewables Obligation to onshore wind 
and other recent changes.  The stability provided by EU long-term renewables targets was 
something identified as very helpful by a wide range of respondents to the Review of 
Balance of the Competences on Environment and Climate Change.305 
 
The Paris Agreement 
One currently unresolved question is how Brexit would affect the UK’s ratification of the Paris 
Agreement, which the UK signed in April 2016.  The UK’s vote to leave the EU has the 
potential to affect progress towards ratification.  
 
Ministers have made no recent comment on when the UK might ratify the Paris 
Agreement, beyond indicating that it will be “as soon as possible”.  Some commentators 
have suggested that Brexit may mean that the Agreement itself has to be recalibrated.306 
Amber Rudd said in early June 2016 that the UK would ratify the Agreement “as soon as 
possible”, possibly after the summer when the European Commission published legislation 
on the 2030 climate and energy framework.307  In the debate on the Finance Bill in July 
2016, the Exchequer Secretary, Damian Hinds, drew attention to the UK’s role in securing 
the Paris Agreement but made no further comment about ratification.308 
Most recently, some commentators have asked whether - with the demise of DECC and 
climate change not appearing in the title of the new Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy (BEIS)  - climate change might receive less government attention.  But 
Baroness Neville Rolfe, minister of state at BEIS, said that climate change will be at the 
heart of BEIS and that the UK intends to ratify the Paris Agreement as soon as possible: 
The title of a department matters far less than its DNA and what it does … Energy 
and climate change will be at the heart of the new department. For example, I can 
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confirm that this Government remain committed to ratifying the Paris agreement, 
which was agreed last year by 195 countries, as soon as possible. Our policy will also 
look at affordable and reliable energy, and generally join things up in the way that I 
described in my opening remarks. 
At the heart of our commitment is the Climate Change Act. While the vote to leave 
the European Union is hugely significant, the Government will continue to play their 
part in tackling the energy and environmental challenges our country faces.309 
In its most recent report, the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) has commented on 
both the Paris Agreement and the UK’s vote in favour of leaving the EU.  It notes that the 
latter does not alter the need to reduce emissions or the scale of that reduction, but might 
have an impact on how the UK’s carbon budgets are met.310    
The Financial Times has suggested that the long-term implications of Brexit for energy are 
“highly uncertain” and quoted the view of Christiana Figueres (the executive secretary of 
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9. Transport 
9.1 EU’s current role in UK transport policy 
Competence for transport is ‘shared’, meaning that either the EU or the Member States 
may act, but Member States may be prevented from acting once the EU has done so.312    
The development of the EU’s Common Transport Policy (CTP) has resulted in the focusing 
of action in a number of policy areas, specifically: 
• Economic – including the creation of a single market in transport services that 
facilitates the free movement of goods, services and people, and the creation of an 
integrated transport system; 
• Social – including the promotion of high safety standards, security and passengers’ 
and workers’ rights; 
• Environmental – including ensuring that the transport system works in a way that 
does not impact negatively on the environment (including reducing the impact of 
noise, pollution, harmful emissions and greenhouse gases); 
• Infrastructure – including the creation of a trans-European transport network (TEN-
T) connecting national networks together, making them interoperable and linking 
outside regions of the EU; and 
• External relations – including developing relations with third countries and, in 
some cases, allowing the EU to act collectively at an international level.313 
The specific provisions of the CTP are contained in Title VI TFEU on Transport (Articles 90 
to 100). 
Broadly, there is a balance between the common perceived benefits of EU Membership 
(e.g. the single market for transport services which has brought down costs through 
liberalisation and competition) and the burdens (e.g. disproportionate or excessive 
regulation). There have long been concerns about EU regulatory burdens and the costs 
these impose, and about the difficulties in finding the right level of legislative prescription 
which achieves the stated aims without being disproportionate. This is particularly 
important in an area like transport, which is heavily regulated at a European level. 
One of the common issues discussed with relation to specific examples below is how 
much Brexit will impact the standards and regulations the UK chooses to apply in its 
transport sector. In many instances they are likely to be similar if not identical to the EU’s. 
This is because of the role the UK played in establishing those standards to our own 
satisfaction in the first place. For example, the UK has been a leading advocate for the 
development of the single market in transport across all modes; to which end the UK has 
usually found itself aligned with the European Commission in promoting liberal market-
based aviation and maritime sectors. In rail, UK domestic policy was often seen as one of 
the models for EU proposals, given the experience of the market reforms and liberalisation 
introduced in the UK twenty years ago. 
All of this suggests that transport post-Brexit may not look wildly different from how it 
looks now; but much remains unclear and will continue to do so until negotiations are at 
a much more mature stage.314  
                                                                                             
312  HMG, Call for Evidence on the Government’s Review of the Balance of Competences between the UK and 
the EU: Transport, 14 May 2013, p5. 
313  Ibid, pp9-10. 
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Switzerland, Norway & elsewhere 
Switzerland has two bilateral agreements on aviation and land transportation (road and 
rail). Broadly, these apply the rules, regulations and their associated costs and benefits of 
the European Common Aviation Area to Switzerland and much of the common rules on 
road and rail without the market pillars.315 
Annex XIII of the EEA Agreement covers all methods of transport, including road, rail, 
aviation, maritime transport and horizontal transport issues. 
9.2 Impact of Brexit 
• State aid is any advantage granted by public authorities through state resources on 
a selective basis to any organisations that could potentially distort competition and 
trade in the EU.316 For transport state aid rules are particularly pertinent in aviation 
and maritime and effectively allow the state to subsidise routes and services that 
would not otherwise be available commercially. They also create a ‘level playing 
field’ across the EU and helps to prevent anti-competitive practices. Others have 
argued that they are not tough enough and allow states to support failing 
companies with subsidy which creates an unfairness.317 Out of the EU, the UK could 
provide subsidies at its own discretion, in line with national competition and 
procurement regimes.   
• Passenger rights & compensation: there has long been a ‘patchwork’ approach 
across transport modes towards passenger rights and compensation. The UK has 
long-established domestic rules which have gradually been supplanted by European 
ones in rail, bus and coach, air and sea (ferries and cruise ships). However, the UK 
has ‘opted out’ of or applied exemptions from a number of EU requirements on 
different modes. It may well be that these will be maintained at the current level 
after Brexit. The sector most likely to see change is aviation. Responses to the 
Government’s 2013-14 Balance of Competences review reflected wide-spread 
concerns amongst the travel industry that obligations must be proportionate and 
not unduly prescriptive.318 The UK will almost certainly develop its own system of 
passenger rights and compensation in the aviation sector post-Brexit but how similar 
these would be to current arrangements or how it would affect non-UK airlines or 
passengers is unknown.  
• Aviation: throughout Europe there is a move to restructure European airspace, 
add capacity, improve safety and increase the overall efficiency of the European air 
transport network through the Single European Sky (SES) project.  The UK and 
Ireland is planning to meet the SES requirements through the Future Airspace 
Strategy (FAS) which sets out a plan to modernise airspace by 2020.319 There is 
general support for proceeding with this work at a European level.320 Norway and 
                                                                                                                                         
314  Further details on how Brexit might affect transport can be found in HC Library briefing paper CBP7633, 
Brexit: how will it affect transport? 25 July 2016. 
315  Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport, 30 April 
2002; and Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Carriage of 
Goods and Passengers by Rail and Road, 30 April 2002. Information on Switzerland and Norway’s 
relationships with the EU can be found in two HC Library papers: Switzerland’s relationship with the EU 
(SN6090), 20 October 2011, and Norway’s relationship with the EU (SN6522), 14 January 2013. 
316  BIS, State Aid Guidance, 10 July 2015. 
317  DfT, Review of the Balance of Competences between the UK and the EU: Transport, February 2014, p57. 
318  Op cit., Review of the Balance of Competences between the UK and the EU: Transport, p43 
319  CAA, Future Airspace Strategy for the United Kingdom 2011 to 2030, June 2011. 
320  Ibid., p33 
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Switzerland, which are both outside of the EU, are a part of SES so this may be 
something to which the UK would want to be party even after Brexit. The 
liberalisation of air transport across the EU and the single aviation market created 
a number of ‘freedoms’ for EU-registered airlines which have allowed them to have 
a base on one Member State and operate on a ‘cabotage’ basis between other 
Member States.321 Respondents to the Government’s Balance of Competencies 
Review generally were of the view that liberalisation had broken down restrictive 
trade and operating barriers that had previously existed, and was credited with 
encouraging growth in the sector.322 Airlines clearly want the UK Government to 
negotiate continuing access to this liberalised regime. The most obvious way of 
doing this would be by becoming part of the European Common Aviation Area 
(ECAA).323 Liberalisation has helped bring down fares across the EU at a much 
greater rate than in other parts of the world.324 It may be that if the UK is unable or 
unwilling (for whatever reason) to replicate the existing market access arrangements 
for airlines post-Brexit, this could potentially lead to higher air fares.325 Fares could 
also be affected by dramatic currency fluctuations. However, higher fares are by no 
means a certainty and it will depend on the deal the UK secures.326 
• Railways: the main legislation as it relates to railways is contained in the three ‘rail 
packages’ that have been passed; the fourth is in the process of being agreed at the 
moment.327 The individual pieces of legislation which make up these packages are 
far-reaching and, for example, legislated for the European Railway Agency – with 
extensive powers – and the detailed Technical Standards of Interoperability (TSIs) 
which set out the technical requirements for the whole railway. They also prescribe 
how railways can be structured, financed and run. The Balance of Competencies 
review revealed some, though not a great deal of, dissatisfaction with 
interoperability.328 There is a commonly-held belief that EU law ‘bans’ the 
renationalisation of the rail network. This is a misconception: the current laws do 
not prevent the state owning and managing the rail infrastructure and (separately) 
operating train services – this model is commonly employed in other Member 
States.329 That said, the ‘market pillar’ of the fourth rail package is slightly 
ambiguous. Brexit would make all of this irrelevant and would mean that a future 
government that was so inclined could renationalise the railways. It would also allow 
a Government that no longer applied EU procurement rules to award rail services, 
train contracts etc. to British-based companies. There is no reason why Brexit should 
have significant impact on HS2. However, some have suggested that, given the 
financial uncertainty caused by Brexit a big expensive project like HS2 may no longer 
                                                                                             
321  More details are given in HC Library briefing paper SN182 
322  Op cit., Review of the Balance of Competences between the UK and the EU: Transport, p24. 
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27 June 2016. 
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328  Op cit., Review of the Balance of Competences between the UK and the EU: Transport, p28. 
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COM(2014) 353 final, 13 June 2014. 
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be a priority and could be scaled back.330 Regulated rail fares could rise as a result 
of Brexit if it leads to an uptick in inflation.331  
• Roads, driving and vehicles: there are potentially a lot of uncertainties for UK 
haulage companies as a result of Brexit, particularly in terms of employment, 
drivers’ hours rules, access to markets and border controls.332 The Agreement on the 
EEA basically extends the EU internal market to Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. 
As regards road transport, this entails that these three countries apply the EU road 
transport rules just like EU Member States. The EU has a separate agreement with 
Switzerland.333 The UK might find itself in a similar situation to one of these 
countries. Legislation on driver licensing and testing derives from EU law. The 
collected European Driving Licence Directives require Member States to adopt a 
common format licence, to harmonise categories and to provide common standards 
of competence and fitness to drive.  While the benefits of Common forms of 
licensing and testing insofar as they have helped the single market are clear, there 
are some concerns in specific areas. For example, the Certificate of Professional 
Competence (CPC) for HGV and bus drivers was heavily criticised by the industry for 
its inconsistent application and enforcement.334 There is also the issue of automatic 
driving licence exchange if you permanently move from one EU state to another.335 
The setting of common standards in many areas of EU legislation, such as vehicle 
standards, has generally had positive impacts in terms of helping to reduce costs 
and allowing for the free flow of vehicles.336 Further, harmonisation of vehicle 
design and construction standards helps with economies of scale, thus keeping costs 
down. While there has been some criticism of the EU-wide type approval process for 
vehicles in the wake of the VW emissions scandal, a return to UK-only type 
approval, with some sort of mutual recognition scheme for all other countries, 
seems unlikely and has not been suggested.337 
• The Blue Badge scheme provides a national arrangement of parking concessions 
for disabled people. A separate scheme operates in London. There are reciprocal 
arrangements for disabled drivers allowing them to park across the EU. The Blue 
Badge scheme does not apply to off-street car parks, whether local authority- or 
privately-owned.338 In 1998 EU Member States made an informal agreement to 
recognise badges of a common format issued in EU countries.339 It seems unlikely 
that Brexit would necessitate the UK changing the format of the Blue Badge, so 
there is no obvious reason why it would not continue to be recognised across 
Europe in the same way as those issued in Switzerland and Norway. 
                                                                                             
330  E.g. “Heathrow runway ruling may come in weeks, says Grayling”, The Times, 18 July 2016. 
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• Shipping and ports: At present, over 90% of UK trade is handled by ports and the 
EU is the UK’s largest trading partner. Much shipping law is derived from 
international forums such as the IMO, the ILO, the OECD and UNCITRAL, but 
undoubtedly access to the European single market has benefitted the UK shipping 
industry. UK shipping post-Brexit is likely to be concerned about general policy areas 
such as employment law, immigration, border controls and contract law. More 
specifically on transport issues, it is likely to be concerned about securing freedom to 
trade; safety and the environment; tonnage tax and security. The UK ports sector, 
being largely privately owned and competitively run, is very different to those of 
many other EU Member States. Consequently, it has long had concerns about public 
subsidy in other EU countries distorting competition, particularly between the larger 
international ports.340 The greatest concern for UK ports over the past decade or so 
has been the repeated attempt by the EU to legislate on port services, which they 
have argued would impose disproportionate and potentially harmful regulation in 
an area where the UK is already competitive.341 The proposed ‘Port Services 
Regulation’ was cited several times during the referendum campaign as a reason to 
leave the EU.342  
 
 
                                                                                             
340  Report of the exchange of views between ports CEOs and Transport Commissioner Bulc 19 January 2015 
Brussels, p7. 
341  More details can be found in HC Library briefing paper CBP7457. 
342  E.g. It's not just the plot to let in 1.5 million Turks.. DANIEL HANNAN outlines ten bombshells the EU's 
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10. Immigration 
At the moment, it is very unclear what kind of future relationship the UK might have with the 
EU and EEA/Swiss states after leaving the EU. A key question, when considering the impact of 
leaving the EU on immigration policy and the immigration rights of British and EU/EEA 
citizens, is to what extent the UK might remain bound by EU free movement of people laws 
post-Brexit. There is unlikely to be any clarity about this until the withdrawal negotiations are 
underway.  
10.1 Controlling EU immigration 
Depending on the nature of any future EU-UK relationship, leaving the EU could have 
significant implications for the rights of UK citizens to travel to and live in EU/EEA Member 
States, and for EU/EEA (hereafter, ‘EU)’ nationals wishing to come to the UK. 
Changing the immigration entitlements of citizens from 27 Member States would have 
significant implications for the workload (and required resourcing) of the UK’s border 
agencies. One very visible consequence is that EU nationals travelling to the UK (and 
British citizens travelling to European countries) might find themselves queuing at passport 
control alongside non-EU nationals, rather than in the same category as returning national 
citizens. 
On the other hand, if the UK were to negotiate a relationship with the EU similar to the 
non-EU EEA states or Switzerland, the immigration rights of UK and EU citizens might not 
change very much. Switzerland and the non-EU EEA states are both bound by free 
movement of people laws, although the EEA Agreement does give them some scope to 
apply some safeguarding measures unilaterally, “If serious economic, societal or 
environmental difficulties of a sectorial or regional nature liable to persist are arising.”343 
The pre-Brexit position 
EU ‘Free movement’ rights  
For as long as the UK remains a Member State of the EU, it is subject to EU free 
movement of people laws. 
The right to move and reside freely in another Member State is one of the rights granted 
by EU citizenship (as per Article 21 of TFEU). Anyone who has nationality of an EU 
Member State is also an ‘EU citizen’, and as such, has ‘free movement’ rights across the 
EU (subject to certain restrictions, as set out in the ‘Free Movement of Persons’/’Citizens’ 
Directive).344  
The ‘free movement of people’ principle entitles citizens of EU Member States and their 
families to reside and work anywhere in the EU. This right also applies to citizens of non-
EU EEA States (Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein) and Switzerland.345  
As well as the freedom to “move and reside freely” throughout the EU under EU 
citizenship provisions, the TFEU contains Articles specifying the free movement rights of 
workers and self-employed persons.346 Free movement is supported by a broader set of 
                                                                                             
343  Agreement of the European Economic Area OJ No L 1, 3.1.1994 page 3, (as amended), Article 112 
344  Directive 2004/38/EC. 
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rights, such as protection against discrimination on the grounds of nationality for 
employment, and provisions to co-ordinate social security so that people do not lose 
entitlements when they exercise their free movement rights.  
In practice, free movement law means that EU nationals do not require a visa in order to 
come to the UK, and no time limit may be placed on their stay. Exclusion must be justified 
on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health. All EU nationals (and their 
family members) have an ‘initial right to reside’ in another Member State for up to three 
months for any purpose. They have a right to reside for longer than three months if they 
qualify as a worker, job-seeker, student, or self-employed or self-sufficient person (or a 
family member of one of those), and are not subject to knowledge of English 
requirements. A ‘right of permanent residence’ is acquired after five continuous years with 
a right to reside in the host Member State.   
Comparison with controls for non-EU nationals 
The comparable provisions for non-EU nationals, including British citizens’ family 
members, are specified in the UK’s Immigration Rules and are significantly more restrictive. 
For example, opportunities for non-EU nationals to come to work in the UK under the 
points-based system are generally restricted to skilled migrants who already have a job 
offer. Non-EU national spouses of British citizens must satisfy various visa eligibility criteria, 
including that their British partner has an annual income of at least £18,600 (or a higher 
amount in savings). 
Most non-EU visa categories require that applicants already have some English language 
skills, and only give temporary permission to stay in the UK initially. The scope to extend 
the permission, switch into a different immigration category, or stay in the UK 
permanently, varies depending on the visa category.   
The differences between EU free movement rights and visa restrictions for non-EU 
nationals have become more striking in recent years, as the UK’s Immigration Rules have 
become more restrictive. The UK and its European partners have recognised the potential 
for exploitation of EU free movement law, for example, through ‘sham marriages’ 
between EU and non-EU nationals who would otherwise struggle to qualify for entry 
under national immigration legislation. The proposed new settlement for the United 
Kingdom within the European Union agreed in February 2016 included some proposals to 
clarify and extend the scope to prevent non-EU national family members from using EU 
law to obtain a right of residence.347 However these measures will not come into force, 
due to the UK’s vote to leave the EU. 
How might exit affect UK and EU citizens’ immigration rights in the long-term? 
Leaving the EU means that the UK could set its own criteria for deciding which EU citizens 
can be admitted to the UK. This is assuming that it did not negotiate a future agreement 
with the EU (or certain Member States) which required the continued application of free 
movement law. 
The UK’s approach to controlling EU migration is likely to be informed by broader 
considerations of the national interest, including the extent to which it wants to continue 
to attract certain types of migrant to the UK and ensure that British citizens have 
continued access to EU states, and whether it wants to continue to have access to the 
single market. 
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Will the UK be able to apply different visa requirements to different EU nationalities (as it 
currently does for visitors from non-EU states, for example)? Some experts noted in 
advance of the referendum that the EU’s strong preference is for its third-country partners 
to apply the same visa conditions to all EU Member States. That makes a ‘pick and mix’ 
approach potentially difficult to achieve.348  
Harmonising the visa rules for European and non-EU nationals  
Broadly speaking, if EU nationals become subject to the same visa rules and requirements 
that currently apply to other nationalities, they would only be able to come to the UK if 
they qualified individually for a visa as a visitor, student, worker, or family member of 
someone already settled here.  
No longer being bound by free movement law could give the UK more powers to prevent 
the presence of certain categories of EU migrant. For example, European foreign offenders 
would no longer have a greater degree of protection from removal/deportation than other 
nationalities. The proposed new settlement for the UK in the European Union had 
included a pledge to clarify the scope for excluding EU national offenders, and to give 
further consideration to the issue in the event of a future revision of the Free Movement 
Directive, although there was some ambiguity over when that might have been done.349  
The Coalition Government’s Balance of Competences Review on free movement of people 
noted that the majority of EU migrants come to the UK to work.350 EU free movement law 
has ensured that UK employers have relatively easy access to labour from EU states. This 
has offset some of the obstacles to non-EU economic immigration imposed by the UK’s 
Immigration Rules. For example, successive governments have taken action to ensure that 
the points-based system only caters for skilled non-EU workers, and it does not generally 
cater for job-seekers.351 It has been assumed that any need for lower-skilled labour can be 
met by workers from within the UK and EU. If EU nationals become subject to similar 
controls as non-European nationals, it is possible that there will be some pressure to relax 
some visa restrictions or expand certain categories, depending on the needs of the 
economy.352 
Just as the UK would be able to impose its own controls on EU immigration, so the rights 
of UK citizens to visit or move to an EU Member State would depend on what visa 
requirements those states chose to apply. The EU tends to require reciprocity from its 
third-country partners, so the extent of access/control that the UK wants to apply to EU 
nationals could affect British citizens’ opportunities to travel to or live in Europe. 
What other options might be available? 
As commentators have noted, there are any number of options between maintaining full 
free movement rights and introducing full visa restrictions for EU nationals, which the 
Government may wish to consider when preparing its negotiation strategy. Some of these 
are similar to previous ideas for free movement reform raised by UK Government 
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The legal status of 
British and EU 
expats post-Brexit 
will be one of the 
issues to resolve 
during the UK’s 
withdrawal 
negotiations 
Ministers.353 Proposals which have attracted some attention in the immediate aftermath of 
the referendum result include:354 
• Allowing for the free movement of workers only, as originally provided for in the 
1957 Treaty of Rome.   
• The “EEA option”, i.e. free movement rights with scope to unilaterally apply 
restrictions in the event of “serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties”. 
Furthermore, Liechtenstein has a special ‘Sectoral Adaptations’ agreement with the 
EU, which enables it to apply a quota system to control the number of EEA citizens 
given permission to reside in the country. The agreement is based on a recognition 
of Liechtenstein’s ‘specific geographic situation’, and is subject to review every five 
years.355 
• An “EEA minus” option – some restrictions on free movement rights, such as quotas 
for work permits, in return for restricted access to the single market. 
The advantages and disadvantages of different models, and prospects for securing 
agreement from the EU, are likely to continue to generate considerable commentary and 
debate in the months ahead. 
Might the implications for Irish nationals be different? 
Irish nationals have a special status in UK law as “non-aliens”. They also enjoy free 
movement rights between Ireland and the UK, under the Common Travel Area 
arrangements. Both of these pre-date Ireland and the UK’s EU memberships. It is therefore 
possible that Brexit might have different implications for Irish nationals than other EU 
citizens. Equally, there has been some speculation that Brexit might lead to some changes 
to those special arrangements.356 
How might people exercising free movement rights at the point 
of UK exit be affected? 
One of the most prominent questions to arise in the immediate aftermath 
of the referendum result is how leaving the EU will affect the legal status 
and entitlements of British citizens living in other EU Member States, and 
EU nationals living in the UK.  
For the time being, the UK remains a Member State of the EU, and these 
rights are unaffected.  
The post-Brexit legal status of British and EU expats will be one of the 
issues to be discussed during the course of the UK’s exit negotiations. A 
Cabinet Office statement of 12 July set out the Government’s initial 
position: 
When we do leave the EU, we fully expect that the legal status of EU nationals living 
in the UK, and that of UK nationals in EU member states, will be properly 
protected.357 
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There will be no certainty on this until a deal is reached between the UK and EU. On the 
other hand, there is widespread agreement that sudden curtailments of immigration 
status or mass expulsions would be impractical, undesirable and legally dubious. 
One possibility is that EU citizens could continue to be allowed to live in the UK (and vice 
versa) after the UK’s exit on the same basis as now, if they had a ‘right to reside’ in the UK 
on a certain cut-off date. This would mean that EU free movement laws would continue 
to be a significant influence over UK immigration controls for years after the UK’s exit.358  
Some of the practical issues to consider in such a scenario include: 
• What cut-off date will be used to determine expats’ rights? E.g. the date of the 
referendum? The date of UK withdrawal from the EU? 
• Will people who have already acquired a right to permanent residence under EU law 
be treated differently to those who have moved more recently, or who move after 
the withdrawal negotiations begin? Or would all EU nationals present on that date 
be given a permanent immigration status, irrespective of length of residence? 
• Would certain categories, such as EU nationals with a history of offending, be 
treated differently? 
• Would EU migrants with a ‘right to reside’ need to apply to transfer to a different 
immigration status category under the UK Immigration Rules, such as Indefinite 
Leave to Remain, or would they retain their rights and status under EU law? 
• If EU migrants are required to apply for documentation confirming their status in the 
UK, what evidential requirements would apply, given that EU citizens have not been 
obliged to apply for documentary proof of their right to reside in the UK under EU 
law, and there are no comprehensive records of EU nationals’ movements to/from 
the UK? 
• If EU migrants retain their status under EU law, would this continue in the event of a 
change in their circumstances in the future (e.g. if they ceased to be a worker)? 
• How will the status of EU migrants who do not have a right to reside be resolved? 
• Will EU migrants continue to have the same entitlements to welfare benefits, 
healthcare, etc. as they currently do? 
• Will non-EU national family members similarly retain their rights under EU law? 
10.2 Border controls, non-EU immigration and asylum 
The pre-Brexit position 
The UK has not been automatically bound by EU legislation on border controls, non-EU 
immigration and asylum. Under special Treaty-based arrangements, the UK has been able 
to participate in measures selectively, deciding on a case-by-case basis whether opting in 
would be in its best interests. Successive UK governments took the view that it was 
preferable for the UK to retain responsibility for its own borders and have flexibility to 
adjust its immigration policy in response to the circumstances in the UK.  
The 2014 Balance of Competences Review on asylum and non-EU migration concluded 
that the balance of competence on these matters lay “predominantly with the UK”.359 
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The UK has opted-in to around a third of all EU legislative measures on migration.360 In 
recent years, the UK has tended to favour measures which enhance practical co-operation 
between Member States, rather than further EU legislation in this area. 
The Government’s response to the European Commission’s ‘European Agenda on 
Migration’, published in May 2015, reflected this approach.361 The Agenda proposed 
some immediate measures in response to increases in irregular migration flows in the 
Mediterranean, as well as longer-term solutions to better manage all types of migration to 
the EU. The UK has been giving practical support for some of the measures, such as those 
directed against people smugglers and traffickers, and action to establish ‘hotspot’ 
registration centres in Italy and Greece. It declined to participate in other measures, 
notably legislation establishing an emergency relocation scheme for asylum seekers in 
Europe. 
Home Office funding from the EU 
The UK has received approximately £240 million from current EU migration funding 
streams. This has included funding for Assisted Voluntary Returns schemes, which 
facilitate irregular migrants’ departure from the UK, as well as projects to support refugee 
resettlement and community integration in the UK.362 
How might UK border controls be affected by exit? 
The UK has not been part of the internal border-free Schengen Area (unlike the non-EU 
EEA states and Switzerland). Border Force officers conduct checks on EU travellers crossing 
UK ports of entry, as well as on British citizens and non-EU nationals.  
It has been recognised that there have been some significant security benefits to not 
participating in the border and visa aspects of the Schengen body of law.363 However it 
does mean that the UK has been missing out on some potentially useful opportunities to 
share data on people travelling within the EU. For example, it has been excluded from the 
EU’s Visa Information System, which is used by Member States and Europol to exchange 
information about visa applications in order to combat abuse and prevent crime.364 
The UK has had access to non-immigration parts of the Schengen Information System 
database (SIS-II) since April 2015. This access could be lost when it leaves the EU. The 
database gives UK law enforcement agencies (including some border control staff) access 
to real-time information about wanted or missing people, public security threats, and 
missing or stolen property. The Home Office said at the time of joining the database that 
this information would ensure that “more foreign terrorists, murderers and paedophiles 
will be kept out of the country”.365  
The collection and screening of Advance Passenger Information has become an integral 
part of UK border security mechanisms over the past decade. The UK has opted-in to EU 
legislation on collecting passenger data from transport carriers from outside the EU, and is 
a strong advocate for the EU to adopt similar measures to collect passenger data on intra-
EEA journeys.366 It is likely to be keen to ensure continued access to such information. 
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  Number 07213, 26 August 2016 102 
As an EU Member State, the UK has been lending some informal support to Frontex, the 
EU’s agency for co-ordinating the management of the EU’s external borders. For example, 
it provided some staff and assets to assist the Operation Triton mission in the 
Mediterranean Sea.367 It has been unable to fully participate due to having exercised 
related opt-out rights.368 The EEA states participate in Frontex, but this is in the context of 
their membership of the Schengen Area. 
What will happen to the juxtaposed border controls in northern 
France? 
Leaving the EU does not automatically terminate the Treaty of Le Touquet, which 
established the ‘juxtaposed’ immigration controls for France and the UK. The Treaty is a 
bilateral agreement between the UK and French governments, rather than a matter of EU 
law.  
There was some speculation in the run-up to the referendum that France would terminate 
these arrangements in the event of a UK vote to leave the EU. Some commentators 
suggested that the arrangements benefit the UK more than France, and that Brexit would 
provide France with a useful opportunity to terminate them.369 Others suggested that this 
was less likely, for example because doing so would have adverse economic consequences 
for the port of Calais and France. It has also been argued that ending the Le Touquet 
Treaty arrangements could encourage greater numbers of irregular migrants to gather in 
northern France and attempt to enter the UK.370  
Mixed views have been expressed about the likely future of the Treaty in the aftermath of 
the referendum result (so far).371  
Article 23 of the Treaty of Le Touquet contains specific rules on how it can be terminated, 
modified or revised. Either France or the UK can terminate the arrangements at any time, 
although the time-scales and conditions for doing so need to be agreed with the other 
country. The two parties can also agree (by exchanging diplomatic notes) to modify the 
treaty (apart from those provisions that need the approval of parliament). And either party 
can ask for consultations if they want to revise the treaty “in the light of new 
circumstances or needs”. 
There is also a provision which allows the ‘local representatives of the authorities 
concerned’ to agree to a temporary change in the area where juxtaposed controls are 
operated (Article 1.5). 
Moreover, under Article 24 “Each of the Contracting Parties reserves the right to take any 
measures necessary for the safeguarding of its sovereignty or security”. 
UK-French cooperation on border security matters has extended beyond the agreements 
establishing the juxtaposed controls. See, for example, the joint statement agreed in 
September 2014, which outlined a “comprehensive action plan” in response to the 
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growing migrant population in Calais, and the further joint declaration agreed on 20 
August 2015. Both of these were made in the context of both countries’ membership of 
the EU, and included expressions of support for broader EU action to manage migration 
flows in Northern Europe and across the EU. 
What would be the consequences of ending juxtaposed controls? 
UK immigration officers would no longer be able to conduct immigration checks on 
travellers, and potentially deny them entry to the UK, whilst they are still in French 
territory.  
Instead, UK immigration controls would be applied to cross-Channel passengers upon 
their arrival in the UK (as was the case prior to the introduction of juxtaposed controls, 
and as already happens with arrivals to the UK from other departure points).  
Immigration officers would be able to refuse entry to people found ineligible for entry to 
the UK and return them to their country of departure. But not if they claimed asylum 
upon arrival - the claim would have to be processed in the UK. 
Other obstacles to gaining irregular entry to the UK would also remain, since French 
border controls and carriers’ liability legislation would continue to apply. 
What will happen to the border in Northern Ireland and the 
Common Travel Area? 
Mixed opinions expressed by commentators in the run-up to the referendum about the 
future of the Common Travel Area between Ireland and the UK in the event of a Brexit.372 
The UK and Irish governments also indicated uncertainty, whereas ‘Leave’ campaigners did 
not generally envisage a need for significant changes.373 
The Common Travel Area pre-dates the UK (and Ireland)’s membership of the EU. EU law 
recognises Ireland and the UK’s right to maintain the special arrangements with the UK.374 
Professor Bernard Ryan, who has written extensively on the Common Travel Area, has said 
that there is “no obvious legal reason” why Ireland could not retain this benefit after the 
UK leaves the EU.375 
The Northern Ireland Affairs Committee received evidence (before the referendum), 
including from the EU’s Brexit Taskforce, which led it to believe that there may be some 
doubt as to whether the current arrangements could continue, and that a future 
agreement between the UK and Ireland may need to be agreed by the whole of the EU.376 
Since the referendum result, the Irish and UK governments have confirmed a shared 
intention to preserve the benefits of the Common Travel Area.377 The Irish Government 
has said that this will be a “key priority” in the context of UK-EU negotiations. 
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‘Hard’ border controls? 
There are mixed views about whether Brexit might lead to more cross-border customs and 
immigration controls, and how easily these could be implemented. Again, the nature of 
the UK’s future relationship with the EU/EEA is a relevant consideration. 
One of the potential difficulties is that, if EU nationals no longer have the same ‘free 
movement’ rights in both countries, the land border between the Republic of Ireland and 
Northern Ireland could become a weak spot in the UK’s ability to control EU immigration.  
The Northern Ireland Affairs Committee considered three possible scenarios in the event 
of a significant change to UK immigration controls towards EU/EEA nationals post-Brexit. 
It recognised that each of these have certain disadvantages and limitations:378 
• A harder land border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland 
– this would cause significant disruption to cross-border travellers, and it is doubtful 
how effective and comprehensive the controls could be in practice, considering the 
nature of the border. 
• A harder border between the island of Ireland and Great Britain – this would 
imply imposing checks on people travelling between different parts of the UK. 
• A harmonised approach to UK and Irish immigration and border controls – 
whilst this would overcome the need for hard border controls, Ireland’s continued 
membership of the EU might restrict the policy options available. 
How might UK asylum policies be affected? 
Although various parts of EU law commit Member States to adhering to the terms 
specified in the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, 
the UK is a signatory to the 1951 Convention (and other related pieces of international 
law) in its own right. 379 It will continue to be bound by these after leaving the EU, unless it 
decides to withdraw from them.  
On a practical level, EU law on asylum is interwoven into the UK’s asylum system. The 
2012 Balance of Competences Review concluded that the UK has been most affected by 
EU action on non-EU migration in the field of asylum.380  
The EU has been developing a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) since the 1990s. 
The UK opted into the six pieces of legislation adopted during CEAS’ first phase (2000-
2005). There were four directives specifying minimum standards for processing asylum 
claims and the treatment of asylum seekers, and two sets of regulations establishing the 
‘Dublin system’ for determining which Member State is responsible for processing an 
asylum claim.381 
In recent years there has been less UK engagement in new EU initiatives on asylum, as a 
consequence of the UK exercising its special ‘opt-out’ rights in this area.  
For example, the UK did not adopt the recast asylum directives introduced over 2011-
2013, due to concerns that they would have undermined the UK’s asylum system 
(particularly efforts to deter abuse).382 Similarly, as previously noted, the UK has only 
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selectively engaged with the EU’s response to the ‘migration crisis’ over the past year or 
so.  
Could the UK continue to participate in the ‘Dublin’ system? 
One of the issues which the Government will need to consider during the EU withdrawal 
negotiations is whether it will seek continued UK participation in the Dublin system.  
Box 3: What is the Dublin system? 
The Dublin system was intended to prevent the phenomena of ‘asylum shopping’ (asylum seekers 
lodging multiple claims in several EU Member States) and ‘refugees in orbit’ (no state taking 
responsibility for an asylum claim). The EURODAC fingerprint database enables Member States to check 
whether an asylum seeker has previously claimed asylum in another Member State. The Dublin III 
Regulation identifies a hierarchy of criteria for determining which Member State is responsible for the 
asylum claim and sets out the process for handling requests to transfer responsibility between Member 
States. Put simply, this hierarchy prioritises family reunion considerations, followed by which Member 
State issued a visa to the applicant or was the first state entered by the applicant (in the case of 
irregular arrivals). In practice, most transfer requests are based on the irregular entry criterion. This has 
led to criticisms that the current Dublin arrangements place an unfair burden of responsibility on a few 
states at the EU’s external borders. 
 
Are any other non-EU Member States currently part of the Dublin system? 
Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Iceland participate in the Dublin III Regulations 
(but not other pieces of legislation related to the CEAS), via separate agreements with the 
EU. 
Would the Government want to seek continued participation? 
Successive UK governments have been strong supporters of the Dublin system. The UK 
has opted-in to all of the revised versions of the Dublin regulations.383 However, the 
ongoing ‘migration crisis’ in Europe has highlighted the vulnerabilities and imbalances 
within the system. There is some doubt over the long-term future of the Dublin system in 
its current form, although the UK Government does not favour major changes to it. 
The Dublin system has been regarded by successive UK governments as greatly beneficial 
to the UK. The system has enabled the removal of over 12,000 individuals from the UK to 
other EU Member States between 2003 and January 2015.384 In the Government’s view, it 
has generated significant financial savings and contributed to efforts to deter abuse of the 
UK’s asylum system.385  
In May 2016 the European Commission published some proposals for recast Dublin 
regulations, as part of a wider set reforms of the CEAS.386 The proposals include: 
• Shorter timescales for Member States to process transfer requests  
• Introducing a “corrective allocation mechanism” to be automatically activated in the 
event that a State receives a disproportionate number of asylum claims, in order to 
ensure more equitable sharing of responsibilities between Member States 
• Measures to discourage abuse and prevent secondary movements of asylum seekers 
within the EU 
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The Government had not confirmed before the referendum vote whether it would opt-in 
to the recast Directive. It had previously indicated a preference for retaining the principles 
of the existing Dublin regulation.387   
Furthermore, it is not clear whether the UK could choose to selectively apply the Dublin 
regulations but not other parts of the CEAS in the future as a non-Member State. As a 
briefing published in advance of the referendum vote by an immigration law practitioner 
noted:  
… the European Commission announced in April 2016 that it would be proposing a 
new consolidated instrument on asylum bringing all the CEAS measures into one 
Directive. It has also proposed substantial changes to the system with a view to 
creating a more regulated and coherent asylum system across the continent. If the UK 
wants to participate in this new system, it will only be able to do so if it remains in the 
EU.388 
How might the UK’s approach to non-EU immigration, irregular 
immigration and removals be affected? 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the UK’s approach to controlling non-European 
immigration is already determined by domestic legislation, including the UK’s Immigration 
Rules, rather than EU law. The UK chose not to opt in to EU measures facilitating legal 
migration of third-country migrants (e.g. directives establishing common eligibility rules 
and entitlements for certain categories of immigrants, such as workers, students, 
migrants’ family members, and long-term residents).389  
This approach protected UK governments’ flexibility to adjust immigration policy in 
response to changing UK requirements.390 For example, a points-based system for non-EU 
labour and student immigration was introduced from 2008/9, and limits have been 
introduced on the number of visas available in various categories, including those for 
sponsored skilled workers and migrants with ‘exceptional talent’.  
There has been some practical co-operation between the UK and other Member States on 
the removal of irregular migrants, such as through the use of shared charter flights. Also, 
the UK has opted into some of the EU’s Readmission Agreements with third countries. The 
Balance of Competences Review cited this as an example of how the UK was able to 
secure more advantageous outcomes by working with other Member States:   
On Readmission Agreements, working as a bloc with other Member States rather than 
independently has often resulted in a better deal for the UK, with Member States 
acting as a bloc able to wield greater leverage against third countries than when 
acting individually.391 
More generally, the UK has recognised that there are benefits to practical co-operation 
and information-sharing with other Member States, for example to strengthen responses 
to organised immigration crime and current and future migratory pressures.  
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11. Justice and Home Affairs 
Summary 
The UK currently has an opt out arrangement with the EU on policing and criminal justice 
measures, whereby it can chose which measures to opt in to. The UK has chosen, with 
parliamentary approval, to opt in to a number of measures, the most significant of which is 
the European Arrest Warrant. Others relate to information sharing and participation in EU law 
enforcement agencies.  
  
11.1 Police and Justice Cooperation 
Between 1995 and 2009, the Member States of the EU agreed on 130 measures relating 
to police and judicial cooperation in criminal justice matters.  These covered aspects of the 
substantive criminal law (the definition of crimes); mutual recognition in criminal matters; 
harmonisation of criminal procedure; exchange of information; and EU law enforcement 
agencies. These measures, known as the ‘third pillar’ of EU law, were subject to a 
different legal framework in which the role of EU institutions was more restricted.   
The Treaty of Lisbon incorporated these pre-2009 third pillar measures into the main body 
of EU law, to which the powers of the Commission and EU Court of Justice (CJEU) apply.  
From this point the UK had the ongoing option of opting in to any new measures in this 
area, and of opting out of any laws that were adopted before the Treaty.  
The block opt-out decision 
The UK notified the Council in July 2013 of its decision to opt out of these 
measures.  It immediately sought to opt back in to 35 of the same measures, 
accepting the enforcement powers of Commission and CJEU jurisdiction with 
regard to them.392 
Prior to the vote in Parliament, the Government published its Decision 
pursuant to Article 10(5) of Protocol 36 to the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union,393 setting out the 35 measures that the UK was seeking 
to opt back in to. 
In November 2014 the House of Commons voted to endorse the Government’s formal 
application to re-join the 35 Home Affairs and Justice measures by 421 votes to 29.394   
Measures in which the UK currently participates 
Some of the more significant measures in which the UK participates are considered below.   
European Arrest Warrant 
The Government highlighted the importance of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) in 
setting out its case to remain in the EU:  
4.10 The European Arrest Warrant (EAW) makes it easier to extradite foreign suspects 
back to where they are wanted for crimes – and bring suspects back to the UK to face 
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justice for crimes committed here. Since 2004 the EAW has allowed 7,000 people to 
be extradited from the UK to face trial or serve a sentence and has resulted in just 
over 1,000 people being returned to the UK to face justice.395 
The EAW is given effect in domestic law by the Extradition Act 2003. The scheme is 
managed by the National Crime Agency (NCA). The NCA issued 219 EAWs in 2013 and 
228 EAWs in 2014. It received 5,522 EAWs in 2013 and 13,460 EAWs in 2014.396  
The EAW is based on the principle of mutual recognition of Member States’ legal systems 
within the EU. Unlike extradition arrangements with countries outside the EU, the EAW 
requires acceptance of a foreign warrant by national judicial authorities without an inquiry 
into the facts or circumstances giving rise to the warrant. It also limits the grounds on 
which extradition may be refused. It was intended to streamline the process of extradition 
and relies on trust between Member States.  
The EAW has faced criticism in the past. Opponents have argued that it is used too 
frequently and favours procedural simplicity over the rights of suspects and defendants. A 
review conducted under the Coalition Government resulted in amendments to the 
Extradition Act 2003 aimed at addressing concerns about proportionality and other 
matters.  
Schengen Information System 
The Schengen Information System II (SIS II) is another measure highlighted by the 
Government as significant for domestic security. SIS II is a large-scale database that 
supports external border control and law enforcement cooperation. It enables police 
and border guards to enter and consult real time alerts on certain categories of wanted 
or missing persons or objects (such as documents or vehicles).   
The Government’s Impact Assessment on the opt-in decision provided the following 
reasoning as to why SIS II was deemed necessary: 
Improving law enforcement access to real time information on persons and objects of 
interest  
The UK currently receives and shares law enforcement information with European 
partners through bilateral arrangements and through Interpol channels. Processes rely 
on Member States directing information to appropriate law enforcement agencies in 
the UK in order for action to be taken. These processes do not allow for real time 
access to alerts and rely on UK law enforcement manually updating systems (e.g. the 
PNC). This incurs significant resource burdens on law enforcement agencies as well as 
impairing the UK’s ability to detect individuals and objects of interest.  
Secure the UK Border  
Securing the border is a key priority for the Government and security is a primary 
focus. Over 100 million passengers arrive in the UK each year and in total there are 
around 200 million passenger journeys across the UK border. Providing border staff 
with the right information to stop potential threats before they can enter the UK is 
vital. […] 
SISII, through the use of real-time information, will enable the UK to better combat 
domestic and transnational crime and protect the border. It will also strengthen public 
protection by extending the reach of UK law enforcement across Europe through 
enhanced information sharing and increased operational effectiveness.397 
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The Home Secretary made a statement to the House on 5 January 2016 on the 
Government’s counter-terrorism work, in which she mentioned SIS II as one of the 
measures taken by the UK to combat the threat of terrorism: 
In addition, the UK has joined the European watch list system—so-called SIS II—
meaning we are now alerted when any individual is stopped at a border checkpoint or 
by police anywhere in Europe and is checked against the system.398  
Europol 
Europol is the European Union’s law enforcement agency. It assists EU Member States 
to conduct investigations in relation to terrorism and organised crime by providing 
intelligence exchange and support, and analysis.  
The Government’s Impact Assessment on the opt-in decision pointed to the strategic 
importance of Europol in combatting cross-border threats: 
It also has a vital role in assessing threats from a cross-border perspective, producing 
relevant threat assessments and strategic analyses. This is important in identifying 
priority threats at EU level, which informs the coordination of practical cooperation 
amongst Member States. The agency acts as an analysis hub for data and information 
on serious international crime and terrorism and takes a key role in working with 
national law enforcement agencies to coordinate action between Member States.399 
Brexit consequences 
Predictions about the consequences of Brexit are of course speculative at this stage and 
depend on the outcome of negotiations. However, it is likely that the UK would wish to 
recreate at least some of the existing arrangements.  
Some issues are covered by Council of Europe treaties, 400 although in practice these are 
generally less detailed and may prove to be less effective.  
 
In other areas it may be possible to negotiate bilateral treaties with individual Member 
States, or with the EU as a whole. For example, a form of the EAW has been agreed with 
Norway and Iceland (although this is not yet in force).  
 
It is possible that, without the mutual recognition and trust between EU Member States 
that underpins the EAW and other measures, these arrangements would be more 
complicated, expensive or time consuming. In Alternatives to membership: possible 
models for the United Kingdom outside the European Union, the Government suggested 
that the outcome of any future negotiation is uncertain: 
1.4 Under any of these alternatives, there would also be a non-economic cost, in 
terms of the UK’s security and strength. The European Arrest Warrant and the 
Schengen Information System, for instance, allow our law-enforcement agencies to 
obtain and act on information from their EU counterparts. Even if over time we 
manage to negotiate replacement bilateral agreements, there is no guarantee that we 
could fully replace our access to current EU measures for police and security 
cooperation.  
With respect to EU agencies, the UK may be able to enter into agreements to cooperate, 
as other non-EU countries have done.  Although Europol’s role and remit are focussed on 
EU member states it does work with partners outside the EU.  The Europol website points 
out that organised crime does not stop at international boundaries and so cooperation 
agreements with non-EU states are needed: 
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Europol assists EU Member States in combating organised crime within the European 
Union, but because organised crime does not stop at international borders, it is also 
essential to have cooperation initiatives with non-EU countries and international 
organisations. 
The Justice and Home Affairs Council therefore adopted the Council decision of 27 
March 2000 (amended by the Council decision of 6 December 2001 and the Council 
decision of 13 June 2002) which authorises the Director of Europol to enter into 
negotiations on cooperation agreements with third states and non-EU related bodies. 
The nature of the cooperation agreements can vary, ranging from operational 
cooperation, including the exchange of personal data, to technical or strategic 
cooperation.401 
Europol has a number of operational and strategic agreements with non-EU states, listed 
on the website, including Australia, Canada and the USA. 
11.2 Data protection 
The right to privacy is a highly developed area of law in Europe.402  
All EU Member States are also bound by the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), which guarantees the right to respect for private and family life, home and 
correspondence in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. EU data 
protection derives from Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. The Data 
Protection Act 1998 gives effect to this Directive. Although the Act has been criticised on 
various grounds – for example, that the penalties on offer are insufficient to act as a 
deterrent – there is little likelihood that it would be repealed if the UK were to leave the 
EU. Most countries now have similar legislation, and the trend is towards harmonising 
standards internationally in order to facilitate the safe flow of data across national 
boundaries.  
The EU proposed replacing the 1995 Directive with a new Regulation.  Under that 
Regulation, companies across the EU would only have to deal with one set of data 
protection rules and be answerable to a single data protection authority – the national 
authority in the EU Member State where they have their main base.  The draft framework 
was a matter of contention among Member States; the UK Ministry of Justice had argued 
(for example) that the burdens the proposed regulation would impose outweighed the net 
benefit estimated by the Commission.403 
In December 2015, the EU reached agreement on the new data protection rules. The 
Regulation and Directive were formally adopted by the European Parliament and Council 
in April 2016 and will come into effect in May 2018 (the latter requiring transposition into 
national law by that date). Following the referendum result, the UK Information 
Commissioner’s Office issued a statement: 
 
The Data Protection Act remains the law of the land irrespective of the referendum 
result. 
If the UK is not part of the EU, then upcoming EU reforms to data protection law 
would not directly apply to the UK. But if the UK wants to trade with the Single 
Market on equal terms we would have to prove ‘adequacy’ - in other words UK data 
protection standards would have to be equivalent to the EU’s General Data Protection 
Regulation framework starting in 2018.  
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With so many businesses and services operating across borders, international 
consistency around data protection laws and rights is crucial both to businesses and 
organisations and to consumers and citizens. The ICO’s role has always involved 
working closely with regulators in other countries, and that would continue to be the 
case. 
Having clear laws with safeguards in place is more important than ever given the growing 
digital economy, and we will be speaking to government to present our view that reform 
of the UK law remains necessary. 
11.3 EU citizenship  
EU citizenship was formally introduced in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union in 
1992, which stated that the Union aims to “strengthen the protection of the rights and 
interests of the nationals of its Member States through the introduction of a citizenship of 
the Union”.  In addition to the earlier right to move, work and reside freely in any 
Member State, Maastricht introduced voting and election rights in European Parliament 
(EP) and local elections, and extra consular protection for EU citizens.  
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam extended citizens’ rights with a new anti-discrimination clause, 
while Article 17 stipulated that Union citizenship “shall complement and not replace 
national citizenship”.   
 
The Treaty of Lisbon replaced “complement” with “additional to”. The EU Treaty provides 
for EU citizenship in Articles 20 - 25 TFEU. EU citizenship is dependent on holding the 
nationality of an EU Member State and is additional to national citizenship. It does not 
replace national citizenship, but adds an extra layer of rights (and obligations).   
Will Brexit mean loss of EU citizenship? 
EU citizenship does not fall under the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights and is 
not the same as having the nationality of a state, to which the UN Declaration refers.404  
 
The EU Treaty text asserts that the rights of citizenship “shall be exercised in accordance 
with the conditions and limits defined by the Treaties and by the measures adopted 
thereunder”. It is acquired automatically by virtue of being a national of an EU Member 
State; you don’t have to apply for it. The EU Treaties apply to and in the EU Member 
States. If the UK leaves the EU, its citizens – unless they have dual nationality - will no 
longer be citizens of the EU within the terms of the EU Treaties. 
 
However, there has been a debate about the possibility that citizens of a withdrawing 
State have ‘acquired rights’. This is discussed in section 4.4 of Commons Briefing Paper 
7551, Brexit: how does the Article 50 process work? 30 June 2016. The former Director 
General of the EU Council’s Legal Service, Jean-Claude Piris, thought this could not be the 
case with regard to EU citizenship: 
I would not think that one could build a new legal theory, according to which 
“acquired rights” would remain valid for millions of individuals … who, despite 
having lost their EU citizenship, would nevertheless keep its advantages for ever 
(including the right of movement from and to all EU Member States? Including the 
right to vote and to be a candidate in the European Parliament?). Such a theory would 
not have any legal support in the Treaties and would lead to absurd consequences.405 
                                                                                             
404  Article 15 of the Universal declaration states: (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality; (2) No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality. 
405  Robert Schuman Foundation, European issues n°355, 5 May 2015. Should the UK withdraw from the EU: 
legal aspects and effects of possible options. 
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Court of Justice case law 
The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has stated several times that citizenship of the Union 
is intended to be the “fundamental status of nationals of the Member States”. It would 
appear to follow then that leaving the EU would result in a loss of EU citizenship. But 
CJEU case law is not always so clear on this. 
 
Professor Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, while saying that if the UK was no longer in the EU, 
“this would suggest its citizens are no longer EU citizens”,406 pointed to the CJEU ruling in 
the Rottmann case in March 2010, which held that “deprivation of EU citizenship [though 
in circumstances different from Brexit] might not be a matter just for Member States, but 
that the EU might have a role as well”. In the Opinion of Advocate General Poiares 
Maduro in the reference for a preliminary ruling in Rottmann, 30 September 2009, Union 
citizenship can be independent of nationality. A Member State’s decision to withdraw 
naturalisation was a matter of EU law because that action would also mean removing the 
status of EU citizenship. Could it therefore be argued that EU citizenship would remain 
even after Brexit or would this be one of J-C Piris’ “absurd consequences”? Poiares 
argued: 
Any attempt at an answer presupposes a sound understanding of the relationship 
between the nationality of a Member State and Union citizenship. Those are two 
concepts which are both inextricably linked and independent. (29) Union citizenship 
assumes nationality of a Member State but it is also a legal and political concept 
independent of that of nationality. Nationality of a Member State not only provides 
access to enjoyment of the rights conferred by Community law; it also makes us 
citizens of the Union. European citizenship is more than a body of rights which, in 
themselves, could be granted even to those who do not possess it. It presupposes the 
existence of a political relationship between European citizens, although it is not a 
relationship of belonging to a people. On the contrary, that political relationship 
unites the peoples of Europe. It is based on their mutual commitment to open their 
respective bodies politic to other European citizens and to construct a new form of 
civic and political allegiance on a European scale. It does not require the existence of a 
people, but is founded on the existence of a European political area from which rights 
and duties emerge. In so far as it does not imply the existence of a European people, 
citizenship is conceptually the product of a decoupling from nationality.  
 
Some analysts also point to the CJEU ruling in Grzelczyk that EU citizenship is “destined to 
be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find 
themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their 
nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for”. 
 
In Ruiz Zambrano, the CJEU added the requirement that EU citizens must be able to 
“genuinely enjoy the substance of their EU citizenship rights”. Writing in the 
Verfassungsblog, Mark Dawson and Daniel Augenstein conclude: “Hence, while the 
European Union has no original or autonomous competence to confer European 
citizenship, it can and will protect it once acquired against interference by the Member 
States”.407  The authors also suggest that individuals may have the right to retain or reject 
EU citizenship: 
The most obvious move is to think radically. A further de-coupling of EU citizenship 
from national membership would allow the Union to replicate the emancipatory move 
of Van Gend en Loos – to liberate individuals from the preferences of their states. De-
coupling would signify a constitutional recognition that rights acquired as European 
citizens really are ‘fundamental’: integral to individual personhood and therefore 
                                                                                             
406  BBC News, 4 July, EU referendum: Would Brexit violate UK citizens' rights? 
407  After Brexit: Time for a further Decoupling of European and National Citizenship? Mark Dawson, Daniel 
Augenstein 14 July 2016. 
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inscribed into the deep structure of an autonomous EU legal order such that they 
cannot simply be done away with by inter-governmental agreement. De-coupling 
would allow those UK nationals –be they from London, Scotland or any other part – 
to retain their European citizenship rights of free movement and non-discrimination in 
other EU states if they so wished, by virtue of their continued membership in the 
European polity. While the decision to grant Union citizenship may still rest with the 
Member States, via Member State nationality, the decision to withdraw it would rest 
with the individual EU citizen (who may also wish to renounce that citizenship if they 
so choose). 
CJEU cases to date have not been required to respond to questions about EU citizenship 
and EU withdrawal. The Court may yet be asked about this, but in the meantime the 
weight of legal opinion is that Brexit will mean loss of EU citizenship. 
 
The existing alternatives to EU membership do not provide the kind of supplementary 
citizenship provided by the EU. The EEA Agreement guarantees equal rights and 
obligations within the Single Market for citizens and economic operators in the EEA. It 
covers the four freedoms of movement of goods, persons, services and capital, as well as 
‘flanking policies’ such as social policy, consumer protection and environment policy. But 
while EEA nationals enjoy free movement and residence provisions, non-EU EEA nationals 
are not strictly speaking Union citizens within the terms of the Treaty.  
The franchise 
The Directive on Voting Rights for EC Nationals in Local Elections (Directive 94/80/EC) 
agreed in 1994 made provision for EU nationals to vote in local elections in the country in 
which they were resident but in which they were not nationals.408  EU Member State 
nationals who are resident in the UK are therefore able to vote in local elections, devolved 
legislature and EP elections. There is no qualifying time limit and this right was not 
extended to UK Parliamentary elections. A UK withdrawal will leave the future of this 
reciprocal arrangement open to question. 
There are exceptions to the current arrangements. Citizens of the Republic of Ireland who 
are resident in the UK are able to vote in all elections. Citizens of Malta and Cyprus who 
are resident in the UK are also able to vote in all UK elections as qualifying 
Commonwealth citizens. A UK withdrawal will not affect the voting rights in the UK of 
the citizens of these EU countries. 
Some EU Member States have bilateral reciprocal arrangements with non-EU states with 
regard to voting rights. For example, Portugal grants Norwegian citizens the local 
franchise because Portuguese nationals living in Norway can vote in Norwegian local 
elections.  Spain has also signed agreements with several countries, including Norway, on 
reciprocal voting rights of nationals in local elections.  
Citizens of other Commonwealth countries who are resident in the UK are able to vote in 
all elections but this is dependent on their immigration status. There are no formal 
reciprocal arrangements between the UK and other Commonwealth countries but a 
number of Commonwealth countries allow resident British citizens to vote in their 
elections. 
 
                                                                                             
408  See Research Paper 94/23, Votes and seats for European Parliament elections, for details of this Directive.  
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12. Human rights 
Summary 
A UK withdrawal from the EU would mean that the UK no longer has to comply with the 
human rights obligations of the EU Treaties. The controversial EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights would not apply, and the EU Court of Justice would not have jurisdiction over the UK 
(except possibly for transitional cases that arose before withdrawal). 
Withdrawing from the EU does not mean withdrawing from the separate European 
Convention on Human Rights. The Government is planning a British Bill of Rights, but Theresa 
May has said that she does not intend to withdraw from the Convention. 
12.1 Overview 
The EU’s human rights obligations, which include the controversial EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, are sometimes overlooked, as they were largely drawn from other 
human rights instruments to which the UK was already a party, and were not intended to 
create any new rights. They apply to the EU institutions, and also to Member States when 
they are acting within the scope of EU law. 
However, EU human rights have in practice provided new remedies. The Charter has been 
relied on increasingly in the UK, not least because if the courts find a breach they can be 
required to disapply UK Acts of Parliament – something which they cannot do under other 
human rights instruments. 
Leaving the EU would mean that the Charter no longer applied in the UK, and that the 
EU’s enforcement mechanisms could no longer be used against the UK for any breach 
(although there would presumably need to be transitional provisions for cases arising 
before the date of withdrawal). 
However, withdrawing from the EU and the Charter does not mean withdrawing from the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Indeed it might give the Convention a greater 
significance. 
The Convention is not an EU document but a Council of Europe one. It binds the UK 
government under international law and is given effect in the UK through the Human 
Rights Act 1998. The Government’s concerns about how human rights operate in the UK 
have largely focused on the Convention and the Human Rights Act, although the Charter 
did also begin to feature in 2015. The Queen’s Speech 2016 included a commitment to 
bringing forward ‘proposals’ for a British Bill of Rights: although it is not clear what that 
might entail, Theresa May has said that she will not call for the UK to withdraw from the 
Convention. 
Leaving the EU might even result in the Council of Europe having a more prominent role 
in UK politics. And human rights under the Convention could well be raised in 
negotiations over the UK’s withdrawal agreement or future relations with the EU, for 
instance around free movement of persons, and/or in legal challenges in that area. 
It is worth noting that the EU is meant to accede as a body to the Convention (although 
this is not likely to happen soon). 
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12.2 What are the EU’s human rights obligations? 
Article 2 TEU declares that respect for human rights is one of the values on which the EU 
is founded: 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights 
of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in 
a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between women and men prevail. 
The EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights provides much more detail and substance. The 
Charter includes Convention rights (those incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights 
Act 1998 and others), as well as more progressive social and economic rights. In 2009, 
when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, the Charter acquired equal legal status to 
the EU Treaties themselves.409 
The main reason for introducing the Charter was to ensure that the EU institutions 
complied with human rights obligations. But it also applies to EU Member States when 
they are implementing, derogating from or acting within the scope of EU law.410 
The EU Court of Justice in Luxembourg can hear actions against the institutions and the 
Member States for breaches of these rights. If the breach is serious and persistent, the 
Member State’s voting rights in the Council can be suspended.411  
12.3 Does the Charter of Rights give additional rights or 
remedies in the UK? 
There has been considerable debate over whether the Charter simply restates existing 
rights in the UK or creates new ones. When it was being drawn up, many in the UK were 
concerned that it might create new rights and extend the reach of the EU Court of Justice. 
The UK and Poland secured a Protocol that some have seen as an opt-out from the 
Charter but which is more usually considered to be an interpretative guide that possibly 
limits the effect of the Charter for the UK and Poland as regards social rights.412 
The Charter does not necessarily provide a wider set of enforceable rights than is 
otherwise available. Not all of the Charter’s provisions are directly effective; some of them 
are ‘principles’ rather than directly enforceable individual rights; and none of it was 
intended to create new justiciable rights. 
However, it does mean new remedies are sometimes available, and provides a new forum 
for human rights cases in the EU Court of Justice. 
Perhaps the most striking effect of the Charter is that any domestic legislation that 
conflicts with a directly-effective provision of the Charter must be disapplied by the UK 
courts.413 
                                                                                             
409  Article 6(1) TEU 
410  For examples, see Professor Michael Dougan’s oral evidence to the House of Lords EU Justice sub-
committee, 15 December 2015, Q57. 
411  Article 7 TEU 
412  See for example Vaughne Miller, Effects of the EU Charter of Rights in the UK, Commons Library Standard 
Note 6765,17 March 2014; European Scrutiny Committee, The application of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in the UK: a state of confusion, 2 April 2014, HC 979 2013-14; Ministry of Justice, 
Government response to the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee Report, 43rd Report, 
2013-14, HC979, The Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the UK: A state of 
Confusion, July 2014; Anthony Arnull, ‘Protocol (No 30) on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union to Poland and the United Kingdom’, in Peers et al (eds), The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: a Commentary, 2014, p1595 at p1608. 
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This a more powerful remedy than the Human Rights Act 1998 provides. Under the 1998 
Act the courts cannot disapply UK Acts of Parliament: they can only issue a declaration of 
incompatibility with the Convention, and Parliament can then fast-track amendments to 
primary legislation in the light of the judgment (the courts can however strike out 
secondary legislation and legislation from the devolved assemblies that conflicts with 
rights under the 1998 Act).414 
Furthermore, compensatory damages for breaches of EU law can be granted as of right, 
whereas they are discretionary under the 1998 Act. 
There have already been several cases in England where claimants have relied on the 
Charter, either to assert rights that aren’t covered by the 1998 Act or to produce remedies 
unobtainable under the 1998 Act.415 In 2015 the Court of Appeal decided in two cases 
that UK legislation had to be disapplied because it conflicted with directly-effective 
provisions of the Charter.416 
Box 4: The EU and the prisoner voting controversy 
One of the main controversies around human rights in the UK is whether prisoners should be able to 
vote. 
The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg ruled in 2005 that the UK’s blanket ban on prisoner 
voting breached the European Convention on Human Rights. The UK has not yet introduced legislation 
to comply with this ruling. 
But this issue also concerns EU law. In October 2014 the EU Court of Justice in Luxembourg said that 
the right to vote in European Parliamentary elections is protected by the Charter (despite 
representations to the contrary from the UK and others). However, it held that a French ban on some 
prisoners voting was proportionate.417  
UK prisoners could bring a case under the Charter alleging that the UK’s blanket ban was 
disproportionate, in advance of the next European elections in 2019. If they won, this could potentially 
lead to UK legislation being disapplied. 
The Government has said it will produce a full report on prisoner voting after publishing its consultation 
paper on a British Bill of Rights (see below). 
There is more information on prisoner voting in two other House of Commons Library briefing papers: 
• Prisoners' voting rights (2005 to May 2015), CBP1764, 11 February 2015 
• Prisoners' voting rights: developments since May 2015, CBP 7461, 15 February 2016 
In April 2014 the Commons European Scrutiny Committee had called for urgent 
clarification on the application of the Charter in the UK, for the Government to intervene 
in proceedings in the EU Court of Justice to limit the scope of the Charter in the UK, and 
even for primary legislation to disapply the Charter from the UK.418  
In response, the Government agreed on the need for clarification, and said that it would 
publish ‘a report on the balance of competence between the EU and the UK on 
                                                                                                                                         
413  European Communities Act 1972 s2(1) 
414  Scotland Act 1998 s29(1); Government of Wales Act 2006 s94; and Northern Ireland Act 1998 s6. 
415  For discussion see for example Joshua Folkard, ‘Horizontal Direct Effect of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in the English Courts’, UK Constitutional Law Blog, 23 September 2015; Richard Clayton and Cian 
C. Murphy, The Emergence of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in UK Law, 5 EHRLR 469 [2014]. 
416  Benkharbouche v Sudanese Embassy [2015] EWCA Civ 33 andVidal-Hall v Google Inc [2015] EWCA Civ 
311. 
417  Thierry Delvigne v Commune de Lesparre-Médoc and Préfet de la Gironde, Case C-650/13, 6 October 
2014. 
418  European Scrutiny Committee, The application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the UK: a state 
of confusion, 2 April 2014, HC 979 2013-14. 
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fundamental rights’.419 The report duly followed, but served mainly to emphasise the 
disagreements in this area: 
The evidence shows there is a divergence of views on where the balance of 
competence should lie between the EU and the UK on the protection of human 
rights. There is little consensus on what constitutes the national interest in this context 
beyond the principle that the EU and Member States should act consistently with 
human rights. Views vary on whether the EU’s competence on fundamental rights is 
being exercised consistently with interests in the UK, depending on perspectives on 
the role of supranational human rights mechanisms, national sovereignty and how 
fundamental rights are balanced against other interests in society, such as trade.420 
It did, however, recognise that the Charter could have a greater impact than the 
Convention: 
the evidence revealed no instances where the domestic courts have interpreted 
fundamental rights to provide a greater standard of protection than corresponding 
guarantees in the ECHR. However, the evidence acknowledged that, in comparison to 
Convention rights, fundamental rights can have a wider scope of application and can 
result in the disapplication of primary legislation. Some legal practitioners and think 
tanks considered that the resulting impact of fundamental rights on parliamentary 
sovereignty is even more significant than the ECHR.421 
The Government’s response to the Committee also confirmed that the Government would 
intervene in EU Court of Justice cases where necessary, but it seemed to reject primary 
legislation to disapply the Charter in the UK: 
Any decision to unilaterally disapply legislation, including the Charter which has the 
same status as the Treaties, would no doubt have political, legal and diplomatic 
consequences.422 
In December 2015 the then Lord Chancellor said that it would be looking at how the 
Charter affects UK law in its consultation on a British Bill of Rights (see below).423  
The outcome of the EU referendum may well have overtaken this, because from the date 
of withdrawal the EU’s human rights obligations, including the Charter, would no longer 
apply to the UK and the EU Court of Justice would no longer have jurisdiction over the UK 
(except possibly for transitional cases that arose before withdrawal). 
12.4 What about the Human Rights Convention? 
Brexit would not mean leaving the Convention 
Leaving the EU would not automatically mean that the UK withdraws from the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The Convention is not an EU treaty but comes from the 47-
member Council of Europe.  
The UK has signed and ratified the Convention, and so the UK Government is bound by it 
under international law. If the UK no longer wished to be bound by the Convention, it 
would have to withdraw from the Convention separately. 
                                                                                             
419  Ministry of Justice, Government response to the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee Report, 
43rd Report, 2013-14, HC979, The Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the UK: A state 
of Confusion, July 2014, p4. 
420  HM Government, Review of the Balance of Competences between the UK and the EU: Fundamental 
Rights, Summer 2014. 
421  Ibid para 4.87 
422  Ministry of Justice, Government response to the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee Report, 
43rd Report, 2013-14, HC979, The Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the UK: A state 
of Confusion, July 2014, pp17-18. 
423  Michael Gove, oral evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 2 December 
2015, p15. 
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The UK has also given effect to Convention rights under the Human Rights Act 1998. 
Government proposals for a Bill of Rights 
The Government has for some time had concerns about the way human rights are applied 
in the UK, which latterly included concerns about the Charter as well as the Convention 
and the Human Rights Act.424 
It was due to publish a consultation paper on a new British Bill of Rights in the autumn of 
2015, with proposals on ‘preventing abuse of the system, ‘restoring common sense’ to UK 
human rights laws and ‘making clear where the balance should lie between Strasbourg 
and British courts’.425  
In December 2015, when no paper had appeared, Michael Gove (then Justice Secretary 
and Lord Chancellor) said the delay was partly over concerns about the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the EU Court of Justice: 
One of the other challenges, and it is a challenge that the Prime Minister has passed 
directly to me, is to think hard about whether we should use the British Bill of Rights 
in order to create a constitutional longstop similar to the German Constitutional Court 
and, if so, whether the Supreme Court should be that body. This was partly a 
consequence, as we got into the nitty-gritty of thinking about the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the court, of recognising that the European Court 
of Justice in Luxembourg and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which 
was adopted as part of EU law in the Lisbon treaty, also have an application in 
domestic law here.  
The referendum result might override this particular reason for the delay. 
The Queen’s Speech in May 2016 made a brief reference to bringing forward proposals 
for a British Bill of Rights. The Government’s notes explained that the proposed Bill would 
‘restore common sense to the way human rights law is applied’, and include: 
• Measures to reform and modernise the UK human rights framework. 
• Protections against abuse of the system and misuse of human rights laws. 
The rights would be ‘based on’ those set out in the Convention, but would also take 
account of ‘our common law tradition’.  
David Cameron’s administration did not rule out withdrawing from the Convention. 
However, Theresa May, who in a speech in April 2016 had called for the UK to withdraw 
from the Convention and remain in the EU, then said when she launched her campaign 
for leadership of the Conservative Party on 30 May 2016 that she would not call for the 
UK to withdraw from the Convention. The Bill of Rights proposals will now be a matter for 
the new Justice Secretary and Lord Chancellor, Liz Truss. 
The Convention after Brexit 
If the UK does not withdraw from the Convention, it is likely to play an important part in 
the Brexit negotiations and afterwards. 
Human rights could well be raised in negotiations over the UK’s withdrawal agreement or 
future relations with the EU, for instance around free movement of persons, and/or in 
legal challenges. Even though the Government has declared its intention to protect the 
residence rights of those exercising free movement rights before a UK withdrawal, the 
details of this are likely to be subject to reciprocal arrangements with other EU countries, 
                                                                                             
424  See A British Bill of Rights?, House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP 7193, 18 May 2016. 
425  Letter from Rt Hon Michael Gove, Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, 27 November 2015. 
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and even the most thorough withdrawal agreement could have gaps. It is quite 
conceivable that there could be challenges on human rights grounds either to an 
agreement itself or to how individuals are affected by it.426 
Leaving the EU might also result in the Council of Europe (which is responsible for the 
Convention) having a more prominent role in UK politics, as it would become the main 
pan-European political organisation of which the UK was a member. 
EU accession to the Convention 
Finally, it is worth noting note that Article 6(2) TEU requires the EU itself to accede to the 
Convention. However, in December 2014 the EU Court of Justice gave its Opinion on the 
validity of a draft agreement on the EU’s accession to the Convention. It found that it was 
not within the EU’s powers to accede to the Convention under the draft agreement, and 
raised issues about submitting itself to the judgments of the Strasbourg court. 
 
                                                                                             
426  See other sections of this paper for more information on immigration and acquired rights. 
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13. Social security 
13.1 Welfare benefits 
Entitlement to welfare benefits for people moving between EU Member States is closely 
linked to free movement rights for EEA nationals.  Brexit could have significant 
implications both for EU/EEA nationals living in or wishing to move to the UK, and for UK 
expatriates elsewhere in the EEA, and those considering moving abroad. 
The UK could seek to secure bilateral social security agreements on reciprocal rights with 
individual EU/EEA States, but negotiations could be difficult and protracted.  Alternatively, 
the UK could seek a single agreement with the EEA as a whole.  Such an arrangement 
could, however, end up closely resembling existing provisions in EU law.  Whatever the 
solution, decisions would have to be made on how to protect social security rights already 
accrued at the point of withdrawal from the EU. 
The current position 
EU law does not require that Member States allow EU/EEA migrants unrestricted access to 
social benefits.427  Broadly speaking, a person who moves from one Member State to 
another has access to benefits in the host country if they are economically active, or are 
able to support themselves.  Working EU/EEA migrants enjoy full free movement rights 
and are entitled to in-work benefits on the same basis as nationals of the host country.  
Social security coordination regulations also enable working EU migrants to claim ‘family 
benefits’ from the State in which they work for their dependent children resident in 
another Member State (although payments may be reduced if family benefits are already 
being paid by the state where the child resides).428 
EU/EEA migrants who are looking for work, especially those who have never worked in 
the host Member State, have much more limited access to benefits.  EU/EEA migrants not 
looking for work, or unable to work because of sickness or disability, may have no access 
to benefits.  Starting from 2014, the UK Government introduced a series of measures 
further limiting access to benefits for non-working migrants.429  Recent judgments by the 
Court of Justice of the EU have also clarified the situations where Member States may 
refuse social assistance to non-active EU migrants, and to migrants only entitled to reside 
in the host state because of their job-search.430 
The Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union agreed at the 
European Council on 17-19 February 2016 included proposals to change EU law to 
provide an ‘emergency brake’ limiting full access to in-work benefits by newly arrived EU 
migrants for up to four years (with agreement from the Commission that the UK could 
invoke this straight away), and an option for Member States to index exported child 
benefits to the to the conditions of the Member State where the child resides.431  With the 
UK voting to leave the EU, the Settlement has lapsed and the changes to EU law will not 
now be made.  
                                                                                             
427  See CBP-06847, People from abroad: what benefits can they claim? 
428  Articles 67-69 of EC Regulation 883/2004; CBP-06561, Child Benefit and Child Tax Credit for children 
resident in other EEA countries.  
429  CBP-06889, Measures to limit migrants’ access to benefits. 
430  Cases C-333/13 – Dano, 11 November 2014; C-16/74 - Alimanovic, 15 September 2015; C-299/14 - 
García-Nieto and Others, 25 February 2016. 
431  See CBP-7524, EU Referendum: analysis of the UK's new EU Settlement, 26 May 2016, section 3.5. 
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Implications of Brexit 
Until such time as the UK formally leaves the EU, the existing social security rules continue 
to apply and migrants’ entitlements remain unchanged.  In the longer term, the situation 
depends crucially on the outcome of negotiations between the UK and the EU on free 
movement of people. 
If Brexit means an end to free movement rights, the UK would be able to impose 
restrictions on access to many social security benefits via immigration law, for example by 
making EU/EEA nationals’ leave to remain in the UK subject to a condition that they have 
no recourse to public funds.  Entitlement to contributory social security benefits could also 
be limited by limiting access to employment.  The Government would have to decide how 
to deal with those exercising their free movement rights at the point of withdrawal, e.g. 
as workers or self-employed persons, and EU/EEA nationals who might have acquired 
rights in the UK, e.g. those who have gained permanent residence under Directive 
2004/38/EC.  While the long-term position of existing EU/EEA migrants in the UK is 
uncertain, the legal charity the AIRE Centre suggests that steps EU/EEA nationals 
concerned about their future could take now to mitigate against the possible effects of 
Brexit include applying for a residence card or a document certifying permanent residence 
(if they satisfy the conditions), or applying for British citizenship.432 
Brexit also has implications for UK nationals living in other EU/EEA countries, since 
Member States would be free to impose corresponding restrictions on entitlement to their 
benefits.433  According to United Nations estimates, around 1.22 million UK nationals were 
resident in other EU Member States in 2015 (compared with 2.88 million migrants from 
other EU countries living in the UK), with the largest numbers estimated to be in Spain 
(309,000), Ireland (255,000), France (185,000) and Germany (103,000).434  The 
implications for UK nationals resident overseas would depend on the attitude of their 
Member State of residence, but it is possible that restrictions on entitlement to benefits, 
along with other restrictions on rights of residence and changes to immigration status, 
could result in significant numbers seeking repatriation. 
UK withdrawal from the EU would also mean withdrawal from the long-standing 
provisions in EU law to co-ordinate social security schemes for people moving within the 
EU,435 which also apply to non-EU EEA countries and Switzerland.  The main purpose of 
the co-ordination rules is to ensure that people who choose to exercise the right of 
freedom of movement do not find themselves at a disadvantage in respect of social 
security benefits – for example if they should fall ill or become unemployed while working 
in another EU/EEA State.  The Regulations do not guarantee a general right to benefit 
throughout the EEA; nor do they harmonise the social security systems of the Member 
States.  Their primary function is to support free movement throughout the EU/EEA by 
removing some of the disadvantages that migrants might encounter.  They achieve this 
by, for example: 
• prohibiting discrimination in matters of social security systems on grounds of 
nationality; 
• clarifying which state is responsible for paying benefits in particular cases (the ‘single 
state principle’); 
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435  Now in EC Regulations 883/2004 and 987/2009. 
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• allowing a person’s periods of employment, residence and contributions paid in one 
EEA country to count towards entitlement to benefit in another country (this is 
referred to as the principle of ‘aggregation’); and 
• allowing people to take certain benefits abroad with them to another EU/EEA state 
(‘exportation’) 
Withdrawal from the system of co-ordination would pose questions, such as how to deal 
with people who have lived and worked in more than one Member State and accrued 
rights to contributory benefits on the basis of social insurance paid in different countries.  
At present, an individual in this situation would, on reaching retirement for example, 
make a claim for a state pension from the country of residence at that time, but under the 
co-ordination rules each Member State in which the person was insured will calculate its 
pro rata contribution (using agreed formulae), and put that amount into payment (this is 
known as ‘apportionment’). Withdrawal from this system would mean that, unless 
alternative arrangements were put in place, UK nationals who had spent periods living 
and working abroad could have their pension rights significantly reduced.  Other EEA 
nationals who had spent periods living and working in the UK would be similarly 
disadvantaged.  The provider of audit, tax and advisory services Mazars warns that 
uncertainty around the impact of Brexit on the EU social security framework for mobile 
workers “may give rise to a number of unexpected risks and costs”.436 
In place of the co-ordination rules, the UK could seek to negotiate bilateral reciprocal 
social security agreements with individual EEA Member States (the UK already has a 
number of such agreements with non-EEA states, and agreements with certain EEA states 
which pre-date the UK’s EC entry).  These might cover matters such as reciprocal 
recognition of periods of insurance/residence for benefits purposes, exportability of 
benefits (and continued annual uprating of benefits for people living abroad), and 
aggregation/apportionment for contributory benefits and retirement pensions.  However, 
such bilateral agreements as currently exist are far more limited in scope than the EU co-
ordination rules, and no new agreements of this sort have been signed for many years. 
The likelihood of the UK securing a bilateral agreement, and the precise terms, could vary 
from country to country depending on the relationship between that country and the UK. 
The UK might not be able to extract terms favourable to UK nationals, or might not be 
able to reach agreement at all, if there is an imbalance between the number of UK 
nationals living in that country and that country’s nationals living in the UK, or if the 
country perceives the UK’s immigration/benefit rules as impacting disproportionately on its 
own nationals.  Negotiations could prove difficult and protracted.437  Writing before the 
referendum, one commentator noted that “Striking mutually acceptable partnership 
agreements with countries that fundamentally oppose a UK exit from the EU may prove 
problematic”.438 
As an alternative to seeking individual bilateral social security agreements, the UK could 
seek to negotiate a single agreement with the EU/EEA as a whole, which would simplify 
matters for people who had worked and been insured in more than two Member States.  
However, such an agreement might end up closely resembling the existing EU/EEA social 
security co-ordination rules.  It seems highly unlikely that the EU would accept any 
arrangement that discriminated between different Member States, so the UK may have to 
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grant the same rights to all EU nationals, including those from less prosperous Eastern 
European accession states.439440 
13.2 Access to social housing 
Social (council) housing in the UK is a public resource. Therefore, as with entitlement to 
social security benefits, EEA nationals’ access to social housing is based on the principle of 
free movement and the entitlement of EU/EEA nationals to enjoy equal treatment with UK 
nationals in accessing social advantages. 
There is no automatic entitlement to social housing for anyone in the UK. The basis on 
which an EU/EEA national might be eligible to apply for an allocation of social housing is 
summarised in this extract from a parliamentary answer: 
European Economic Area nationals who have a right to reside in the UK on the basis 
that they are self-sufficient are eligible for social housing, if they are habitually 
resident in the common travel area (the UK, Channel Islands, Isle of Man and Republic 
of Ireland). To be considered self-sufficient, a person must have (i) sufficient resources 
not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the UK and (ii) 
comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the UK. 
To be allocated social housing an eligible applicant must also meet the local 
authority's own qualification criteria and have sufficient priority under the local 
authority's allocation scheme. 
An allocation scheme must be framed to ensure that certain categories of people are 
given 'reasonable preference' for social housing, because they have an identified 
housing need, including people who are homeless, overcrowded households, and 
people who need to move on medical or welfare grounds.441 
Housing policy in the UK is a devolved matter; different regulations govern eligibility to 
apply for an allocation of social housing in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland.442  
If Brexit results in the cessation of free movement rights, it will be possible to restrict the 
ability of EU/EEA nationals to apply for social housing. Currently, ‘Persons Subject to 
Immigration Control’ (PISCs) cannot be allocated social housing and are ineligible for 
housing assistance unless they are of a class prescribed in regulations. Broadly, the PISCs 
that are able to apply for social housing have been granted leave to enter or remain in the 
UK with recourse to public funds (for example, people granted refugee status or 
humanitarian protection). 
Prior to withdrawal the Government will have to decide how to deal with those EEA 
nationals who have already acquired a social housing tenancy, some of whom will be 
reliant on full/partial Housing Benefit in order to meet their rent commitments.  
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13.3 Pensions  
The design of pension systems is largely the responsibility of Member States. The 
regulatory framework at EU level covers four main points: cross border co-ordination of 
social security, establishing an internal market for funded occupational pension schemes 
and the minimum standards to protect scheme members; minimum guarantees 
concerning accrued rights in occupational pension schemes in case of the insolvency of 
the sponsoring employer; and anti-discrimination rules.443 
State Pensions 
Long-standing rules enable the co-ordination of social security entitlements for people 
moving within the EU.444 The rules also apply to EEA countries and Switzerland.   
The aim of the provisions is not to harmonise social security systems, but to remove 
barriers to workers moving between Member States. They enable periods of insurance to 
be aggregated, so an individual who has worked in other Member States can make one 
application to the relevant agency in the country of residence (in the UK, the International 
Pension Centre), which then arranges for each state where a person was insured for at 
least a year to pay a pension. They also enable a pension built up in one Member State to 
be drawn in another (exportability).445 
UK state pensioners resident in EEA countries also receive annual increases to their state 
pension. Elsewhere, the UK state pension is only uprated if there is a reciprocal social 
security agreement requiring this.446  
In its review of the Balance of Competences between the UK and EU, the Government 
commented that the social security co-ordination provisions were of “significant benefit to 
UK citizens, particularly retirees, who are living in other Member States”. It said: 
The export of pensions to those who have accrued the necessary entitlements is perhaps the 
clearest example of the necessary role of coordination rules as originally envisaged, and the 
EU rules superseded bi-lateral agreements already in place for example with the Republic of 
Ireland.447 
The arrangements that will apply in future will be considered as part of negotiations for 
the UK’s exit from the EU.448 The UK could seek to negotiate bilateral agreements with 
individual Member States, or an agreement with the EU/EEA as a whole.449 
On 8 July 2016, when asked what assessment the Government had made of the 
implications of Brexit for UK pensions and healthcare provision for UK citizens currently 
residing in other EU Member States and those wishing to retire to other EU Member 
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States, the Leader of the House of Commons David Lidington said there would be no 
immediate change: 
As the Prime Minister, my Rt Hon. Friend the Member for Witney (Mr Cameron) has 
said, there will be no immediate changes in the circumstances of British citizens living 
in European countries. It will be for the next Prime Minister to determine, along with 
their Cabinet, exactly the right approach to take in negotiating these provisions going 
forward but the Government's guiding principle will be ensuring the best possible 
outcome for the British people. 450 
Workplace pension schemes 
The Pension and Lifetime Savings Association explains that UK workplace pension schemes 
tend to operate on a national basis but want access to investment opportunities and 
service providers in the EU: 
Workplace pension schemes in the UK are not generally looking to provide pensions 
to workers in other Member States. So, in this respect, there is little interest in taking 
up the opportunities that might - in theory at least – be provided by an effective EU-
wide Single Market.  
However, workplace pension schemes do want ready access to investment 
opportunities and service providers in EU and across the world, and this is where a 
strong Single Market has a role to play. Having ready access to the widest possible 
range of service providers helps schemes to invest their assets and administer their 
schemes with a minimum of cost in order to provide the best value to their 
members.451 
EU legislation has had an impact on them: 
• directly, through pensions-specific EU legislation such as the Directive on 
Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision (‘IORP Directive’), 
through the regulatory activities of EIOPA, and through EU employment 
law, such as the Equal Treatment Directive; and 
• indirectly, because the costs of complying with the EU’s investment 
markets legislation (such as EMIR, MIFID, the draft Money Market Funds 
Regulation and the potential Financial Transaction Tax) are passed to 
pension fund clients by asset managers, brokers and banks.452 
The UK Government’s Balance of Competences Review said workplace pension providers 
acknowledged the role the Single Market could play in facilitating access to investment 
opportunities and services. However, they also argued for a strong national dimension to 
decision-making relating to occupational pensions, given the very different traditions of 
provision across Member States.453  
Following the vote on 23 June 2016, the regulators explained that existing regulations 
would continue to apply until changed by the UK Government or Parliament. The Financial 
Conduct Authority said: 
Much financial regulation currently applicable in the UK derives from EU legislation. 
This regulation will remain applicable until any changes are made, which will be a 
matter for Government and Parliament. 
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Firms must continue to abide by their obligations under UK law, including those 
derived from EU law and continue with implementation plans for legislation that is still 
to come into effect 
Consumers’ rights and protections, including any derived from EU legislation, are 
unaffected by the result of the referendum and will remain unchanged unless and 
until the Government changes the applicable legislation.  
The longer term impacts of the decision to leave the EU on the overall regulatory 
framework for the UK will depend, in part, on the relationship that the UK seeks with 
the EU in the future. We will work closely with the Government as it confirms the 
arrangements for the UK’s future relationship with the EU.454  
The Pensions Regulator warned pension scheme trustees against “knee-jerk reactions” to 
market volatility but said trustees should review their position to understand the risks in 
the scheme’s investment strategy and employer covenant (their legal obligation and 
financial ability to support the scheme).455 
Initial reports in the pensions press suggested many pensions experts expect much of the 
existing EU-derived legislation to remain in place (partly on the grounds that it was 
designed to protect members – anti-discrimination provisions, for example).456 Further 
detail is in Commons Library Briefing Paper 7629 Brexit – implications for pensions (10 
August 2016), which will be updated as the situation develops. 
More detail about the legislation that currently applies is on the Europe and International 
section of the PLSA website.457  Library Briefing Paper 7435 Financial Services: European 
aspects (June 2016) brings together recent European legislative and regulatory 
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14. Health policy and medicines regulation 
While health care systems in EU Member States are a matter of national responsibility,458 
other aspects of health care – reciprocal access, pharmaceuticals, the working hours of 
doctors and mutual recognition of qualifications, for example - are regulated to a greater 
or lesser extent by EU law. There is therefore a significant role for the EU in supplementing 
national policies and also in ensuring a cross-border approach to important public health 
issues, such as preventing pandemics and anti-smoking measures. 
There has been a great deal of speculation about the impact that the vote to leave the EU 
will have on the NHS, public health and medical research and regulation. The chief 
executive of NHS England, Simon Stevens, has commented on the range of issues to 
consider during Brexit negotiations, including the movement and regulation of health 
professionals, procurement rules, medicines and devices, cross-border patient entitlements 
and certain public health measures. He has also noted that a new NHS Europe Transition 
Team will be established to work with the Cabinet Office and Department of Health to 
ensure “the NHS voice and patient interests are properly heard” in the negotiation of 
post-Brexit arrangements.459 
Following the referendum, concerns have been raised about how the UK’s future 
economic performance will impact on public funding for the NHS,460 and the effect on 
health and social care staff from the EU.461 Ultimately decisions about the extent of free-
movement for health and care workers from the EU and other issues of health policy and 
medical regulation will be subject to negotiations on the UK’s future relationship with the 
EU. 
14.1 Public health  
The EU Public Health Strategy, Together for Health462 was adopted in 2007.  Objectives 
within the strategy include: improving the health of the EU’s aged population, targets to 
improve surveillance between Member States to combat pandemics and bioterrorism, and 
support for new technologies for health care and disease prevention.  
One area of importance is the early warning and response system for the prevention and 
control of communicable diseases.463 This allows for a network of communication 
between Member States to monitor, communicate and assist in the response to a threat 
of communicable disease. The European Centre for Disease Control and Prevention 
(ECDC) is at the centre of this network, collecting information, providing expertise and 
coordinating related bodies.  Some commentators have said that a resulting lack of UK 
involvement with the ECDC would be a concerning health outcome of Brexit.464  Following 
negotiations, the UK may be able to continue to participate in the ECDC, and this may be 
                                                                                             
458  Europa: Public health: EU action “shall not include the definition of health policies, nor the organisation 
and provision of health services and medical care”. 
459  Health Service Journal, 13 July 2016. 
460  See for example, Health Foundation, “NHS Finances outside the EU”, 5 July 2016. 
461  BMJ, “What does Brexit mean for doctors working in the UK?”, 30 June 2016. 
462  European Commission, White Paper: Together for Health, A strategic approach for the EU 2008-2013, 
2007. 
463  Europa:  Early warning system and response system for the prevention and control of communicable 
diseases (accessed 3 June 2015). 
464  BMJ, How Brexit might affect public health, 16 May 2016. 
  Number 07213, 26 August 2016 128 
in a similar way to Norway and Switzerland.  Both these countries work with the agency, 
but these countries do not have a role in decision making within the organisation.465   
The EU has played a role in other significant public health strategies, such as reducing 
alcohol misuse, promoting good nutrition and tackling antimicrobial resistance. The UK 
has been active on a number of public health issues within Europe, most recently with 
tobacco control policy and antimicrobial resistance.  The President of the Faculty of Public 
Health, Professor John Middleton has said that the referendum decision to leave the EU 
was disappointing for many in the public health community.  He has said that the public 
health community must work to ensure that the UK retains a leadership role in public 
health: 
[…]The public health community needs to lead action to tackle air pollution, climate 
chaos and migrant health. In this time of self-interest, we need to be the collective 
voice and conscience for the dispossessed, the disabled and disenfranchised, and to 
protect the health of this and future generations. We must not allow ourselves or our 
political leaders to withdraw from our global responsibilities.  
 
The UK has been a European leader in tackling antimicrobial resistance, in securing 
better standards in pharmaceuticals and in tobacco control. We need everyone in the 
public health community to work together to debate calmly and constructively, to 
speak with authority and to the evidence. I will be discussing with senior national 
colleagues in public health how we retain a UK leadership role in public health for our 
UK citizens, in Europe and internationally. We need to ensure that health and life 
expectancy gained over 40 years in the EU are not lost, but built on. And we need to 
lead international efforts to tackle new public health scourges in our global village.466 
14.2 Tobacco control 
Tobacco control is an area of public health where the EU has been very active.  Most 
recently, the revised EU Tobacco Products Directive467 was implemented in the UK in May 
2016. 468  The Directive strengthens the rules on tobacco products.  It introduces a 
condition that 65% of the packet be covered in picture and text health warnings, that 
packets in future will contain a minimum of twenty cigarettes; and it bans flavourings of 
tobacco.  The Directive also introduces a new regulatory approach to electronic cigarettes.     
There have been concerns expressed by e-cigarette users and manufacturers that the new 
regulations of these products will reduce the availability of e-cigarettes and impact their 
potential as a means of assisting smoking cessation.  In May 2016 the European Court of 
Justice decided that the Directive was valid in the face of legal challenges from a number 
of tobacco companies and a UK electronic cigarette manufacturer.469 In response to a July 
2016 House of Lords debate on the regulation of e-cigarettes in the new legislation, the 
Health Minister, Lord Prior of Brampton, stated that he thought the approach was 
proportionate; and that the Government would review the regulation within five years of 
its implementation.470   
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In the area of tobacco control, the UK has already gone further than the provisions of the 
EU Tobacco Product Directive as the first EU country to introduce standardised packaging 
for tobacco products.  These regulations came into force in May 2016.471   
14.3 Healthcare professionals and the recognition of 
qualifications 
The latest information shows that there are around 130,000 people from the EU working 
in health and social care.472 As at September 2015 there were around 55,400 EU nationals 
working in NHS hospital and community health service in England - representing 5% of 
the overall workforce (around 5% of the total UK population are citizens of another EU 
country, and around 7% of the total UK workforce). The proportion varies by category of 
staff, with 9% of hospital doctors (10,136), and 6% of nurses (20,634), in England being 
EU nationals.473 
The Health Secretary Jeremy Hunt, Simon Stevens, and other senior NHS leaders, have 
sought to provide reassurance to NHS employees from the EU that they continue to be 
welcome in the UK and have praised their huge contribution to the country.474 However, 
there have been concerns that even if the residency status of EU nationals working in the 
NHS is confirmed, it could become more difficult to retain staff and attract new recruits 
from EU countries, at a time when services are already under pressure.  
Under the European Directive on the recognition of qualifications, health and social care 
professionals who qualified within the EEA automatically have their qualifications 
recognised by the relevant regulatory body in any EEA country. For example, doctors who 
qualified from recognised medical schools within the EEA have been able to register with 
the General Medical Council (GMC), allowing them to practise in the UK without 
additional checks on their competence and English language skills (whereas healthcare 
workers from outside the EEA will generally be subject to pre-registration checks). 
Following the clarifications contained in a revised Directive in 2014, the Department of 
Health has given the power, through legislation, to a number of the health and care 
regulators to introduce “proportionate” language controls for EEA applicants.475 However, 
the President of the Royal College of Surgeons has commented that leaving the EU could 
allow regulators to introduce stronger pre-registration checks on EEA trained healthcare 
professionals.476 The Nursing and Midwifery Council has raised concerns that applying 
checks currently applied to nurses from non-EEA countries to those coming from the EEA 
would have a major impact on the regulator’s ability to process applications.477  
The GMC has said it will seek to understand the implications for UK doctors wishing to 
work in the EU once the UK is no longer a member.478 
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14.4 Junior doctors and the EU Working Time Directive 
The European Working Time Directive (EWTD), which includes a general limit of 48 hours 
on the working week, and a requirement for 11 hours of rest between working periods, 
has applied to most health service staff since 1998. Initially junior doctors were exempt 
from the working hours limit because there were concerns about the impact on NHS 
services and training, but from 2004 to 2009 junior doctors were gradually brought within 
the provisions of the EWTD (although it is still possible for doctors and other NHS staff to 
work longer hours by signing an opt-out clause).  
There have been long-standing concerns that the EWTD has restricted training 
opportunities for junior doctors and damaged continuity of care.  The previous Labour 
government commissioned an independent review, chaired by Professor Sir John Temple, 
of the impact of the EWTD on the quality of training. A report of this review, Time for 
Training, was published in May 2010. Its findings concluded that high quality training 
could be delivered in 48 hours, but traditional models of training and service delivery had 
wasted training opportunities.479   
The Royal College of Physicians (RCP) and other bodies involved in the training and 
regulation of doctors have raised particular concerns about restrictions around on-call time 
and compensatory rest requirements resulting from the EU Court of Justice judgments in 
SiMap (which stated that all time when a worker was required to be present on site whilst 
on call counted as actual working hours) and Jaeger (which confirmed that time on call at 
a place of work counted as working hours even if workers could sleep, and that 
compensatory rest must be taken immediately after the end of the working period).480 
Although leaving the EU could in theory allow the NHS to ignore the requirements of the 
EWTD, allowing greater flexibility in devising work and training rotas, this may be subject 
to wider negotiations on employment rights and access to the Single Market.  The EWTD 
is also implemented through UK regulations and staff contracts, and any attempted 
changes in this area could face opposition from unions.481     
14.5 Reciprocal access to healthcare 
EU citizens who can show that they are either employed or self-employed in the UK, or 
non-active but ordinarily resident in the UK, are entitled to free NHS treatment, so any 
changes to free movement rights could make it harder for EU citizens to receive free 
healthcare on the basis of residence in the UK. Similarly, the rights of UK nationals living in 
the EU to access state provided healthcare will be subject to negotiation of the terms 
under which the UK leaves the EU. 
Continuing participation in a number of other reciprocal healthcare schemes will also be a 
matter for negotiation. For example, if the UK remains in the EEA it might be able to 
continue to participate in the European Health Insurance Card scheme, or, subject to 
negotiation, for the UK to participate on a similar basis to Switzerland. 
EEA residents and Swiss residents are entitled to hold an EHIC, which gives access to 
medically necessary, state-provided healthcare during a temporary stay in another EEA 
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country.482  In certain circumstances EEA/Swiss residents can also be referred to other 
Member States for pre-planned treatment. The costs of treatment under these schemes 
can be reclaimed from the visitor’s country of residence. Furthermore, EEA States are 
required to reimburse the healthcare costs of their state pensioners, and their families, 
who chose to live in another part of the EEA.483   
In October 2014, the Government published a Quantitative Assessment of Visitor and 
Migrant Use of the NHS in England. The research found that EEA visitors and non-
permanent residents cost the NHS about £305m, of which £220m is potentially 
recoverable under the EHIC scheme. However, the Department of Health accounts for 
2012-13 show that only about £50m was actually recovered from EEA countries. The 
report also stated that the £50m the UK recovers “is less than is paid out for British visitors 
to EEA countries, namely £173m”.484 A PQ in December 2014 showed that the UK paid a 
total of £580m for its pensioners living abroad in the EEA in 2013-14, and received £12m 
from other EEA countries for its pensioners who live in the UK.485 
14.6 Medicines regulation 
EU legislation provides a harmonised approach to medicines regulation across Member 
States.  The most recent revision of EU medicines legislation in 2004 led to the 
establishment of the European Medicines Agency (EMA), which is based in London.486  
The EMA is responsible for the scientific evaluation of human and veterinary medicines 
developed by pharmaceutical companies for use in the EU.  It can grant marketing 
authorisations for medicines which allow for their use across the EU, Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Norway. 
Pharmaceutical companies can currently apply to the EMA for a centralised authorisation 
as long as the medicine concerned is a significant therapeutic, scientific or technical 
innovation or if its authorisation would be in the interest of public or animal health. This 
centralised procedure is compulsory for some groups of drugs.487 Alternatively, companies 
may apply to national marketing authorities of EU countries simultaneously; or, through 
the mutual-recognition procedure, companies that have a marketing authorisation in one 
country can apply to have it recognised in other EU countries.488 
The inclusion of non-EU EEA countries in the centralised marketing authorisation 
procedure may mean that the UK could continue to participate if it negotiates to stay in 
the EEA.  However, if this were not the case, pharmaceutical companies would need to 
apply for marketing authorisations separately to the Medicines and Healthcare Products 
Regulatory Agency (MHRA) for a medicine they wished to supply in the UK.   
In response to the referendum result, the MHRA has said that it will continue to make a 
global contribution to improving public health through effective regulation of medicines 
and medical devices: 
                                                                                             
482  The EHIC entitles EEA visitors to the UK to free NHS treatment that is medically necessary during their visit, 
including treatment of pre-existing medical conditions, as long as they have not travelled to the UK 
purposefully for treatment. 
483  The Government estimates that approximately 400,000 British pensioners reside in Spain at any one time – 
see Review of the Balance of Competences between the UK and the EU: Health, July 2013. 
484  Quantitative Assessment of Visitor and Migrant Use of the NHS in England (independent report 
commissioned by the Department of Health), October 2014, p87. This £173m (for 2012/3) only relates to 
the EHIC scheme and does not include British pensioners who permanently live abroad. 
485  PQ HL3430 [on Pensioners: Health Services], 16 December 2014. 
486  Reg 726/2004, 31 March 2004, laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision 
of medicinal product for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency. 
487  European Medicines Agency (accessed 28 July 2016). 
488  EMA, Mutual recognition and decentralised procedures –human (CMDh) (accessed 28 July 2016). 
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Following the result of the referendum on the UK’s membership of the European 
Union, the focus of the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency 
continues to be on our public health role. We will continue to work to the highest 
levels of excellence and quality, working with and supporting our customers, partners 
and stakeholders to protect health and improve lives. 
Working closely with government we will consider the implications for the work of 
the Agency. We will continue to make a major contribution globally to improving 
public health through the effective regulation of medicines and medical devices, 
underpinned by science and research.489 
Following the referendum, it has been reported that the EMA is likely to move its 
headquarters and that a number of other EU countries have expressed interest as potential 
new sites for the agency.490  The EMA has said in response to the referendum result that 
its work will continue as normal and, as there is no precedent for a Member State leaving 
the EU, the implications for the location and operation of the EMA are unknown.  The 
EMA also stated that any decision about the location of the agency’s headquarters will be 
decided by common agreement of the Member States: 
EMA welcomes the interest expressed by some Member States to host the Agency in 
future. The decision on the seat of the Agency will however not be taken by EMA, but 
will be decided by common agreement among the representatives of the Member 
States. We are confident that the Member States will take the most appropriate 
decision on EMA's location and arrangements in due course, taking also into account 
the complex political and legal environment generated by the outcome of the UK 
referendum.  
The European Regulatory Network as a whole is a very strong and flexible system that 
is able to adapt to changes without jeopardising the quality and effectiveness of its 
work. The Agency is in close contact with the EU institutions. As soon as concrete 








                                                                                             
489  MHRA, Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency statement on the outcome of the EU 
referendum, 27 June 2016. 
490  The Times, More than 800 jobs put at risk if medicine watchdog is forced out, 2 July 2016. 
491  EMA, Statement on the outcome of the UK referendum, 6 July 2016. 
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15. Higher education  
15.1 Support for EU students 
Arguably the most significant consequences of EU membership for the UK higher 
education (HE) sector are the provision of support to EU students studying in the UK and 
access to European research funding. 
Membership of the EU also gives UK students access to European student mobility 
schemes such as Erasmus+. Furthermore, the UK is a signatory to the Bologna Process 
which aims to create a harmonised HE system across Europe.  
Under EU legislation on free movement citizens moving to another Member State should 
have the same access to education as nationals of that Member State. With regard to 
higher education this means that every eligible EU student pays the same tuition fees and 
can apply for the same tuition fee support as nationals of the hosting EU country. UK 
higher education institutions therefore charge incoming EU students the same tuition fees 
as home students, and the Government provides tuition fee loans to cover the cost of 
these fees on the same basis as loans to UK home students. In 2013/14 there were 
125,300 EU students at UK universities492 and in that year £224 million was paid in fee 
loans to EU students on full-time courses in England - 3.7% of the total student loan 
bill.493 
A host Member State is not obliged, however, to provide maintenance support to citizens 
of other EU States, although some EU nationals who have lived in the UK for three years 
prior to the start of their course are eligible to apply for the full package of grants and 
loans for maintenance support.  
EU student mobility programmes 
The Erasmus+ scheme is an EU programme open to education, training, youth and sports 
organisations, and it offers opportunities for UK participants to study, work, volunteer, 
teach and train in Europe. The scheme will allocate almost €1 billion to the UK over seven 
years and it is expected that nearly 250,000 people will undertake activities abroad with 
the programme.494  
The Bologna Process 
In 1999 the UK signed the Bologna Declaration, which set in train a process aimed at 
creating a European higher education area through the harmonisation of systems across 
Europe in matters such as credit transfer and comparability of degrees, and by promoting 
academic mobility. 
15.1 European research funding 
The European Research Area (ERA) was launched by the European Commission in 2000 
with the aim of co-ordinating research and innovation activities across the EU. ERA 
initiatives are developed through periodic framework programmes; the current 
programme, Horizon 2020, aims to allocate €80 billion for research and innovation from 
2014 to 2020. Funding is allocated on a competitive basis through the European Research 
                                                                                             
492  Higher Education Statistics Agency SFR 210 Higher Education Student Enrolments and Qualifications 
Obtained at Higher  Education Providers in the United Kingdom 2013/14. 
493  SN/SG/917 Tuition fee statistics 1 December 2014. 
494  Erasmus + Key Erasmus+ facts and figures. 
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Council. UK universities are predicted to receive about £2 billion from Horizon 2020 in the 
first two years of the programme.495 
The 24 Russell Group universities receive about £400 million a year in EU research funds - 
some 11% of their research income.496  
15.2 The impact of Brexit 
Universities are concerned about their situation post Brexit and Universities UK outlines the 
issues.497 Their concerns focus on two main areas: the impact on students and the impact 
on research.  
Students  
Leaving the EU potentially means that the Government will not have to provide student 
loans or maintenance funding for EU students, which would save the Government money. 
However, the loss of student funding for EU students could have an impact on the 
numbers of EU students coming to study in the UK and this could have a detrimental 
impact on fee income for universities and on the culture and diversity of universities. 
Conversely it has been argued that the situation could be more nuanced: that Brexit could 
increase places for UK students and charging EU students higher fees as overseas students 
could maintain or increase fee income if UK higher education continued to attract EU 
students.498   
The UK could also lose access to the Erasmus + programme. This could be a particular 
difficulty for students whose degree courses include compulsory time abroad.  
Research 
It has been suggested that the UK may lose access to EU research funding post-Brexit. 
There are anecdotal indications that some grant applications are already experiencing 
difficulties and UK researchers are being dropped from funding bids.499 There are also 
concerns that the movement of staff and researchers could be impacted, and that this 
could detrimentally affect the quality of research projects if the UK does not continue to 
attract high calibre individuals from across Europe.  
Government statement on higher education and research 
On 28 June 2016 Jo Johnson, Minister of State for Universities and Science, issued a 
statement on higher education, setting out the current position for universities and 
students post-Brexit. The statement says that current arrangements will apply for this 
coming academic year and future access to the Erasmus+ programme and research 




                                                                                             
495  Horizon 2020: UK launch for EU's £67bn research budget, BBC News 31 January 2014. 
496  UK’s big guns make a stand for research in Europe, Times Higher Education 23 April 2015. 
497  Universities UK, Brexit FAQs for universities and students. 
498  Higher Education Policy Institute, Hepi director: Brexit may bring ‘new opportunities’ in sector, 12 July 
2016. 
499  UK scientists dropped from EU projects because of post-Brexit funding fears, The Guardian, 12 July 2016. 
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16. Culture, communication, copyright, 
broadcasting, sport 
16.1 Culture 
The EU’s competence in relation to culture dates back to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. 
Funding from EU programmes has been an important source of financial support for the 
UK’s cultural and creative sectors. Creative Europe is the current framework programme 
giving support to these sectors and has a budget of €1.46 billion.500  
Creative Europe is open to non EU countries that have concluded agreements with the 
European Commission.501 
Post-referendum comment 
John Whittingdale, the then Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, said that his 
department would work closely with all of its sectors “to make sure they have a voice” in 
negotiations to leave the EU. He also said the sectors would be supported in seeking new 
arrangements and opportunities across the world.502 
Since the referendum, a number of organisations have raised concerns about the impact 
of economic uncertainty and potential loss of funding on the cultural sector.503 
16.2 Digital Single Market 
Background 
A Digital Single Market is one of the elements of the European Commission's Digital 
Agenda for Europe.504 The Agenda “proposes to better exploit the potential of 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in order to foster innovation, 
economic growth and progress”.505  
A Digital Single Market Strategy was adopted in May 2015 and sets out 16 actions to be 
delivered by the end of 2016.  It is a wide-ranging programme and includes initiatives in 
the following areas: 
• e-commerce 




• audiovisual media 
• data protection 
                                                                                             
500  Europa website, Creative Europe [accessed 28 July 2016] 
501  Ibid 
502  “Culture Secretary statement on DCMS sectors following the EU referendum”, DCMS news story, 29 June 
2016 
503  For some discussion see: “Economic fall-out of Brexit will impact museums warns MA”, Museums 
Association News, 24 June 2016; Robert Hewison, “Brexit will happen. The British culture sector needs a 
new plan”, Apollo Magazine, 5 July 2016; Rosie Collier, “What will Brexit mean for arts and culture in the 
UK?”, New Statesman, 11 July 2016 
504  Europa website, Digital Agenda in the Europe 2020 strategy [accessed 28 July 2016] 
505  Ibid 
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• cybersecurity 
• e-government  
The strategy has three pillars: 
• Better online access to digital goods and services 
• An environment where digital networks and services can prosper; and  
• Digital as a driver for growth 
A European Commission press release gives further detail.506  
UK policy 
In January 2015, the Coalition Government published the UK vision for the EU’s digital 
economy.507 
In October 2015, the Government said that the Digital Single Market was “a key priority… 
It offers huge potential for jobs and growth and could increase UK GDP by up to 2%, and 
it can also benefit citizens, as shown by our recent deal within the European Council on 
roaming”.508 
Post-referendum comment 
The relevance of the Digital Single Market for UK businesses will depend on the terms of 
the UK's exit from the EU and future trade arrangements.509 
The Government has said that it has not made an assessment of the cost to the economy 
of businesses being unable to access the Digital Single Market.510 
In July 2016, the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee published a report on the 
digital economy. While the implications of the European Single Digital Market were 
beyond the remit of the Committee’s inquiry, the report did say that the Government 
“needs to address the issue of whether businesses will be able to access the European 
Single Digital Market, if they want to do so”: 
In broader terms, we recommend that the Government sets out in its digital strategy 
the implications of withdrawal from the European Union, in reference to specific, 
current EU negotiations relating to the digital economy. The Government must 
address this situation as soon as possible, to stop investor confidence further draining 
away, with firms relocating into other countries in Europe, to take advantage of the 
Digital Single Market.511 
 
                                                                                             
506  “A Digital Single Market for Europe: Commission sets out 16 initiatives to make it happen”, European 
Commission press release, 6 May 2015 
507  Further detail can be found on a Digital Single Market section of the Number10 website [this refers to 
policy under the Coalition Government] 
508  PQ 901740 on the Digital Single Market, answered 22 October 2015 
509  For some discussion see: “Brexit and the Digital Single Market: what does this mean for your business?”, 
Osborne Clarke, 4 July 2016; James Hammersley, “Comment: Should Brexit negotiations protect the 
Digital Single Market?”, Essential Retail, 16 July 2016 
510  PQ 41682 [answered 7 July 2016] 
511  Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, The Digital Economy, HC 87 2016-17, July 2016, para 71 
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16.3 Broadcasting 
Broadcasting in the EU is currently subject to the Audiovisual Media Services Directive 
(AVMSD).512 This updated the earlier ‘Television Without Frontiers’ Directive of 1989. 
Provisions in the current Directive include: 
• a quota for works by independent European producers  
• controls on advertising and sponsorship, including a prohibition on sponsoring 
news and current affairs programmes 
• provisions for the protection of minors, particularly from pornography and violence 
• a right of reply for people whose legitimate interests have been damaged by the 
broadcasting of incorrect facts 
The later Directive aimed to take into account technological developments in 
broadcasting, including the growth of on-demand services. These pose a challenge to 
advertiser-funded broadcasters and the Commission responded by proposing a relaxation 
of some of the existing rules on advertising, including providing for product placement in 
programmes.  
Since the adoption of the AVMSD, the audiovisual media landscape has changed 
significantly due to media convergence. The Commission therefore proposed a further 
revision of the AVMSD in 2016. In preparation for this, there was a public consultation in 
2015.513 The Commission identified the following issues to be considered in the evaluation 
and review of the AVMSD: 
1. Ensuring a level playing field for audiovisual media services; 
2. Providing for an optimal level of consumer protection; 
3. User protection and prohibition of hate speech and discrimination; 
4. Promoting European audiovisual content; 
5. Strengthening the single market; 
6. Strengthening media freedom and pluralism, access to information and 
accessibility to content for people with disabilities. 
The consultation floated the possibility of broadening the type of services covered by the 
Directive beyond television and “television-like services” further into the online sphere, 
and even of altering the core principle that determines where the regulation of these 
services takes place. (Under the current Directive, jurisdiction is based on the “country-of-
origin” principle, and services are regulated by the Member State in which they originate.) 
The UK Government responded to the consultation in January 2016. In its response the 
Government said that it regarded the regulation of the European audiovisual market 
through the AVMSD as a “success story”. However, it insisted that it saw the country-of-
origin principle as “vitally important”. Furthermore, whilst recognising that there was 
scope to develop common standards, the Government saw a “tangible difference 
between the concepts of broadcasting regulation and internet regulation”.514 
                                                                                             
512  2010/13/EU. For a summary of its provisions, see Europa website, Audiovisual Media Services (AMS) 
Directive.  
513  European Commission News, Commission seeks views on Europe's audiovisual media rules, 6 July 2015 
514  HM Government, UK Government response to the European Commission consultation on the review of 
the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD), 2016, pp1,5 
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A new legislative proposal amending the AVMSD was adopted by the European 
Commission on 25 May 2016. Building on the consultation proposals, it aims “to create a 
fairer environment for all players, promote European films, protect children and tackle 
hate speech better” while also reflecting “a new approach to online platforms, addressing 
challenges in different areas”.515 
Now that the UK is to leave the EU, the Government might choose to look again at these 
pan-European requirements. The extent to which broadcast models of regulation can or 
should be applied to new media such as the internet is one area of controversy which 
would persist whether the UK were inside or outside the EU. 
Elsewhere in the broadcasting industry, ITV is reportedly expecting a downturn in 
advertising revenues following the ‘Brexit’ vote, with cost cuts of £25m planned for next 
year.516 A poll conducted by PACT, the independent TV producers’ group, before the 
referendum showed 85% of members in favour of remaining in the EU and only 15% 
against. Concerns have been expressed for the future of London as the centre for 
international channel groups dependent on the AVMSD (and Ofcom licences) to broadcast 
from the UK into all EU countries. Despite widespread pessimism in the industry, some – 
for example, Lord Dobbs, author of House of Cards – are hopeful of new creative 
possibilities in a market freed from European regulation.517  
Copyright 
Areas of UK copyright law derive from EU law. For example, the 1993 Directive on 
Copyright Duration518 harmonised upwards the terms of authors’ rights to the highest 
factor operating in a Member State. The 2001 Copyright Directive519 (also known as the 
Information Society Directive or the InfoSoc Directive) further harmonises aspects of 
copyright law across Europe, such as copyright exceptions; it also affects the application of 
copyright and control techniques on the internet and restricts the range of defences to 
copyright infringement.  
Faced with the challenges of the ever-expanding digital market, in December 2015 the 
Commission announced plans to update EU copyright law. As a first step, the Commission 
adopted a legislative proposal on cross-border portability, which will ensure that 
subscribers to online content services can continue using them while temporarily present 
in another Member State.520 (The UK Government supports this proposal.521) Further 
measures are expected to follow in 2016.522 The emphasis is on  
• Widening online access to content across the EU 
• Adapting exceptions to copyright rules to a digital and cross-border environment  
• Creating a fair marketplace, including as regards the role of online intermediaries 
when they distribute copyright-protected content 
• Strengthening the enforcement system 
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Copyright is otherwise governed by a series of interlocking international agreements, 
among them the Berne Convention of 1886 and the WIPO [World Intellectual Property 
Organization] Copyright Treaty of 1996. It seems unlikely that, once Britain is outside the 
EU, the Government would seek to unpick these arrangements, since they bring reciprocal 
benefits to UK creators and rights-holders.523  
Following speculation about the future of intellectual property (IP) rights after the 
referendum, the Intellectual Property Office issued a statement. This sets out the current 
position on trademarks, designs, patents, copyright and enforcement, emphasising that 
nothing will change until the negotiations to exit are concluded.524 In a detailed article on 
the consequences of the vote, an IP lawyer comments that “the primary areas of concern 
will be working out what to do about EU rights currently valid in the UK and how to 
handle ongoing litigation involving such rights”.525 
16.4 Sport 
The Lisbon Treaty made sport an area of EU competence. Detailed information on the EU’s 
role in this area, including a Work Plan for Sport 2014-17, is available from the Europa 
website.526 
 
When the UK leaves the EU, funding could be lost. The Erasmus+ programme, for 
example, funds grassroots sports projects and cross-border challenges such as combating 
match-fixing, doping, violence and racism.527  
The impact of leaving the EU on professional sport will depend on the terms of the UK's 
exit. However, if free movement were to end, this could have a significant on football in 
particular – players from EU countries could require work permits in future.528 
 
 
                                                                                             
523  By way of example, the amended Directive on copyright duration (2011/77/EU) gives recording artists the 
same rights already enjoyed by songwriters. Since this amendment was vigorously campaigned for by 
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17. Consumer policy 
Consumer protection in the UK is currently a complex combination of EU and national 
law. It is unclear whether any consumer laws would need to be repealed or replaced on 
Brexit because that will depend to a considerable degree on what form Brexit takes.  
17.1 Background  
The consumer protection regime in the UK has recently been reviewed, dismantled and 
completely rebuilt. Legislative reforms have been made against a backdrop of structural 
changes to consumer law enforcement.  There have been two drivers for change – one an 
EU initiative, the other a domestic initiative. First, the adoption in October 2011 of the 
Directive on Consumer Rights (2011/83/EC). Most of the requirements of the Directive 
have now been implemented in the UK through the Consumer Contracts (Information, 
Cancellation and Additional Payments) Regulations 2013. The second driver was the 
findings of a series of consultations on consumer laws held in the UK between March and 
November 2012. This led to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (the CRA 2015). The CRA 
2015, which came into force on 1 October 2015, represents the biggest overhaul of 
consumer law for decades. The Act deals with consumer rights and remedies in relation to 
the supply of goods, digital content and services.  
For businesses, who have just got to grips with this new consumer landscape (and a body 
of new provisions), there is understandable concern that Brexit will bring more change. 
For consumers, there is concern that Brexit may lead to a ‘watering down’ of their existing 
rights and protections. Certainly, it is difficult to predict how or when Brexit will be 
achieved and the longer term commercial and consumer implications.  
Various commentators have argued that it is extremely unlikely that the Government will 
replace the majority of its EU-derived law (although it may have the option to do so). 
Practically, if the UK does not comply with EU law in certain areas, it may not be able to 
trade with the EU. Consumer protection, data protection and product liability are areas of 
law which are thought to be particularly unlikely to change.   
17.2 Current EU consumer programme 2014-2020  
For the moment at least, little has changed; the UK has to continue to comply with EU 
consumer law and policy.  The Charter of Fundamental Rights529 and the European 
Treaties since the Single European Act guarantee a high level of consumer protection in 
the EU. Promoting consumers’ rights is also a core value of the EU, enshrined in Article 12 
TFEU. 
 
Over the years, the importance of consumer policy has grown within the EU. It is now an 
integral part of internal market policy; it aims to ensure that the internal market is open, 
fair and transparent so that consumers can exercise real choice and receive fair treatment. 
A huge amount of existing consumer protection regulation in the UK is derived from the 
EU in one form or another. For example, Directives implemented in the UK protect 
consumers from unsafe products, unfair practices, misleading marketing practices, 
distance selling, and so on.  
 
The strategy for consumer policy at European level is regularly reviewed by the European 
Commission, not least because the EU’s 500 million consumers play a central role in 
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driving innovation and enterprise.530 Consumer spending accounts for approximately 56% 
of the EU’s GDP.531 The European Commission adopted in May 2012 the European 
Consumer Agenda, its strategic vision for EU consumer policy.532 This Agenda replaced the 
Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013.533 It aims to maximise consumer participation and 
trust in the market, and in turn achieve the objectives of the EU’s economic growth 
strategy, Europe 2020. The Consumer Agenda has four pillars, or overriding objectives, 
which are:   
 
• Promoting consumer safety  
• Enhancing knowledge of consumer rights  
• Strengthening the enforcement of consumer rules  
• Integrating consumer interests into the key sectoral policies  
 
The Consumer Agenda also addresses imminent challenges, such as those linked to the 
digitalisation of daily life, the desire to move towards more sustainable patterns of 
consumption, and the specific needs of vulnerable consumers. According to the 
Commission’s second Report on Consumer Policy, most of the 62 measures presented in 
the Consumer Agenda have been completed.534   
  
The Consumer Programme 2014-2020535 has a budget of €188.8 million to support EU 
consumer policy.536  Direct beneficiaries will be national authorities in charge of consumer 
policy, safety and enforcement, the network of European Consumer Centres, EU-level 
consumer organisations, and national consumer organisations. The programme will fund 
actions across all 28 EU Member States and countries of non-EU EEA Members. It aims to 
help consumers enjoy their consumer rights and actively participate in the single market, 
thereby supporting growth, innovation and meeting the objectives of Europe 2020.  
 
The main challenges to be addressed by the 2014-2020 programme have been grouped 
under four headings:  
 
• Safety: to reinforce the co-ordination of national enforcement authorities, and to 
address the risks linked to the globalisation of the production chain.  
 
• Consumer information and education: to address the issue of poor knowledge 
of key consumer rights by consumers and retailers alike (particularly in respect of 
cross-border purchases and sales); to gather robust data on how the market is 
serving consumers; and to improve the capacity of consumer organisations etc.  
 
• Consumer rights and effective redress: to further strengthen consumer rights 
and to address problems faced by consumers when trying to secure redress, 
notably cross-border, so that consumers are confident that their rights are well 
protected in any other Member State as well as at home.  
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• Strengthening enforcement cross-border: to increase awareness among 
consumers about the network of European Consumer Centres and to further 
strengthen the efficiency of the network of national enforcement authorities.  
17.3 What will Brexit mean for UK consumer policy?   
As already mentioned, the consumer protection regime in the UK is a complex 
combination of EU and national law and covers a very wide range of goods and services. It 
is impossible to calculate the impact of withdrawal in any meaningful way without 
knowing the basis on which the UK would continue to interact with the EU. Clearly, the 
crucial question is whether the UK retains any sort of access to the European Single 
Market, and if so, how much and in return for what?  
 
The EEA/EFTA States, for example, have participated in EU consumer programmes since 
the EEA Agreement came into force in 1994. In addition, the Consumer Council in 
Norway has established close links with bodies at European level such as BEUC (an alliance 
of European consumer organisations). The Icelandic Consumer Agency and the Norwegian 
Consumer Council also belong to the European Consumer Centres Network (ECC-Net), 
which provides information and support to EU consumers. However, it is also the case that 
in return for access to the internal market, EEA/EFTA states are required to adopt all EU 
consumer protection provisions without access to the EU’s decision-making institutions.  
 
The CRA 2015, which now dominates the UK’s consumer regime, and other home-grown 
consumer laws, will not be directly affected by Brexit. However, an important question is 
whether a non-EU UK would keep all or some of the rules and procedures of EU consumer 
protection legislation. Existing consumer legislation could be unpicked and changed, but 
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18. Foreign policy 
18.1 Introduction 
Whatever position politicians and commentators took during the referendum, it was 
widely agreed that leaving the EU would have enormous consequences for British foreign 
policy.   
But it is still far from clear what the exact implications will be of the decision to leave. In 
the immediate aftermath of the result, Lord Hennessy said: “Never in our peacetime 
history have so many dials been reset as a result of a single day’s events.”537 
In the run up to the referendum, the Government led by former Prime Minister David 
Cameron decided that there should be no pre-planning for Brexit, whether on foreign 
policy or other policy areas. Parliamentarians are amongst those who have criticised this 
decision.538 
Some of the consequences for UK foreign policy of leaving the EU will be the product of 
design. For example, much will depend on the precise terms for Brexit that are ultimately 
agreed. However, other consequences will be largely or wholly ‘unintended’.  
The contours of a reconfigured UK foreign policy are likely to emerge only gradually over 
the next decade. For now, there are only initial reactions (many of them based as much on 
instinct as evidence) to go on. Inevitably, there are pessimists (mainly from the Remain side 
of the referendum debate) and optimists (mainly from the Brexit side). A minority is 
reserving judgement. 
Given the high degree of uncertainty at present, it seems sensible at this stage to restrict 
ourselves to formulating some tentative ‘key questions’ about the possible implications for 
UK foreign policy of leaving the EU – to which we might have some answers by 2026.  
To do this, we have made two important assumptions that might conceivably turn out to 
be incorrect. We have assumed that the UK is going to leave the EU and that the EU will 
survive in one form or another. In addition, we have not sought to address the 
implications for UK foreign policy of a vote for Scottish independence in a second 
referendum. 
Here then are our four key questions for assessing the impact of Brexit on UK foreign 
policy by 2026: 
1 Will the UK successfully have ‘gone global’? 
Will the UK be liberated or find itself relatively isolated after leaving the EU? Will 
‘globalisation’ survive or might it go permanently into reverse? How committed in 
practice will ‘rising powers’ such as China and India be in giving priority to boosting 
economic ties with the UK (and on what terms)? 
2 Will there still be a UK-US “special relationship”?  
Will the NATO relationship be sufficient to sustain it? Can the UK continue to act as 
a ‘bridge’ between the EU and the US from outside the EU? Might the US pivot 
towards Germany instead? Will the UK remain a stalwart ally of the US in Asia? 
3 Will the UK retain the capacity to intervene in the world? 
                                                                                             
537  Peter Hennessy, Brexit: 'An unprecedented geopolitical shift', BBC News Online, 25 June 2016. 
538  In its most recent report (HC 153, July 2016), the Joint Committee for the National Security Strategy has 
criticised the fact that the November 2015 National Security strategy did not include Brexit as ‘risk’. 
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What will be the UK’s appetite for intervention in future crises abroad? What 
diplomatic and military weight will such interventions carry? What will be the future 
balance between ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’ expenditure? 
4 Will the UK still have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council? 
If the Security Council is reformed, might the UK end up losing its permanent seat – 
while the EU perhaps secures one instead? 
All this said, we now proceed to ignore our own advice by looking at the very early signs 
of the impact of Brexit for two important aspects of UK foreign policy, namely the Middle 
East and relations with the US. In this regard, see also section 21, Defence and the 
Armed Forces. 
 
The Middle East 
The UK plays a limited but significant role in the Middle East. British influence is based on 
deep foreign policy experience and a tissue of connections acquired through many years 
of engagement in the region, as well as international cooperation, a large aid programme 
and a significant military capability.  
The historical baggage can be a liability as well as an asset. Most UK policy in the region 
has been conducted with EU partners, although there are relationships, particularly with 
the Gulf monarchies, that seem to develop without so much reference to the EU. 
Sanctions regimes (including arms embargoes), terrorist designations and the criteria for 
arms export control have all tended to be decided at EU level.  In the case of Israel and the 
Palestinians, the UK has acted largely in concert with other EU Member States and the EU 
Council adopted policies such as the arms embargo on Syria and its lifting.  
Some UK policies – the sanctions against Iran over its nuclear programme, for example – 
could be based both on decisions taken at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and 
decisions at the EU level.  
Iran was an example of EU Member States playing a strong role in Middle East diplomacy, 
with the UK in the forefront. For several years, the big three EU members, France, 
Germany and the UK, took the lead on nuclear negotiations with Iran, although the other 
members of the UN Security Council participated later in the process (and it is difficult to 
imagine it being brought to a conclusion without the active involvement of the US). 
The United States, remains the biggest actor in the region and many UK interventions 
have been in conjunction with the US, for example the invasion of Iraq (with the UK part 
of a ‘coalition of the willing’) and the occupation of Afghanistan (as part of NATO’s 
International Security Assistance Force). The picture in the Middle East, as in other regions, 
is a complex one. With EU membership UK policy was co-ordinated with partners in a 
variety of multilateral fora, including the UN, EU and NATO, as well as bilaterally with the 
US and with governments in the region. After the UK leaves the EU, informal coordination 
of UK policies with those of EU member states will remain a possibility. 
Many in the region have not forgotten Britain’s historic Middle East role: the Sykes-Picot 
agreement’s part in setting up troubled states such as Iraq and Syria and ‘denying’ the 
Kurds a state, and the intervention in Iran to bring down the democratically-elected 
Mossadegh government in 1953 remain part of popular legend. Many, indeed, seem to 
have an exaggerated idea of the continuing importance of the ‘Little Satan’. Acting 
through the EU may go some way to alleviating the negative effects of Britain’s historical 
baggage in the Middle East.  
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Pooling UK influence with that of other EU Member States sharing many of the same 
interests was, for many in the foreign policy ‘establishment’, a sensible idea in the 
international arena. As well as diluting some of the UK’s negative historical baggage, 
acting through the EU means a larger aid budget, the promise of access to the largest 
consumer market in the world and a louder political voice, one that in some quarters 
carries more authority because it is not American (this is likely to have been a factor in the 
negotiations with Iran). All of these can be significant ‘soft power’ tools in the pursuit of 
European interests.  If the UK no longer coordinates its Middle East policy with EU 
member states, it will no longer have access to these shared tools.  
UK withdrawal could also be a blow to the credibility of EU foreign policy in the region. 
Without the UK’s defence capacity and foreign policy experience, the EU’s voice in the 
Middle East could be less influential. Without the UK, the EU may also be more likely to 
adopt policies that were more at odds with US views, although the UK position on Israel 
and the Palestinians has traditionally been closer to that of its EU partners than to 
Washington’s.  
It can also be argued, however, that withdrawal from the EU will not make much 
difference to the UK’s capacities in the Middle East; since the US remains the most 
significant power in the region, the UK could co-ordinate its Middle East policies more 
closely with those of the US or it could continue coordination with the EU, but informally.  
Despite the much-discussed pivot to Asia, the US will remain very influential in the Middle 
East for some time to come; some critics see the EU as little more than America’s sidekick 
in the region. US decisions have more impact than UK actions, within the EU or outside. 
The power of the West to impose its decisions on the Middle East is in any case declining.  
UK policy-making in the Middle East could continue to be worked out in important 
multilateral fora other than the EU, such as the UN Security Council and NATO.  
 
Relations with the United States 
The quotation often attributed to Henry Kissinger about whom to dial in 
Europe sums up the view in US foreign policy circles that a co-ordinated 
or even a unified Europe would make a better ally than a continent with 
myriad divergent foreign policies - particularly in relation to defence. 
The US has often encouraged European countries to take more 
responsibility for the defence of their continent. The US pivot to Asia is 
in part also dependent on Europeans taking more responsibility for the 
security of their region. A taste of this policy was the US approach to 
the 2011 conflict in Libya: ‘leading from behind’. Europeans were 
encouraged to take the lead in the Libya action, with the US providing 
support. In the event, much more US support was needed than had 
been envisaged at the outset. 
NATO is the main vehicle for transatlantic defence cooperation, but 
successive US administrations have not sought to stop the EU from 
developing its Security and Defence Policy, as long as the policy is not 
seen to undermine NATO. The US values the UK contribution to the EU 
defence debate for two major reasons: UK defence capabilities and the 
‘special relationship’. Firstly, the UK and France are often regarded as 
the only two EU nations with a serious defence capability and the UK is 
one of the few NATO Member States to spend at least 2% of GDP on 
defence. (Commenting before the Government committed to fulfilling 
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that target for the rest of this Parliament, one former US Defence 
Secretary said that cuts limited the UK’s ability to be a full partner of the 
US.)539  In spite of defence cuts, a UK exit will sharply reduce the 
remaining EU member states’ combined defence capacity and the UK’s 
role as an example of military capability to EU Member States will be 
diminished.  
Secondly, the US relied on the UK to mould EU defence co-ordination. 
The US wants EU defence structures to evolve in such a way as not to 
undermine the US relationship with Europe, which means they should 
not be seen to be in competition with NATO. UK governments have 
traditionally advocated preserving the importance of NATO, while at the 
same time working, particularly with the French, to cooperate in 
defence matters and maximise the effectiveness of European forces. 
Both these positions suit US interests.  
The US has also viewed the UK’s support for EU enlargement as a 
sensible way for the EU to take more responsibility for its 
neighbourhood and to draw countries such as Turkey more firmly into 
the Western camp. While further EU enlargement after the Western 
Balkans is thought to be unlikely for some time (the parallel process of 
NATO enlargement to the east also appears to have stalled), 
Washington used to appreciate the traditionally more open approach 
supported by UK politicians.  
Conservative commentators in the US and the UK have suggested that 
the Obama Administration abandoned traditional allies such as Britain 
(and countries in Eastern Europe) in pursuit of the ‘reset’ with Russia 
and the ‘pivot’ to Asia.540 However, the failure of the ‘reset’ policy and 
the outbreak of conflict in Ukraine have given NATO a new lease of life. 
European integration with strong British influence has been traditional 
Republican as well as Democratic policy. 
Although NATO has been invigorated and the UK’s NATO role is not in 
itself undermined by the vote to leave the EU, it is possible that leaving 
the EU will make the UK less relevant to US foreign policy. The UK will 
no longer be able to argue from within against EU defence structures 
that might compete with NATO.  
Nor will the UK be useful in supporting traditional US free markets and 
free trade economic policies for Europe. The US-European Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership, for example, may face more 
difficulties in the EU: France has recently indicating stiffening opposition 
to it and France’s voice will be relatively stronger after the UK leaves. 
The UK’s relationship with the US had already been undermined by a 
number of factors, with German unification and economic success 
changing the balance in the EU. After the referendum, former US State 
                                                                                             
539  ‘UK not 'full partner' with US, says former defence chief’, Daily Telegraph, 16 
January 2014. The UK Government explicitly committed to spending 2% of GDP on 
defence for the remainder of the decade in the Summer Budget, July 2015 
540  See for example ‘Five Conservative Principles That Should Guide U.S. Policy on 
Europe’, Heritage  Foundation, 1 March 2013.  
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Department official Nicholas Burns said that Henry Kissinger’s question 
about who to phone had now been answered:  
Henry Kissinger’s famous question about ‘Who do I call in 
Europe?’ has now been settled. The answer is that we call the 
German chancellor’s office. That means we have to invest in the 
relationship with Germany.541 
However, some commentators have argued that the Germany will not 
be such a natural fit as the UK as the main EU interlocutor for the US – 
German positions on austerity and the use of military force are likely to 
remain further from the US. This could signal a longer-term distancing 
between the US and the EU.  
Nevertheless, practical cooperation between the US and the UK, in areas 
such as intelligence sharing, are likely to continue. 
                                                                                             
541  UK-US special relationship shaky following Brexit vote, Financial Times, 27 June 
2016.  
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In 2014, nearly 10% 
of the UK’s aid 
budget would have 
required reallocation 
if the UK had not 
been an EU member 
state 
 
19. International development 
19.1 Development cooperation and 
humanitarian aid 
The EU has been one of the UK’s largest multilateral aid partners. 
The UK’s total aid budget was £11.726 billion in 2014 – of this, £1.144 
billion was channelled through the European Commission.542 The UK 
channels funds for development cooperation and humanitarian aid 
through two budget lines, both of them managed by the European 
Commission: 
• The development part of the EU budget 
• The European Development Fund  
The development part of the EU budget 
According to DFID: 
Development investment provided through the European Union 
(EU) budget funds programmes in Asia, Latin America, Eastern 
Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. It also funds some 
thematic programmes and the EU’s humanitarian assistance, 
through ECHO.543 
DFID has described its engagement with the development part of the EU 
budget as follows: 
The EU budget-development is managed by the EC. Funding is 
split by regional and thematic lines, with decisions taken by 
committees for the regional instruments. The UK uses its position 
in the Council of the EU to influence EU development policy.544 
In 2012 the development part of the EU budget was the largest 
recipient of UK aid. In 2013 and 2014, it was second.545 The UK 
contributed £816m to the development part of the EU budget in 
2014.546 
In the 2011 Multilateral Aid Review, the development part of the EU 
budget (excluding its humanitarian arm, ECHO) was assessed as 
“adequate value for money”.547  
The Review acknowledged strengths in the development part of the EU 
budget: for example, it funded programmes in countries which were UK 
priorities but which did not receive UK aid; it funded programmes which 
promoted EU enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy;548 
and financial accountability was found to be strong and well-
                                                                                             
542  DFID, Statistics on International Development 2015, December 2015, Tables 2 and 9. 
543  DFID, Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14, HC 11, 15 July 2014, p98. ECHO is the 
Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection – the humanitarian 
arm of the Commission. 
544  Ibid 
545  DFID, Statistics on International Development 2015, December 2015, Table 9. 
546  DFID, Statistics on International Development 2015, December 2015, Table 9. 
547  DFID, Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14, HC 11, 15 July 2014, p98. 
548  Some observers argue that these programmes mean that EU development 
cooperation is insufficiently focused upon poverty-reduction in the poorest 
countries. 
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established. However, the development part of the EU budget was 
assessed as weak in the following categories: gender equality, focus on 
poor countries, contribution to results, strategic and performance 
management, and financial resources management.549  
A 2013 DFID review of the progress made in addressing weaknesses 
identified during the Multilateral Aid Review reached the following 
conclusions: 
Progress on aid allocation and ensuring staff have development 
expertise. Some progress on gender and a results framework. 
More progress needed on evaluation and managing for value for 
money.550 
In the UK Government’s 2011 Multilateral Aid Review, the humanitarian 
arm of the Commission, ECHO, was assessed as “very good value for 
money”.551  
European Development Fund  
According to DFID: 
The European Development Fund (EDF) is the main funding 
instrument for European Commission (EC) development spending 
in 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACPs) and 25 
European Union (EU) overseas countries and territories. The EDF is 
a separate Member State fund that sits outside the EU’s budget.  
The EDF has a strong poverty focus with 80% of funds going to 
low income countries. Its size, focus on poverty and cross-cutting 
development impact makes the EDF critical for progress on the 
MDGs and poverty reduction.552 
DFID has described its engagement with the EDF as follows: 
The EDF is a fund managed on behalf of EU Member States by the 
EC. EDF decisions are taken by a Member State committee, by 
consensus wherever possible. The UK also uses its position in the 
Council of the EU to influence EU development policy.553 
In 2014 the EDF was the third largest recipient of UK aid.554 The UK 
contributed £328m to the EDF in 2014. 555  The UK is set to contribute 
14.7% of the EDF during the 2014-2020 funding round.556 
Balance of Competences Review 
The Government’s Balance of Competences Review on development 
cooperation and humanitarian aid, July 2013, identified a number of 
“advantages and disadvantages of working through the EU”. These are 
summarised in the boxes below. 
                                                                                             
549  DFID, Multilateral Aid Review: Assessment of European Commission budget, 
February 2011. 
550  DFID, Multilateral Aid Review update 2013. 
551  DFID, Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14, HC 11, 15 July 2014, p98. 
552  Ibid, p97. 
553  Ibid 
554  DFID, Statistics on International Development 2015, December 2015, Table 9. 
555  DFID, Statistics on International Development 2015, December 2015, Table 9. 
556  Internal Agreement between the EU Member States on the financing of EU aid 
under the multiannual financial framework for the period 2014 to 2020, in 
accordance with the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, and on the allocation of 
financial assistance for the Overseas Countries and Territories to which Part Four of 
the TFEU applies. OJL 210/1, 6 August 2013. 
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Advantages 
The EU is a major contributor to global efforts to reduce poverty and make progress towards 
the other Millennium Development Goals.  
The Commission’s large aid budget, which is pooled from mandatory contributions by all 
Member States, provides economies of scale and strengths in key areas, for example 
infrastructure and regional projects.  
The EU’s global reach is greater than that of any of the Member States acting individually.  
Working through the EU gives the UK access to the EU’s comprehensive range of external 
actions, which can be combined to tackle problems in fragile states and address a range of 
global development challenges. 
The close alignment of UK and EU development objectives, and the EU’s perceived political 
neutrality and global influence, mean the EU can act as a multiplier for the UK’s policy 
priorities and influence. 
 
Disadvantages 
Although policy making at the EU level is often critically important, it can sometimes result in 
compromise positions that do not give full effect to UK priorities or that lack impact.  
EU development programme management and delivery are overly complex and inefficient, 
and the EU does not systematically measure the results that EU aid achieves.  
The division of roles between the Commission Directorates-General and the EEAS557 is 
unclear and there can be a lack of coordination between Brussels and EU Delegations 
overseas. 
The EU institutions’ capacity and development expertise is limited in relation to their scope 
and scale, although ECHO’s humanitarian expertise is widely recognised.  
Although the EU’s size and global influence make it one of the most important platforms for 
achieving Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), the EU is not implementing it with full 
effect.558  
 
Public debate in the run-up to the referendum 
While there continued to be extensive public debate about aspects of 
UK policy on development cooperation and humanitarian aid during the 
first half of 2016, the implications of leaving the EU were not a major 
                                                                                             
557  European External Action Service – the European Union’s diplomatic service. 
558  According to the European Commission’s ‘International Cooperation and 
Development’ website: “Through Policy Coherence for Development, the EU seeks 
to take account of development objectives in all of its policies that are likely to affect 
developing countries. It aims at minimising contradictions and building synergies 
between different EU policies to benefit developing countries and increase the 
effectiveness of development cooperation.” Over the years, commentators have 
often criticised the EU for a lack of coherence in its development policy. 
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part of that debate. However, some think-tanks and NGOS in the field 
did begin to discuss the issue as the referendum approached.559  
Post-referendum reaction 
Official statements 
DFID ministers have made several statements on the implications of the 
vote to leave the EU for UK aid policy.  
Baroness Northover (LD): My Lords, is DfID now looking at the 
implications of Brexit and the potential end of the UK’s major 
influence over the EU’s aid budget? If so, what are the 
implications for what the UK might do bilaterally now? 
Baroness Verma: My Lords, we expect some challenges and 
change following the decision to leave the EU, which will affect 
some parts of the development work that we are undertaking, 
but it is a very small percentage of the work that we deliver 
through the European Development Fund. We will very much 
continue to work with our partners through multilateral 
institutions. I emphasise that we have committed ourselves to the 
0.7%—that will be our commitment and we will continue to help 
shape global events and work with our multilateral partners to do 
so.560 
Other reaction 
Think-tanks and NGOs in the field are beginning to publish reactions to 
the vote in favour of leaving the EU.561 Experts at the Overseas 
Development Institute have looked at how developing countries might 
be affected by Brexit. Below is a summary of the key findings of their 
report: 
• Brexit will have major implications for developing 
countries. 
• Different countries will be affected in different ways, in 
the short-term and in the long-term, depending on how the 
UK exits. There are mostly negative effects for developing 
countries, but there may also be opportunities. 
• The pathways of impact are through trade, financial 
markets and investment, growth, aid and development 
finance, migration and remittances, and global 
collaboration. 
• In the short-term, the threat of Brexit led to currency and 
stock market fluctuations, which have not spared emerging 
markets and poorer countries. 
• We estimate that the 10% devaluation of the pound in 
the first week post-Brexit, coupled with lower GDP in the 
UK (estimated at 3%), will lead to lower exports by 
                                                                                             
559  For example, see K. Watkins, “What would a Brexit mean for EU development 
assistance?”, devex.com, 6 June 2016; K. Watkins, “What would Brexit mean for UK 
aid and trade?”, devex.com, 15 June 2016.  
560  HL Deb 6 July 2016 c2006. See also HC Deb 29 June 2016 c286. Further details 
about the official response may come when the Bilateral and Multilateral Aid 
Reviews are finally published. Publication was delayed until after the referendum. 
561  See, for example, “Brexit: first post-referendum thoughts”, European Centre for 
Development Policy Management, 1 July 2016. 
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developing countries ($500 million in least developed 
countries). 
• The devaluation will also reduce the value of aid by 
roughly $1.9 billion. The combined cost (through aid, trade 
and remittances) of the devaluation for developing 
countries is expected to be $3.8 billion. If the pound 
continues to fall, the effects could increase. 
• The long-term effects will depend on UK trade deals, EU 
trade deals (with the UK no longer influencing them), the 
way aid and other development finance will be maintained 
and allocated, the way in which global collaborations is 
affected, the way financial markets react, and the way 
immigration and remittances are maintained. This will be a 
long process. 
• The opportunities of Brexit for developing countries rely 
on specific commodity price changes (e.g. gold exporters 
gain), changes in distribution of aid, cheaper imports from 
the UK, and the ability to gain from new trade deals, 
including through targeted Aid for Trade. 
• Greater policy consideration is needed on what the UK 





                                                                                             
562  M. Mendez-Parra, P. Papadavid and D. Willem te Velde, “Brexit and development: 
how will developing countries be affected?” Overseas Development Institute 
briefing, July 2016”. On the same topic, see also Ian Scoones, “Uncertain trade, less 
progressive aid and a new colonial-minded PM? What Brexit means for Africa”, 
African Arguments, 27 June 2016. 
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20. Defence and the armed forces  
Summary 
While generally supportive of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 
successive UK governments have been cautious in their approach to greater European 
defence integration, regarding it as entirely complementary to NATO and essential for 
strengthening European military capabilities within that alliance, as opposed to the pro-
European view that the EU should establish an independent military capability outside the 
NATO framework.  
Until the UK formally leaves the EU it will remain part of its CSDP planning structures and 
the EU military operations to which the UK has committed forces.  
The impact of Brexit on the UK’s military is arguably minimal in the near term. In the 
longer term, however, the UK’s ability to influence or shape the CSDP agenda going 
forward will be significantly curtailed. Questions have also been raised over future UK 
defence spending if economic growth predictions fail to materialise in the aftermath of 
the Brexit vote. The affordability of the MOD’s Defence Equipment Plan, should the 
defence budget be cut at some point in the future, could be brought into question. 
The UK’s relationship with NATO will be unaffected.  
Projection of military power  
The UK is one of the largest and most advanced military powers in the EU and is one of 
only five EU countries capable of deploying an operational HQ, and therefore capable of 
taking command of a mission. Militarily, a UK withdrawal would more likely place the EU 
at a disadvantage, with fewer assets and capabilities ultimately at its disposal. From the 
UK’s standpoint its ability to project military power will be largely unaffected, and any 
military shortfalls could be compensated for through bilateral arrangements with 
countries such as France. The UK could also choose to continue its participation in CSDP 
operations as a third party state.  
Capabilities development 
The UK has consistently sought to develop the operational capability of CSDP as a means 
of strengthening both the EU and NATO. That position is unlikely to change with Brexit, 
as capabilities development remains a central tenet of NATO’s smart defence agenda. The 
UK is also involved in an increasing number of bilateral capability development initiatives 
with other European nations, such as France.  The UK could also continue to participate in 
European Defence Agency projects as a third party country if it chooses to do so.  
EU defence directives 
If, during withdrawal negotiations, the substance of the two defence directives agreed in 
2011 are retained in the withdrawal agreement, the applicability of their provisions to the 
UK will not change. If the UK chooses to operate outside of the directives, however, it 
would have little impact on the UK’s general procurement approach. Any changes would 
focus more on the specific rules that the UK would no longer have to abide by.  
Future direction of CSDP 
The most significant implication of Brexit is the very limited ability that the UK will possess 
to influence or shape the EU’s defence agenda going forward. Given that the UK has 
been one of the main driving forces behind the development of CSDP, it has been 
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Article 42 (2), Treaty on 
European Union  
 
“The common security and 
defence policy shall include 
the progressive framing of a 
common Union defence 
policy. This will lead to a 
common defence, when the 
European Council, acting 
unanimously, so decides […] 
 
The policy of the Union in 
accordance with this Section 
shall not prejudice the 
specific character of the 
security and defence policy 
of certain Member States 
and shall respect the 
obligations of certain 
Member States, which see 
their common defence 
realised in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO), 
under the North Atlantic 
Treaty and be compatible 
with the common security 
and defence policy 
established within that 
framework”. 
 
suggested that, without the UK’s support, the strategic ambition of a “common European 
defence” could ultimately falter. However, as the main source of opposition to 
integrationist proposals thus far, the absence of the UK from CSDP decision making could 
equally be the opportunity that pro-European states, such as Germany, have been looking 
for to further the EU defence project in the longer term. Once outside the EU the UK will, 
for example, have no negotiating power in discussions over recently published German 
proposals for a permanent military planning headquarters, which will duplicate existing 
NATO assets. 
Impact on the UK defence budget and equipment plan  
There have also been questions over future UK defence spending if economic growth 
predictions fail to materialise in the aftermath of the Brexit vote. The affordability of the 
MOD’s Defence Equipment Plan if the defence budget is cut at some point in the future 
could subsequently be brought into question.  
A second Scottish independence referendum?  
The prospect of a second referendum on Scottish independence in the aftermath of Brexit 
has reignited the debate about the location of the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent at 
Faslane in Western Scotland.  
 
The EU’s security and defence policy (CSDP) has had a chequered past. 
First set down as an aspiration in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the 
intergovernmental nature of this policy area has meant that its 
evolution has been entirely dependent upon political will and the 
convergence of competing national interests among the EU Member 
States, in particular the UK, France and Germany. The major turning 
points for CSDP over the last 10 years have come about largely as a 
result of Franco-British proposals. Thus far the goal of a “common 
union defence policy” under Article 42 (2) has failed to be realised.  
While generally supportive, successive UK governments have been 
cautious in their approach to greater European defence integration. 
The development of an EU defence policy has been regarded as 
entirely complementary to NATO and essential for strengthening 
European military capabilities within that alliance, as opposed to the 
more pro-European, and French, view that the EU should establish an 
independent military capability outside the NATO framework.  
To that end, UK involvement in the evolution of CSDP has been 
significant in that it has allowed the UK to influence and shape its 
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development.563 This has been particularly evident in efforts to improve 
EU Member States’ military assets and capabilities, including the 
creation of the EU battlegroups,564 and the establishment of the 
European Defence Agency.565 The UK has also been influential in 
determining the parameters of the EU military decision making and 
planning structures that have developed, in particular ensuring their 
complementarity with NATO.566  
In 2009 the European Commission also passed two defence directives, 
which currently apply to the UK, aimed at regulating defence 
procurement across the EU and the intra-community transfer of defence 
goods and services. The first introduces harmonised EU rules on the 
procurement of defence and sensitive non-military security equipment. 
The second simplifies national licensing procedures governing the 
movement of defence products and services within the EU.567 
Analysts largely concur, however, that over the last seven years the EU’s 
defence policy has lost much of its momentum. While there has been 
progress in civilian crisis management, with the EU becoming a notable 
‘soft power’ actor,568 and in efforts to achieve greater regulation of the 
defence market; arguably very little notable progress has been made in 
developing the ‘hard power’ aspects of CSDP.  
Despite over a decade of work on capabilities development the EU 
collectively still suffers from major capability shortfalls and the flagship 
EU battlegroups have never been deployed in nearly eight years since 
their creation. Crucially, there continues to be no consensual EU 
                                                                                             
563  The history of CSDP is charted in a number of Library briefing papers: RP00/20, 
European Defence: From Pörtschach to Helsinki; RP00/84, Common European 
Security and Defence Policy: A Progress Report; RP01/50, European Security and 
Defence Policy: Nice and Beyond; RP06/32, European Security and Defence Policy: 
Developments Since 2003; RP08/09, The Treaty of Lisbon: amendments to the Treaty 
on European Union, SN04807, Priorities for ESDP under the French Presidency of the 
EU and SN06771, The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy: a Fresh Impetus?, 
December 2013. 
564  The EU Battlegroup concept was launched in 2004 and designed to allow the EU to 
rapidly respond, in a military capacity, to a crisis or urgent request from the UN. They 
achieved full operational capability in 2007 although, to date, no EU battlegroup has 
been deployed on operations. Further information on the EU Battlegroups is 
available at: EU Battlegroups, April 2013. 
565  To support efforts to improve the EU’s military capabilities, the European Defence 
Agency was established in 2004. In addition to several multinational procurement 
projects, among its most recent initiatives is the Code of Conduct on Pooling and 
Sharing, which was signed in 2012. 
566  In 2000 the Nice European Council agreed the creation of permanent political and 
military structures within the EU for CSDP purposes. In 2003 an EU civil-military 
planning cell, which would operate in parallel with a European cell based with 
NATO’s operational planning HQ (SHAPE), was also created. Initially France, 
Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg had proposed the creation of an entirely 
independent EU military planning cell. It was only UK influence that led to the 
proposals being watered down, placing the new EU planning capability firmly within 
the NATO framework and subject to an operational planning hierarchy that would 
give first refusal to NATO and then to any national operational HQ before the EU 
planning cell would play a role.   
567  For more detail on these directives see Standard Note 4640, EC Defence Equipment 
Directives, June 2011. 
568  The EU has launched more than30 CSDP missions in Africa, Asia and Europe, the 
majority of which are focused on crisis management, security sector reform, training, 
monitoring and humanitarian aid. Further information is available at: 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm  
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approach to foreign policy crises569 or, in the longer term, a vision for 
CSDP at the highest political level. While the EU Treaty makes reference 
to the eventual development of “a common defence”, sharp divisions 
have remained among EU Member States about what they want CSDP 
to achieve. Decision making also remains cumbersome and the 
financing of operations is complex often resulting, at a time of financial 
austerity, in States reluctant to commit assets.  
20.1 Implications of Brexit  
Until the UK formally leaves the EU it will remain part of its CSDP 
planning structures and the military operations to which the UK has 
committed forces, including EU naval operations in the Mediterranean 
(Operation Sophia) and off the Horn of Africa (Operation Atalanta) and 
the longstanding EU operation in Bosnia (Operation Althea), among 
others.  
Arguably the near term impact of Brexit on the UK military will be 
minimal. In the longer term, however, the UK’s ability to influence or 
shape the CSDP agenda going forward will be significantly curtailed. 
Questions have also been raised over future UK defence spending if 
economic growth predictions fail to materialise in the aftermath of the 
Brexit vote. The affordability of the MOD’s Defence Equipment Plan, 
should the defence budget be cut at some point in the future, could be 
brought into question. 
The UK’s relationship with the United States570 and NATO, which the 
Government has referred to as “the bedrock of our defence in the 
United Kingdom”,571 will be unaffected.  
EU military operations and financing  
The UK is one of the largest and most advanced military powers in the 
EU in terms of manpower, assets, capabilities and defence spending.572 
It is also one of only five EU countries capable of deploying an 
operational HQ, and therefore of taking command of a mission.573 
Military assets are provided to CSDP missions on a case-by-case basis 
and, with the exception of common costs,574 operations are financed on 
                                                                                             
569  The approach of the major European military powers to events in Libya and Mali in 
2013 have been seized upon as evidence of the EU’s inertia. A collective EU 
response was largely absent in both cases with France and the UK opting to pursue 
military action outside of the EU framework. The EU battlegroups, which were 
devised with Africa in mind, remain unused. The EU’s involvement in both theatres 
has instead focused on the delivery of soft power initiatives such as border 
assistance and training.  
570  See Pentagon press release, Readout from Secretary Carter’s call with UK State 
Secretary for Defense Michael Fallon, 24 June 2016  
571  HC Deb 27 June 2016, c2 
572  According to NATO’s compendium of defence expenditure 2016, the UK defence 
budget is currently 2.21% of GDP, compared to France which spends 1.78%, 
Germany which spends 1.19%, Italy which spends 1.11% and Spain which spends 
0.91%. The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review stated that “the UK’s 
defence budget is the second largest in NATO, after the US, and the largest in the 
EU” (Cm 9161, p.13). It also stated that “we are strengthening our armed forces so 
that they remain the most capable in Europe…” (p.24)  
573  France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the UK. 
574  CSDP operations with military implications cannot be financed from EU funds. For 
the common costs, the Council established a special mechanism (ATHENA) in 2004. 
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a national basis.575 Thus far, the UK has been a consistent contributor to 
EU-led operations, often as lead nation,576 and since the Battlegroups 
concept was launched in 2004, the UK has provided, or led, a 
Battlegroup five times, including the current EU battlegroup which will 
deploy until December 2016.577  
In terms of military power and projection, therefore, the UK’s 
withdrawal is more likely to place the EU at a disadvantage, with fewer 
assets and capabilities ultimately at its disposal. This is particularly true 
of certain strategic assets such as tactical airlift and intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance assets. From the UK’s standpoint its 
ability to project military power would be largely unaffected, and any 
military shortfalls could be compensated for through bilateral 
arrangements with countries such as France and Germany.578  
Indeed, some may argue that fewer military commitments at a time of 
economic austerity and significant reductions in the size of the Armed 
Forces should be welcomed. Yet as the Ministry of Defence itself has 
acknowledged, EU-led operations can play a key role in achieving 
stability in certain situations, thereby avoiding a more costly intervention 
by either NATO or the UN:  
When successful, EU action can achieve results where others find 
it difficult to act. CSDP has helped to establish stability in the 
Balkans, Georgia and Indonesia, and in the process avoided the 
need for more costly and risky interventions through NATO or the 
UN. In Afghanistan the EU police mission plays an essential role 
alongside NATO in increasing capacity of the Afghan National 
Police. The EU continues to lead the international effort to counter 
piracy and protect World Food Programme aid.579  
Ensuring the success of CSDP operations remains in the UK’s interest. 
However, being a member of the EU is not necessarily a prerequisite for 
achieving this aim. Outside the EU the UK could choose to continue its 
participation in CSDP operations as a third party state. Indeed, under 
                                                                                                              
Common costs are financed on the basis of a GNI-based indicator. The UK share is 
presently 14.82% of eligible common costs. The total UK cost share for 2014 was 
€8.8m. Funding is drawn from the Peacekeeping budget which is managed by the 
FCO. 
575  The expenditure arising from the deployment of assets to an EU-led military 
operation is met by the individual member States on a “costs lie where they fall 
basis”.  
576  Over the last ten years the UK has made a contribution to 11 CSDP military 
operations. Most notably: Operation Althea in the Balkans, the counter-piracy 
Operation Atalanta  off the Horn of Africa (which the UK has operational command 
of) and Operation Sophia (EU NAVFORMED) which is currently tackling people 
smuggling in the Mediterranean.  
577  In the first half of 2005, the latter half of 2008 and 2010 and the latter half of 2013, 
in conjunction with Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania and the Netherlands. The current 
battlegroup (July-December 2016) will also include personnel from Ireland and 
Lithuania. 
578  In 2010 the UK and France agreed a series of measures intended to enhance 
defence co-operation between both country's armed forces, including the signing of 
two new defence treaties (the Lancaster House treaty). The 2015 Strategic Defence 
and Security Review places an emphasis on further developing the UK-France 
defence and security relationship. It also makes specific reference to the deepening 
defence relationship between the UK and Germany (Cm 9161, November 2015, 
p.52).  
579  MOD Policy: Meeting NATO and EU Treaty Defence Commitments. 
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the Berlin-plus arrangements agreed in 2002 the EU already has 
recourse to NATO assets and capabilities for the conduct of EU 
operations, where the alliance as a whole chooses not to be engaged.580 
Several non-EU countries, including Canada, Norway and the US581 have 
also implemented framework agreements that allow them to participate 
in EU military and civilian crisis management operations. As a result, 
Canada and Norway have both contributed forces to Operation Althea 
in Bosnia; Canada has provided personnel for EU police missions in 
Bosnia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, while Norway has 
contributed assets to Operation Atalanta (EUNAVFOR) and has provided 
forces to the EU Nordic Battlegroup. 
Capabilities development  
The development of the EU’s military capabilities has been on the 
agenda for over a decade through a mixture of EU and NATO initiatives. 
The UK has consistently sought to develop the operational capability of 
CSDP by encouraging other EU Member States to invest their defence 
equipment budgets more wisely, particularly in the current economic 
climate, as a means of strengthening both the EU and NATO. That 
position is unlikely to change with the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, as 
capabilities development remains a central tenet of NATO’s smart 
defence agenda. The UK also remains a member of the Organisation for 
Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR)582 and is involved in a number of 
bilateral capability development initiatives with other EU Member States, 
such as France.  
Even though outside of the EU the UK could not participate in the 
European Defence Agency, it could continue participating in EDA 
projects as a third party country.583 In 2006, for example, Norway signed 
an administrative agreement with the EDA which allows it to participate 
in the Agency’s research and technology projects. Switzerland also has a 
similar cooperation agreement.  
Withdrawal from the EU is therefore unlikely to have a major impact. 
The UK already adopts a multi-faceted approach to defence 
procurement, and is likely to continue doing so. Exit from the EU will 
also not prohibit the UK from participating in exercises with individual, 
or groups of, EU nations; nor will it prevent them from deploying 
together on military operations that fall outside of the EU’s remit. 
During Defence Questions on 27 June the Secretary of State 
acknowledged that the UK will have to “work hard to ensure that these 
bilateral relationships are kept in good repair”. He went on to 
comment: 
We have strong defence relationships and defence sections in 
these embassies across Europe, and we will have to look at them 
                                                                                             
580  See Research Paper 03/05, NATO: The Prague Summit and Beyond, January 2003.  
581  Respectively, Official Journal of the EU L315/21, 1/12/2005; OJL 67, 14/3/2005, and 
OJ L143/2, 31/5/2011. 
582  Further information on OCCAR is available at: http://www.occar.int/185.  
583  Although it would no longer have a seat on the Steering Board and would not have 
any say on how the EDA is run or the projects it focuses on. The UK would no 
longer, however, be obliged to pay towards the common costs of the EDA, which 
costs the UK between £3m and £4m per annum.  
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independently and make sure in the Brexit negotiations that none 
of that co-operation – the joint training, the exercising and the co-
operation in capabilities – is put at risk.584 
EU defence directives 
The defence directives agreed in 2011 were originally conceived as a 
means of making the EU internal defence market work better, and in 
the case of the directive on defence procurement, to increase 
competition in the EU defence sector by making more EU governments 
put non-sensitive defence contracts out to tender.  
Both directives were transposed into UK law in August 2011. If, during 
withdrawal negotiations, the substance of the two defence directives is 
retained in the withdrawal agreement, the applicability of their 
provisions to the UK will not change.  
Being relatively new, little official assessment of their success or impact 
on UK policy has been made to date.585 Therefore, if the UK chooses 
not to retain the two directives, it is unclear whether withdrawal from 
their provisions would have any serious impact on the UK. The 
Government already seeks to procure where possible through open and 
fair competition.586 Within the framework of the directive on defence 
procurement, the Government also retains liberty of action in what 
contracts it chooses to exempt from EU public procurement rules, under 
Article 346 TFEU. Government-to-government sales and 100% research 
and development contracts are also excluded from the directive’s 
provisions. Therefore, operating outside the EU directive on defence 
procurement would arguably have little impact on the UK’s general 
procurement approach. Any changes are likely to focus more on the 
specific rules that the UK would no longer have to abide by. It would 
not, for example, be obliged to tender contracts EU-wide, and it would 
not have to ensure non-discrimination among EU Member States in its 
assessment of bids.  
Indeed, since its inception, the usefulness of the procurement directive 
has been questioned, as numerous EU Member States have either 
delayed transposing the directive into law,587 or have flouted its 
provisions by continuing to promote protectionist procurement practices 
or by exploiting the government-to-government sales exemption, in 
order to safeguard their respective domestic defence industrial bases.588 
In October 2010, for example, the Greek Defence Minister was reported 
to have commented that “countries must have the right to nourish their 
                                                                                             
584  HC Deb 27 June 2016, c4 
585  The European Commission’s first report on the functioning and impact of the 
directives is not due until later in 2016. In June 2015 the Directorate General for 
External Policies within the European Parliament published a report which attempted 
to make an initial assessment of the success of the directives, thus far.  
586  This approach was set down in the MOD’s 2002 Defence Industrial Policy, and more 
recently in the 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy and the 2012 White Paper National 
security through Technology: Technology, Equipment and Support for UK Defence 
and Security. 
587  See Commission list of the infringement cases it has opened in the past with respect 
to this directive.   
588  See “EU procurement directive prompts industry concern”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 
9 February 2011.  
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own industries”.589 In 2013 the European Commission also expressed its 
concern over the intention of several European countries, notably 
Bulgaria and Romania, to fulfil their fighter aircraft requirements 
through a single source government-to-government purchase in order 
to bypass the competitive provisions of the directive.590 In June 2014 the 
Commission subsequently presented a roadmap of measures intended 
to strengthen the European defence market. Among those intended 
reforms was a commitment to issue guidance on the acceptable use of 
exclusions under the defence directives.591  
Indeed a European Parliament report published in June 2015 on the 
impact of the defence directives concluded that:  
While the number of documents published on TED over these past 
two years has been increasing, this increase is not as significant as 
expected, and above all it is due to a small group of Member 
States (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom). This initial 
survey demonstrates an important disparity in the Member States’ 
publication practices (contract notices and contract awards). This 
poses the question of reciprocity. In value, contract awards 
notified between the 21st August 2011 and the 31st December 
2014 represent around €10.53 billion. The year 2014 accounts for 
around 65% of the total, due to significant contracts notified by 
the United Kingdom in the field of services and facilities 
management, and by France on the segments covering Repair and 
maintenance services of military aircrafts. 
The Directive 2009/81/EC is today favoured for contracts dealing 
with services, the acquisition of equipment deemed to be of a low 
strategic value, and sub-systems. Over the past three years, all of 
the major military equipment contracts, thus those that have had 
a structural effect on the DTIB, were notified without going via 
the Directive. Previous practices have continued, notably the use 
of Article 346 […] 
Concretely today acquisition practices seem to show an 
incomplete and incorrect application of the Directive, with de 
facto a limited or even non-existent impact on the DTIB. It is 
indeed too hasty and premature to draw conclusions from such a 
short period, all the more so given that it generally takes 5 to 10 
years for a directive to be fully applied, and this is referring to the 
civilian sector. Although this new regime is not yet functioning 
satisfactorily at the present time, the Directive represents an 
important step in a sector such as defence, which is marked by a 
significant degree of opacity in acquisition practices.592 
Evolution of EU defence  
Since 2003 proposals to enhance CSDP, most notably the creation of a 
standing EU military headquarters independent of NATO and/or a 
                                                                                             
589  “Greece to boost industry with contentious contracts”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 4 
May 2011.  
590  See “Europe poised for confrontation over Bulgarian F-16 procurement”, Jane’s 
Defence Industry, 13 February 2013.  
591  Further information is available at: European Commission: Actions for a more 
competitive and efficient defence and security sector, 24 June 2014. In November 
2015 the Government set out its opinions on that defence roadmap during a session 
of the House of Commons’ European Union Committee B. 
592  European Parliament, Directorate General for External Policies, The impact of the 
‘defence package’ directives on European defence, June 2015.  
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‘European Army’, have periodically become a priority for the EU, or the 
focus of individual countries.  
Proposals for an independent operational military HQ to be established 
using the Permanent Structured Co-operation mechanism were, for 
example, reinvigorated as part of France’s Presidency priorities in 
2008.593 The development of such capacity was regarded as a 
fundamental tenet of the package of measures intended to improve the 
EU’s ability to field an intervention capability and avoid becoming 
tagged as a mechanism purely for civilian crisis management. At the 
time those proposals made little progress in light of the crisis over the 
Irish ‘no’ vote on the Lisbon Treaty.  
This idea re-surfaced again during the Polish EU presidency in 2011, 
which prompted the UK Government to threaten to wield its veto over 
the issue. Former Foreign Secretary, William Hague, stated at the time: 
I have made very clear that the United Kingdom will not agree to 
such a permanent OHQ. We will not agree to it now, we will not 
agree to it in the future. That is a red line for us... 
We are opposed to this idea because we think it duplicates NATO 
structures and thirdly, a lot can be done by improving the 
structures that already exist.594 
In September 2012, 11 EU Member States (excluding the UK)595 
published a communiqué on The Future of Europe which called for a 
new model defence policy, designed to create a “European Army” and 
more majority based decisions in defence and foreign policy, in order to 
“prevent one single member state from being able to obstruct 
initiatives”.596 Those proposals were supported in a further communiqué 
issued by France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain in November 2012, 
which also called for a “new military structure” for EU-led operations to 
be established.597 In March 2015 the EU Commission President, Jean-
Claude Juncker, also suggested that an EU army should be created “to 
build a common foreign and national security policy, and to collectively 
take on Europe’s responsibilities in the world”. He also argued that it 
would “show Russia that we are serious when it comes to defending 
the values of the European Union”.598  
This is a position supported by the current German government which 
stated in 2015 that “a European Army is Germany’s long term goal”.599 
Indeed, a German defence White Paper published on 13 July 2016 
reiterated that “Germany is striving to achieve the long-term goal of a 
common European Security and Defence Union”. Specifically it proposes 
the greater use of permanent structured cooperation and the creation 
                                                                                             
593  For more detail see Standard Note 4807, Priorities for ESDP under the French 
Presidency of the EU.   
594  “UK blocks bid for permanent EU security headquarters”, EurActiv, 19 July 2011. 
595  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal and Spain. 
596  As reported in “Ministers call for stronger EU foreign policy chief”, EU Observer, 18 
September 2012. 
597  “Five EU countries call for new military structure”, Stratrisks, 18 November 2012.  
598  “Create and EU army to keep back the Russians”, The Daily Telegraph, 8 March 
2015.  
599  “Our goal is an EU Army says Germany’s defence chief”, The Daily Mail, 4 May 2015 
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of “a permanent civil-military operational headquarters in the medium 
term. This will be a civil-military planning and command and control 
capability that is not yet available in this form in the EU member 
states”.600 
Any decision to expand the remit of the planning cell or further 
European defence integration will require unanimity among EU member 
states. While the UK is still a formal member of the EU it will still have a 
veto, which Earl Howe recently suggested would be used in the event of 
proposals to establish a European Army:  
The noble Lord asked about the long-running issue of an EU army. 
I take this opportunity to emphasise that, while the UK remains a 
full member of the EU until such time as we leave it, UK forces 
will not be part of an EU army. In no circumstances could Brussels, 
in any case, direct deployment of UK forces without the specific 
agreement of the UK Government. That agreement will not be 
forthcoming. Defence is entirely a national competence and if an 
EU army were to be proposed, it would be subject to national 
veto.601 
Following Brexit, however, the UK will not be party to any discussions or 
have any formal powers over decision-making on EU defence. The UK’s 
ability to influence the progress, or otherwise, of any EU defence 
proposals (as it did in 2003 and 2011), would therefore be limited to 
the diplomatic pressure it could bring to bear through other foreign 
policy channels.   
Without the UK’s support it has been suggested that the strategic 
ambition of a “common European defence” could ultimately falter.  
However, the absence of the UK from CSDP decision making could 
equally be the opportunity that pro-European states, such as Germany, 
have been looking for to further the European defence project, in the 
longer term. As Philip Worré, Director of ISIS Europe, noted in a January 
2013 briefing: 
A British exit would undoubtedly cause much turmoil, and CSDP 
will have lost a key contributor and supporter. From a strictly 
CDSP – and European defence integration – perspective, however, 
Britain’s departure could create opportunities in terms of military 
cooperation and accelerate the establishment of permanent 
structured cooperation, because of a more unified approach 
among the remaining Member States.602 
Impact on the UK defence budget and future 
equipment plan  
At present the Government is committed to meeting the NATO target 
of spending 2% of GDP on defence, until 2020/2021. It has also 
committed to continue funding the equipment budget at 1% above 
inflation until the end of this Parliament.603 The MOD is currently 
                                                                                             
600  German Federal Government, White paper on German security policy and the future 
of the Bundeswehr, 13 July 2016.  
601  HC Deb 11 July 2016, c46 
602  Philip Worré, “The consequences of a British exit from the EU and CSDP: An 
Analytical Timeline”, ISIS Europe Occasional Paper, January 2013.  
603  Ministry of Defence, Defence Equipment Plan 2015  
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earmarked to spend £178 billion on defence equipment over the next 
10 years, to 2025.604  
Within the context of Brexit a number of analysts have raised concerns 
over the impact of currency fluctuations on existing defence 
procurement programmes, such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. In a 
commentary piece for RUSI Professor Trevor Taylor has argued that “the 
depreciation of the pound against the dollar in the wake of Britain’s 
decision to leave the European Union raises major doubts about the 
affordability of the country’s current defence equipment plans”.605 
Speaking in the House on 11 July 2016 the Defence Secretary, Michael 
Fallon, suggested that it is too early to determine what the impact of 
Brexit would be on the defence equipment plan. He commented: 
It is a little too early to be sure exactly where the sterling-dollar 
exchange rate will end up. Like any large commercial 
organisation, we take precautions against fluctuations in the 
currency, but it is too early to say whether that current level is 
likely to be sustained.606 
In the longer term questions have also been raised over whether it will 
be possible to maintain the commitment to spending 2% of GDP if 
economic growth predictions fail to materialise in the aftermath of the 
Brexit vote. Malcolm Chalmers of RUSI has argued, for example, that “it 
is unrealistic to expect that the defence budget can be entirely 
exempted from the expenditure cuts that will probably be needed in a 
post-exit spending review”.607 In a report published on 10 July 2016 the 
Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy also expressed this 
view: 
A May 2016 report by the UK-based Institute for Fiscal Studies 
(IFS) highlighted analysis that UK GDP might be reduced by 
between 2.1% and 3.5% in 2019 as a result of Brexit. The IFS 
continued: “A hit to GDP of this magnitude would imply a hit to 
the public finances, after taking account of the reduced EU 
contribution, of between £20 billion and £40 billion in 2019–20.” 
In that context, even if the new Government were again to 
commit to spending at least 2% of GDP on defence, a stagnant or 
contracting UK economy might mean that the defence budget 
would be reduced in real terms. This would impact on the 
ambition and capabilities set out in the NSS & SDSR 2015.608 
The Committee goes on to state that “economic contraction caused by 
Brexit could limit the ability of the armed forces to fulfil their role 
effectively”.609  
In defence questions on 27 June 2016 the Government reiterated its 
commitment to spending 2% of GDP on defence until the end of this 
                                                                                             
604  Ministry of Defence press release, 23 November 2015  
605  Trevor Taylor, “Brexit and UK defence: put the equipment plan on hold?” RUSI 
Commentary, 6 July 2016.  
606  HC Deb 11 July 2016, c52 
607  “After the Brexit, what’s next for defense?”, Defense News, 24 June 2016  
608  Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, National Security Strategy and 
Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, HC153, July 2016. 
609  ibid 
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Parliament. The level of defence spending beyond 2020 has yet to be 
determined. Philip Dunne stated: 
As was made clear in last year’s comprehensive spending review 
at the same time as the strategic defence and security review, and 
as I have already said this afternoon, the defence budget is going 
up in real terms in each year of this Parliament […]  
I am not going to join those in the Opposition who seek to talk 
the economy down. We have a clear commitment to meet the 
NATO defence spending pledge and that is what we will do.610 
The need for a new SDSR in the event of Brexit, and earlier than the 
next scheduled review in 2020 is now the subject of debate.  
Impact of a second independence referendum in 
Scotland?  
The prospect of a second referendum on Scottish independence in the 
aftermath of Brexit has also reignited the debate about the location of 
the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent at Faslane in Western Scotland. For 
the present the MOD has said that it is not anticipating another 
referendum and there are no plans to move nuclear weapons from 
Scotland.611 How political events unfold with respect to Scotland over 
the next few years will determine whether the MOD needs to revisit its 
position in the longer term. The biggest concerns for the MOD would 
be identifying suitable alternative locations, and the costs of relocation 
which in 2014 they described as “a gargantuan sum of money”.612 
 
Box 5: Brexit and defence: suggested reading  
• Royal United Services Institute: Brexit Briefings 
• Chatham House: After Brexit: Britain’s Future  
• International Institute for Strategic Studies: Brexit  
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611  “No plans to move nuclear weapons from Scotland”, BBC News Online, 15 July 
2016.  
612  Scottish Affairs Committee, The referendum on separation for Scotland: Terminating 
Trident – days or decades, HC 676, October 2012.  
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21. The devolved legislatures 
If the UK leaves the EU there could be further policy and legislative 
divergence in areas of devolved competence, as the UK Government 
and Devolved Administrations will no longer be required to implement 
the common requirements of EU Directives. This would probably be 
particularly noticeable in policy areas such as the environment or 
agriculture, which are currently strongly governed by EU policy and 
legislation.  
The following sections look briefly at the relationship of the devolved 
legislatures with the EU and possible effects on these nations of a UK 
withdrawal. 
21.1 Scotland 
The EU Referendum result in Scotland 
In Scotland, 62.0% of voters on a turnout of 67.2% voted to Remain in 
the European Union.  Just over 1.02 million people voted Leave and 
1.66 people million voted Remain. 
Electorates in all 32 Scottish Local Authorities voted to Remain.  The 
biggest Remain vote was in the City of Edinburgh, where 74.4% of 
those who voted did so to Remain, whilst Moray saw the lowest Remain 
vote with 50.1%.  A Scottish Parliament Information Centre (SPICe) 
Infographic provides details of the result by Scottish local authority area.   
Scotland’s current constitutional relationship with 
the European Union 
Schedule V of the Scotland Act 1998 reserves all aspects of foreign 
affairs to the UK Government and Parliament including relations with 
the European Union. This means the UK Government is responsible for 
managing relations with the EU, including leading on all policy and 
legislative negotiations.  However, the Scotland Act does give the 
Scottish Government and Scottish Parliament responsibility for 
implementing European obligations where they relate to devolved 
matters. 
This means, as with the other devolved legislatures, the Scottish 
Parliament is responsible for transposing and implementing a wide 
spectrum of EU legislation in areas such as agriculture, fisheries and the 
environment. The Scottish Government is also responsible for 
administering the spending of European funds such as Structural Funds 
and the Common Agricultural Policy in Scotland.  In other areas where 
the UK Government has competence, such as EU economic policies and 
areas of Single Market legislation, the Scottish Government and Scottish 
Parliament have an interest in monitoring how EU laws will impact on 
Scotland including in devolved areas. 
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The value of the EU to Scotland 
In October 2015, the Scottish Parliament Information Centre (SPICe) 
published a briefing analysing “The impact of EU membership in 
Scotland”.  The briefing set out what EU membership means for 
Scotland, including an analysis of the data relating to Scotland’s 
economic and social links with the EU.  Data in the briefing was 
updated in papers provided to the Scottish Parliament’s European and 
External Relations Committee in July 2016.     
On 23 August 2016, the Scottish Government published a paper 
outlining the Potential Implications of the UK leaving the EU on 
Scotland’s Long Run Economic Performance.  The paper summarised the 
impact that leaving the EU could have on Scotland’s GDP and public 
spending up to 2030.  The key conclusions presented by the Scottish 
Government were that by 2030 “Scottish GDP is projected to be 
between £1.7 billion and £11.2 billion per year lower than it would 
have been if Brexit does not occur” and “Tax revenue is projected to be 
between £1.7 billion and £3.7 billion lower.”613 
Access to the Single Market 
The EU is the main destination for Scotland’s international exports, 
“accounting for around 42% of Scotland’s international exports in 
2014, with an estimated value of around £11.6 billion”.614     
The latest Scottish Export Statistics for 2014 show that of Scotland’s top 
ten international export destinations, six are EU Member States 
(Netherlands, France, Germany, Ireland, Spain and Denmark). However, 
the Scottish Government’s export figures for 2014 also indicate that 
international exports to countries outside the EU are forming an 
increasing share of all Scotland’s international exports – in 2014 they 
made up 58% of Scotland’s international exports.   
Since 2002 exports to the EU, as a share of total Scottish exports, have 
actually decreased from 54% to 42%. This is because whilst exports to 
the EU have grown by 6% since 2002, exports to the rest of the world 
have grown by 74%.  One reason for the declining reliance on the EU 
market may be the increase in bilateral free trade agreements being 
negotiated by the EU, which has exclusive competence to negotiate 
international trade agreements. 
Food and drink is Scotland’s biggest export in terms of sector.  The 
value of food and drink exports to the EU was £1,775m in 2014.   This 
reflects an increase of 57% (£645m) since 2002. However, exports have 
fallen by 3% (£55m) since 2013615.  As a proportion of all food and 
drink exports, those going to the EU have shrunk from a peak of 45% 
in 2008 to 37% in 2014. 
The Single Market also allows businesses from across the EU to invest 
across Member State borders.  Figures from the Financial Scrutiny Unit 
                                                                                             
613  Scottish Government, Brexit research shows economic risk to Scotland,  23 August 
2016.  
614  Scottish Government, Export Statistics Scotland.  
615  Scottish Government, Export Statistics Scotland 2014.  
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in SPICe show that in Scotland in 2013, nearly 4,600 business sites 
owned by non-UK European companies had a combined turnover of 
£42.1 billion and added £15.8 billion in Gross Value Added (GVA) to 
the Scottish economy.  This made up 15.6% of all Scotland’s GVA, 
making it the most reliant region of the UK on European-owned 
companies.  The figures exclude some financial service activities and 
public sector activities .  Whilst European-owned companies are an 
important component of Scotland’s economy, their investments lean 
towards the energy and food and drink sectors.  It is not clear whether 
any of this investment would be lost when the UK leaves the EU.     
In terms of jobs, the Financial Scrutiny Unit in SPICe has calculated that 
around 150,000 jobs were sustained directly in Scotland from exports to 
the EU in 2013. 
Migration and Freedom of Movement 
The principle of free movement has allowed Scots to travel to other EU 
Member States to work or study.  Likewise, other EU nationals are able 
to come and work or study in Scotland.   
In the period between the UK joining the EU in 1973 and 2003, the 
Scottish population either saw minimal or decreased growth. The 
average change over the period was a population reduction of 0.1% 
per year. From 2004 when the EU expanded with the accession of eight 
central and eastern European countries and Malta and Cyprus, the 
Scottish population has increased by at least 0.3% a year.  The latest 
estimates suggest that in 2014 there were around 173,000 people in 
Scotland who had the nationality of another EU Member State, 
equating to 3.3% of the overall population.616   
Higher Education 
EU membership has influenced Scotland’s higher education sector both 
in terms of student mobility and access to funding.  Non-UK EU 
nationals are entitled to study at Scottish universities for free.  In 2014-
15, 14,440 EU students studied at Scottish universities at a cost to the 
Scottish Government of £27.1 million.617 Although few Scottish 
students choose to undertake their full degree in another Member 
State, the main study abroad option for UK nationals wishing to spend 
part of their time studying at an institution in another EU Member State 
is ERASMUS+ which replaced ERASMUS in 2014.  The total number of 
UK students taking part in the ERASMUS scheme rose from 11,723 in 
2009-10 to 15,566 in 2013-14. The proportion of students from 
Scottish HEIs taking part in ERASMUS remained at around 13% during 
this period. Scottish participation in the programme is slightly higher 
than in other parts of the UK (relative to Scotland’s overall population in 
                                                                                             
616  National Records of Scotland, Mid-2014 Population Estimates Scotland Population  
estimates by sex, age and administrative area, 30 April 2015, Correction: 8 May 
2015. 
617   Student Awards Agency Scotland, Higher Education Student Support in Scotland 
2014-15. Statistical summary of financial support provided to students by the 
Student Awards Agency for Scotland in academic session 2014-15, October 2015.  
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UK).618  There are not yet any figures available on participation in 
ERASMUS+. 
European funding 
Scotland has benefited from both pre-allocated and competitive 
European funds over the last four decades.  European funding 
programmes such as Structural Funds and the CAP see funds pre-
allocated to Member States.  The allocation of CAP funds and European 
Structural Funds between the countries of the UK is negotiated by the 
UK Government with the Devolved Administrations.   
Between 2007 and 2013 Scotland benefited from around €4.5 billion of 
CAP funding.  Between 2014 and 2020 Scotland is likely to benefit from 
around a further €4.6 billion.619 
Between 2007 and 2013 Scotland received around €800 million in 
European Structural Funds.  During the 2014 to 2020 Multiannual 
Financial Framework, Scotland’s programmes will benefit from a total of 
€985 million; with match funding from the Scottish Government and 
other public sector organisations, total funding will be around €1.9 
billion.620 
Scotland has also been successful in accessing competitive funding.  The 
biggest programme that Scotland has benefited from is the research 
and development programme, now named Horizon 2020. By March 
2016, Scottish organisations were awarded over €217 million.621 This 
figure equates to 11.6% of the funding awarded to the UK (over €1 
billion). 
Higher education institutions (HEIs) and research institutes have been 
the main beneficiaries, securing almost 80% (€173 million) of the 
funding awarded to Scottish organisations. Of this total, €157 million 
went to HEIs and over €16 million to research institutes. A further €39 
million of Horizon 2020 funding was awarded to Scottish businesses, 
almost €29.5 million of this going to small and medium enterprises. 
Figures up to February 2016 show that the University of Edinburgh is 
currently the most successful Scottish HEI within the UK for Horizon 
2020 funding – ranking 6th across the EU and gaining over €59 million 
in funding to date. The University of Glasgow ranks 18th in the EU, 
having gained over €35 million in Horizon 2020 funding to February 
2016.622 
Prior to the start of the programme, Scotland had also successfully 
accessed EU research and innovation funding via the 7th Framework 
Programme (which ran from 2007 to 2013). Figures provided to the 
Scottish Parliament Information Centre by Scotland Europa in 
                                                                                             
618  Erasmus + website.   
619  Gov.uk, 8 November 2013, UK CAP allocations announced.   
620  Scottish Government, 19 December 2014, Scottish economy to benefit from 
multimillion European investment.   
621  Scotland’s engagement in Horizon 2020: Third performance monitoring and 
analysis, update March 2016; provided by Scotland Europa. 
622  Information provided to SPICe by Universities Scotland (July 2016) (personal 
communication). 
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September 2015 indicated that Scotland was awarded €741 million in 
total under this programme. 
While Scotland has benefited from European funds being spent in 
Scotland, it has also contributed payments to the EU Budget as part of 
the UK.  Projections done by the Scottish Government in 2009 and by 
the Financial Scrutiny Unit in SPICe suggests Scotland is a net 
contributor to the EU budget.623   
The Scottish Government’s position on the UK 
decision to leave the EU 
Following the announcement of the EU referendum result, the First 
Minister of Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon, made a statement on Friday 24 
June in which she said that she regarded it as “democratically 
unacceptable” that Scotland should face the prospect of being taken 
out of the EU against its will.   The First Minister also said: 
I want to make it absolutely clear that I intend to take all possible 
steps and explore all options to give effect to how people in 
Scotland voted - in other words, to secure our continuing place in 
the EU and in the single market in particular. 
To that end, I have made clear to the Prime Minister this morning 
that the Scottish Government must be fully and directly involved 
in any and all decisions about the next steps that the UK 
government intends to take. 
We will also be seeking direct discussions with the EU institutions 
and its member states, including the earliest possible meeting 
with the President of the European Commission. 
I will also be communicating over this weekend with each EU 
member state to make clear that Scotland has voted to stay in the 
EU - and that I intend to discuss all options for doing so.624 
The First Minister also used her speech to address the issue of a second 
independence referendum in light of the EU referendum result.  She 
said: 
Lastly, let me address the issue of a second independence 
referendum. 
The manifesto that the SNP was elected on last month said this: 
"The Scottish Parliament should have the right to hold 
another referendum...if there is a significant and material 
change in the circumstances that prevailed in 2014, such as 
Scotland being taken out the EU against our will." 
Scotland does now face that prospect - it is a significant and 
material change in circumstances - and it is therefore a statement 
of the obvious that the option of a second referendum must be 
on the table. And it is on the table. 
Clearly, though, there are a lot of discussions to be had before 
final decisions are taken. 
It would not be right to rush to judgment ahead of discussions on 
how Scotland’s result will be responded to by the EU. 
                                                                                             
623  SPICe, Scotland in the European Union.  
624  Scottish Government, 24 June 2016, First Minister - EU Referendum Result.  
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However, when the Article 50 process is triggered in three 
months’ time, the UK will be on a two year path to the EU exit 
door. 
If Parliament judges that a second referendum is the best or only 
way to protect our place in Europe, it must have the option to 
hold one within that timescale. 
That means we must act now to protect that position. I can 
therefore confirm today that in order to protect that position we 
will begin to prepare the legislation that would be required to 
enable a new independence referendum to take place if and 
when Parliament so decides. 
In the week following the EU referendum, the Scottish Parliament 
debated the outcome.  At the conclusion of the debate, the Parliament 
passed the following motion by 92 votes to 0 votes with 31 abstentions: 
That the Parliament welcomes the overwhelming vote of the 
people of Scotland to remain in the European Union; affirms to 
citizens of other EU countries living here that they remain 
welcome and that their contribution is valued; mandates the 
Scottish Government to have discussions with the UK 
Government, other devolved administrations, the EU institutions 
and member states to explore options for protecting Scotland’s 
relationship with the EU, Scotland’s place in the single market and 
the social, employment and economic benefits that come from 
that, and instructs the Scottish Government to report back 
regularly to parliamentarians, to the European and External 
Relations Committee and the Parliament on the progress of those 
discussions and to seek Parliament’s approval of the outcome of 
that process. 
During the debate, the First Minister announced the formation by the 
Scottish Government of a Standing Council on Europe to advise on 
legal, financial and diplomatic issues.   
On 29 June the First Minister visited Brussels and met with the President 
of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, as well as the 
President of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, and the leaders of 
a number of the political groups in the European Parliament.  According 
to the Scottish Government, she “stressed that Scotland chose to 
remain part of the European Union, and her determination to ensure all 
options are considered to enable Scotland to remain in the EU”.   
Following the First Minister’s meetings she held a press conference at 
which she said: 
In my discussions during the day, I've heard, as you would expect, 
deep concern about the impact of the referendum not just on 
Scotland, the UK and the European institutions, but on people in 
all our countries and on the EU itself. 
For my part, I've emphasised that Scotland voted to remain part of 
the EU. 
If there is a way for Scotland to stay, I am determined to find it. 
We are in uncharted territory, and none of this is easy. My task is 
to bring principles, purpose and clarity to the situation, and to 
speak for all of Scotland. 
We are early in this process. The referendum is not yet a week 
behind us - a long week for all of us. 
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My concern at this stage is to ensure that once the UK negotiation 
with the EU starts, all the options are on the table. I don’t 
underestimate the challenges but I am heartened by the 
discussions. Here, I've found a willingness to listen: open doors, 
open ears and open minds. 
In the weeks following the referendum, the Scottish Government has 
also sought to send a message to the 173,000 non-UK EU citizens living 
in Scotland that they continue to be welcome in the country.  In 
addition, the Scottish Government has called for the rights of European 
Union nationals living in Scotland to be protected.625 
Scotland’s role in the triggering of Article 50 
Neither the Scottish Government nor the Scottish Parliament has a 
formal role in the UK Government’s decision on the notification of 
Article 50.  However, the UK Government may choose to consult with 
the Devolved Administrations ahead of notifying the European Council 
of its intention to leave the EU.  Following her meeting with Scotland’s 
First Minister, the new Prime Minister, Theresa May, said: 
I have already said that I won't be triggering Article 50 until I think that 
we have a UK approach and objectives for negotiations - I think it is 
important that we establish that before we trigger Article 50.626 
The Prime Minister also indicated that she “wanted the Scottish 
Government to be fully engaged in our discussion” about the UK 
Government’s approach to negotiations with the EU. 
The Scottish Parliament’s relationship with EU law 
Under the current devolution settlement, when the UK leaves the EU, 
the competences exercised by the EU will be repatriated to the UK.  
Where those competences relate to devolved matters, an effect of UK 
withdrawal from the EU will be that the Scottish Parliament will obtain a 
competence to legislate on those matters, which it did not have before 
the withdrawal takes effect. 
Section 29(2)(d) of the Scotland Act 1998 also requires that all 
legislation of the Scottish Parliament is compatible with EU law.  As a 
result, a decision by the UK to leave the EU may require amendments of 
the Scotland Act 1998 to remove various references to the EU or EU 
law.  
In addition, a repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 would not 
of itself end the domestic incorporation of EU law in the devolved 
nations, given that EU law is implemented in Scotland within very many 
pieces of primary and secondary legislation, and not all legislation 
implementing EU law relies on the 1972 Act.    
The Scottish Parliament’s role in the leaving process 
As mentioned above, the Scottish Parliament does not have a formal 
role in the notification of Article 50.  However, the Scottish Parliament 
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Government, 5 July 2016, Reassurance following EU referendum.  
626  BBC News, 15 July 2016, Brexit: PM is 'willing to listen to options' on Scotland.  
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has taken an active interest in the process following the referendum 
vote.   
In addition to the debate held in the Scottish Parliament on 28 June 
2016, the Parliament’s European and External Relations Committee has 
started an inquiry into the EU referendum and its implications for 
Scotland.  The Committee took evidence on the implications for 
Scotland of the decision to leave the EU at its meeting on 28 July, with a 
focus on economic issues and on some of the sectors affected by the 
decision to leave.  The Committee has also issued a call for evidence to 
gather more information on the impact of the decision to leave the EU.  
The Committee’s inquiry will continue over the coming months.   
21.2 Wales 
Introduction 
Wales has primary responsibility for transposing and implementing EU 
legislation within the 20 areas of devolved competence set out in 
Schedule 7 to the Government of Wales Act 2006, as well as direct 
interest in influencing and shaping relevant EU policy and legislative 
proposals within these areas. 
These include a number of areas where the EU has extensive 
competence, such as agriculture, fisheries and rural affairs, animal 
health and welfare, food, and environment, and where there is an 
established body of EU law and regulation that Wales must already 
comply with. Notably, for two of the other main Welsh competences – 
education and health – the scope for EU intervention is limited (with the 
exception of the impact of ‘horizontal’ EU legislation such as anti-
discrimination law, public procurement rules, and rights of equal access 
for EU citizens). EU-level action in these areas is primarily focused 
around information exchange, benchmarking of best practice, and 
mobility of professionals and learners. 
For other policy areas where the UK retains the lead competence, the 
Welsh Government, National Assembly for Wales and other Welsh 
stakeholders and organisations also have an interest in the potential 
impact of EU policy and legislation in Wales. These include aspects of 
economic development and employment policy, competition policy 
(including public procurement), financial services, and (most aspects of) 
energy policy. 
Value of EU membership to Wales 
At an event in Cardiff in April 2015, the First Minister for Wales, Carwyn 
Jones AM, outlined what he saw as the economic benefit of EU 
membership to Wales: 
About 500 firms from other EU Member States are based in Wales, 
employing over 54,000 people. The Single Market is also Wales’ 
primary export destination. The total value of Welsh exports to the EU 
in 2014 was £5.6 billion. 
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Wales has access to considerable funding opportunities from the EU, 
notably from the CAP and Structural Funds (as well as a plethora of 
other funding streams). “Under the current round of CAP, 2014-2020, 
Wales will receive approximately £250 million of funding per annum in 
direct payments to farmers in addition to €655 million for its 2014-2020 
rural development programme”.627  
Between 2014 and 2020, Wales will receive around £1.8 billion in EU 
Structural Funds from the Cohesion Policy for programmes covering 
West Wales and the Valleys (‘Convergence’ region) and East Wales 
(‘Competitiveness’ region). Welsh farmers’ payments from the CAP are 
estimated to be worth £240 million a year.628  In addition, Wales will 
receive €355 million for its rural development plan for 20014-2020.629 
“Together with match funding, the funds will drive a total investment of 
at least £2.7bn across Wales”.630  
It has been estimated that the CAP provides around 80-90% of the 
basic farm income in Wales.631 The Deputy Minister for Farming and 
Food, Rebecca Evans, has said that the cessation of direct payments to 
farmers without any domestic replacement from the UK Government 
would be ‘hugely damaging’ to the farming industry.632 The Welsh 
Government’s 2014 Wales and the European Union: Annual Report 
outlined the following accomplishments of the 2007-14 round of 
Structural Funding in Wales: 
…these include the investment of over £1.9bn of EU Structural 
Funds in 290 projects, representing £3.7bn of total project 
investment (including match funding) across Wales, cumulatively 
up to the end of 2014 for the 2007-2013 programmes. This 
investment has helped EU projects to deliver important benefits 
for people, businesses, the environment, and communities during 
2014, supporting some 190,800 people to gain qualifications and 
over 62,800 into work, and creating some 30,600 jobs and over 
10,400 enterprises. 
In addition, organisations from Wales are eligible to participate in a 
range of different EU funding programmes supporting a number of 
different EU policy goals. Examples include: 
• Horizon 2020, the EU Research Development and Innovation 
Programme; 
• the Territorial Co-operation Programmes (including a Wales-
Ireland Cross Border Co-operation programme worth around 
€100 million in EU funding); 
                                                                                             
627  National Assembly for Wales, Research Briefing, Wales and the EU: What does the 
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• Erasmus+ (supporting innovative mobility and co-operation 
activities in the fields of education, training, youth and sport);  
• Creative Europe Programme (support for media, cultural and 
other creative industries); 
• European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and many more.633 
Implications of Brexit 
In the EU referendum Wales voted to leave by 52.5% to 47.5%. The 
Environment and Rural Affairs Secretary, Lesley Griffiths, spoke on ITV 
Wales about the uncertainty following the referendum result, but also 
said he wanted to “make sure that we embrace all the opportunities 
that will come our way, as well as rising up to the challenges”.634 
On 9 August the First Minister announced that he would be setting up a 
European Advisory Group made up of “business people, politicians and 
experts with a detailed understanding of the European Union” to advise 
the Welsh Government “on the wide-ranging impact on Wales of the 
UK’s exit from the EU and how Wales can overcome challenges to 
secure a prosperous future and a continued positive relationship with 
Europe”.635   
In August the Chancellor Philip Hammond said that EU funding for 
farmers, scientists and other projects would be replaced by the Treasury 
after Brexit for EU-funded projects signed before this year’s Autumn 
Statement. Agricultural funding currently provided by the EU would also 
continue until 2020.636 Carwyn Jones said on 13 August in response to 
these statements: 
We need a ‘full guarantee’ that funding will continue for our 
existing EU programmes to 2023. It’s also not unreasonable to 
expect further funding to address Wales’ economic and social 
needs, particularly support for our most deprived areas after this 
date. We have made clear to the UK Government that there is 
now an overwhelming case for a major and immediate revision of 
the Barnett Formula, to take into account Wales’ needs arising 
from EU withdrawal.637 
The Welsh Secretary, Alun Cairns, told the House of Commons in July 
that Wales would “get its fair share” of funding but did not guarantee 
that Wales would receive the same amount of funding as it would from 
the EU after Brexit.638 
On 18 July Theresa May met Carwyn Jones in Cardiff, telling him she 
wants the Welsh Government to be "involved and engaged" in Brexit 
negotiations.639  
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21.3 Northern Ireland 
Introduction 
In the EU referendum Northern Ireland voted by 55.8% against 44.2% 
to remain. For political, economic, geographic and social reasons, the 
impact on Northern Ireland of UK withdrawal from the EU might be 
expected to differ in important ways from the impact of withdrawal on 
other parts of the UK. Northern Ireland is the only region of the UK to 
share a land border with another EU Member State and UK withdrawal 
would, therefore, mean that “an external border of the European Union 
would run through the island of Ireland”.640 The final terms of any 
withdrawal agreement would undoubtedly mitigate some potential 
impacts identified and the Common Travel Area is an example of such 
cooperation which predates the UK’s and Ireland’s entry into the 
European Communities.641 
Like the UK, the Republic of Ireland (RoI) joined the then EC in January 
1973 and this common membership facilitated the development of 
improved relations between the two States, as they worked together to 
resolve the conflict in Northern Ireland. In March 2012 a Joint Statement 
by Irish Taoiseach Enda Kenny and former Prime Minister David 
Cameron set out a programme of work to reinforce the British-Irish 
relationship over the following ten years. It emphasised the importance 
of the two countries’ shared common membership of the EU for almost 
forty years and described them as ‘firm supporters of the Single Market’ 
who would ‘…work together to encourage an outward-facing EU, 
which promotes growth and jobs’.642 It has been suggested that a 
‘British withdrawal, however unlikely, would be a source of enormous 
instability and turbulence for Ireland’,643 and it is possible that the 
political arrangements established by the Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement would not be entirely protected from this instability. The 
Agreement, which included the establishment of a Northern Ireland 
Executive and Northern Ireland Assembly, also enshrined North-South644 
and East-West645 co-operation, effected constitutional changes and 
established cross-border bodies. The status of the UK and Ireland as EU 
Member States is woven throughout the Agreement.646 Both the 
Northern Ireland Assembly and the Executive have been working to 
                                                                                             
640  The Institute of International and European Affairs (Aug 2012) Towards an Irish 
Foreign Policy for Britain.   
641  For an overview of the possible consequences of a UK exit, see Centre for Cross-
Border Studies, EU Referendum Briefing Papers Briefing Paper 1 The UK Referendum 
on Membership of the EU: What does it mean for us? February 2016. 
642  Joint statement by the Prime Minister David Cameron and the Taoiseach, Enda 
Kenny, 12 March 2012.   
643  The Institute of International and European Affairs (Aug 2012) Towards an Irish 
Foreign Policy for Britain.   
644  This refers to co-operation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.   
645  This is co-operation between the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain.   
646  Indeed, the section entitled ‘Agreement between the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland’. 
speaks of “close co-operation between (the) countries as friendly neighbours and as 
partners in the European Union”.   
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develop ‘European engagement’647 and the Northern Ireland Assembly 
has increasingly sought to engage with European issues (there have 
been two Committee inquiries examining this issue).648 
Stormont's first minister, Arlene Foster, has said that Northern Ireland 
and Scotland cannot stay in the EU when the rest of the UK leaves.649 
She added that her job was, with Deputy First Minister Martin 
McGuinness, “to get the best deal possible for all of the people of 
Northern Ireland”.650 But Martin McGuinness has said the wishes of the 
people of Northern Ireland “must be respected” by the British 
Government. It is not clear how these views will be reconciled, but both 
the SDLP and Sinn Fein have suggested creating an all-Ireland national 
forum to consider the implications of Brexit.651  
Enda Kenny has raised the prospect of a referendum on uniting 
Ireland.652 
Proceedings have been brought in Northern Ireland about triggering 
Article 50.653 The N.I. case was lodged in the High Court in Belfast on 
19 August 2016.  The claimants include members of the Northern 
Ireland Assembly, people with links to the voluntary and community 
sector, and human rights organisations.  The press release states that 
the claim differs from the judicial reviews brought in the Divisional 
Court in London in that, among other things, they raise issues of N.I. 
constitutional law, the Good Friday Agreement, and EU law 
incorporated into N.I. law by the European Communities Act 1972. 
Policing and border issues 
It has been argued that “the devolved institutions and EU programmes 
have facilitated engagement and embedded Northern Ireland as a 
region deeper into EU than at any time before”.654 A UK withdrawal 
could represent a significantly changed context for the work of the 
institutions, which might be subject to any stresses emerging in UK-
Ireland relations following a UK EU exit.655 UK withdrawal might also 
have implications for Anglo-Irish co-operation in dealing with cross-
border crime and terrorist activity. In discussions on the UK opt-out from 
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Carlingford and Irish Lights Commission. One might expect the impacts described to 
also impact on these bodies.   
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policing and justice measures in 2014, the Northern Ireland Executive’s 
Justice Minister, David Ford, highlighted the enhanced co-operation 
between authorities on both sides of the border as a result of the 
devolution of policing and justice powers to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly.656 The former RoI Justice Minister, Alan Shatter, was 
concerned that a UK withdrawal from police and justice measures 
“would be a retrograde step in the area of security co-operation”.657   
The UK and the RoI make great use of the EAW. Figures indicate that in 
2004-2012, of the 50 EAW requests that Northern Ireland made to 
other Members States, 30 were made to Ireland.658 Prior to the 
introduction of the EAW in 2004, a number of European and domestic 
measures in the UK and Ireland regulated extradition proceedings, 
including the 1957 Council of Europe (CoE) Convention on Extradition, 
the Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965 in the UK and 
the Extradition Act 1965 in Ireland. The Convention system no longer 
applies in Ireland with respect to the UK, and although it would be 
possible to enact legislation to bring this back into force, one 
commentator suggested this would not “provide a satisfactory basis for 
an alternative system of extradition between the two countries, with all 
the defects, its imperfections, all its outdatedness, all its afflictions and 
all its potential for endless litigation with an uncertain outcome in 
relation to the surrender of individuals”.659 The Lords EU Committee 
concluded that while the EAW was not perfect and had resulted in 
serious injustices such as long periods of pre-trial detention in poor 
prisons, the 1957 Convention was not an adequate alternative between 
the UK and Ireland.660 
Before the referendum the former N.I. Secretary Theresa Villiers said a 
post-Brexit border could remain free-flowing. This view was shared by 
the ruling Democratic Unionist party (DUP), which backed Brexit. But the 
UK Government did not think the situation would continue as it is. The 
then Chancellor, George Osborne, said on a visit in June that “a 
hardening of the border” would be unavoidable.661 The border issue is 
also discussed in Section 11.2 (above) of this paper. 
The UK Government’s March 2016 document Alternatives to 
Membership: possible models for the United Kingdom outside the 
European Union,  “It is not clear that the Common Travel Area could 
continue to operate with the UK outside the EU, and Ireland inside, in 
the same way that it did before both countries joined the EU in 1973”. 
The new UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, said during the EU 
referendum debate that it was “inconceivable” that there would not be 
any changes to border arrangements in the event of Brexit. 
                                                                                             
656  Evidence given by David Ford, Northern Ireland Justice Minister to House of Lords 
European Union Select Committee “EU police and criminal justice measures. 
657  Alan Shatter, TD “Official Report of Dáil Eireann” 15  May 2013.  
658  Lords EU Committee “EU Police and Criminal Justice Measures: The UK’s opt-out 
decision”, 2012-2013, p 91. 
659  Ibid para 264, p 92. 
660  Ibid para 264, see executive summary and p 92. 
661  Belfast Telegraph, 6 June 2016. 
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EU funding 
Northern Ireland benefits significantly from EU funding. Table 1 below 
provides information on funding from six EU Regional Policy 
Programmes for 2014-2020:662 
EU Regional Policy Funding 2014-
20 Programme  
€m 
European Regional Development 
Fund  
308 million  
European Social Fund Programme  183 million  
INTERREG VA  240 million  
PEACE IV 229 million  
European Fisheries and Maritime 
Fund  
24 million  
Rural Development Programme  227 million  
Total  1,211 million 
 
These are relatively significant sums which Northern Ireland could lose if 
the UK leaves the EU. Brexit would also impact on the future of the 
Special EU Programmes Body, which is responsible to the European 
Commission, the Northern Ireland Executive and the Irish Government 
for the delivery and management of the INTERREG and PEACE 
Programmes. In addition to the direct impact on spending, there could 
also be a particular impact on the community and voluntary sector, 
which in Northern Ireland plays an important role in addressing social 
and economic deprivation, training and employment, social enterprise, 
health and well-being, ‘peace building’ and building cross-community 
and cross-border relationships. The annual income of the Northern 
Ireland community and voluntary sector is reported to be around £741.9 
million, of which approximately £70.1 million is estimated to derive 
from various EU funding programmes.663 The sector is also an important 
employer in Northern Ireland, constituting around 4% of the total N.I. 
workforce.664 A loss of EU funding could contribute to higher levels of 
unemployment, particularly among women, given the predominance of 
women employed in this sector. Additionally, EU withdrawal could 
compromise the sustainability of many voluntary organisations in 
contributing to EU-sponsored networks and programmes.  
Manufacturing, R&D and innovation  
Business leaders in Northern Ireland have expressed concern about the 
possible effects of a UK withdrawal on trade in general and with the RoI 
                                                                                             
662  For further information, see The impact of EU Funding on the Region. The following 
paper illustrates the impact of PEACE and INTERREG Funding in Northern Ireland, 
the border region of Ireland (including Western Scotland 2007- 2013 INTERREG) 
over the past and future Programming periods: Part A 1995 to 2013. Part B 2014 to 
2020. 
663  Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action (2012) State of the Sector VI, p2. This 
is not an exact reflection of the contribution of programmes to the voluntary and 
community sector. The figure includes funding for projects led by a voluntary or 
community organisation, but does not include the involvement of community and 
voluntary organisations in EU funded projects led by a public sector body.   
664  Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action (2012) State of the Sector VI, p9.   
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in particular.665 A worst case scenario might see the introduction of 
tariff controls on the border. Table 2 shows exports to the RoI 
accounted for a quarter (25%) of total exports and just under a quarter 
(24%) of exports to the rest of the EU.666 
Destination of NI Manufacturing Exports 2013/14 
 (£m) % 
Ireland 1,553 25 
Other EU 1,470 24 
Outside EU 3,089 51 
Total 6,113 51 
 
The destination of exports by ‘high potential’ service companies in 
Northern Ireland is outlined in the table below (the most recent data 
available is for 2011/12). Exports from this sector to the RoI were valued 
at £69.8million in 2011-12 and accounted for 29% of all sectoral 
exports, which represents over three quarters of sectoral exports to the 
EU. Total exports to the EU were valued at £88.4million and were the 
equivalent of 37% of all exports in the sector. The sector did, however, 
export a greater proportion of total exports to countries outside of the 
EU (63% of total sectoral exports). 667 
Destination of exports by NI ‘high potential’ service companies 2011/12 
 (£m) % 
Ireland 69.8 29 
Other EU 18.6 8 
Outside EU 151.9 63 
 240.3 100 
 
The data in the table above shows that both the RoI and the other EU 
countries represent significant trade partners for Northern Ireland. Any 
changes to trade relations that might limit Northern Ireland’s ability to 
trade with these regions would likely have a substantive and negative 
impact on Northern Ireland’s economy. It is also possible that 
uncertainty itself about the UK’s potential withdrawal from the EU 
might impact on trading with EU partners.  
The importance of the EU Horizon 2020 programme to developing 
research & development and innovation (R&D&I) is recognised in the 
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment’s Horizon 2020 Action 
Plan. UK withdrawal from the EU would prevent Northern Ireland from 
accessing Horizon 2020 and subsequent EU R&D&I funding and could 
                                                                                             
665  See for example The Belfast Telegraph 24 January 2013. 
666  DFP Results from the Northern Ireland Manufacturing Sales & Exports Survey 
2011/12 (December 2012). 
667  DFP Exporting Northern Ireland Services Study 2010 July 2012.  
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negatively affect its ability to improve its capacities in this area. Of the 
121 projects with Northern Ireland involvement supported under 
Horizon 2020’s predecessor, the Framework 7 programme, 84 included 
participation by the regions’ universities. Through the work of the 
Barroso Task Force the European Commission directly engaged with the 
Northern Ireland Executive to support efforts in Northern Ireland to 
improve competitiveness, create sustainable employment, reduce 
dependence on the public sector and create a more dynamic private 
sector.668  
On 14 January 2016 the European Commission announced its intention 
to continue the work of the Northern Ireland Task Force and its future 
priorities will be prepared with the Commission for finalisation in the 
first half of 2016.669 Withdrawal from the EU would mean the 
termination of the NI Task Force and possibly the closure of the NI 
Executive Brussels Office.670  
Agriculture, the agri-food industry and the 
environment 
Agriculture and the wider agri-food industry are key industries in 
Northern Ireland. Based on 2014 data, agriculture accounted for 1.4% 
of total Gross Value Added (GVA) as compared to the overall UK figure 
of 0.6%.671 Agriculture also accounted for 3.4% of total civil 
employment in Northern Ireland as compared to the overall UK figure of 
1.2%.672 The biggest single EU-related benefit for Northern Ireland 
agriculture is the direct payments which totalled £293 million in 2014 
(£246 in Single Farm Payment alone). Many local farmers rely on these 
direct payments to be viable, and the loss of such funding could 
significantly reduce the number of farms and farmers as well as farm 
production in Northern Ireland, while increasing the levels of rural 
unemployment and land dereliction. The loss of significant agricultural 
production could also restrict the ability of the Northern Ireland 
Executive to deliver on its ambitious plans for the development of the 
local agri-food industry (60% growth in turnover to £7 billion and a 
15% growth in employment to 115,000 by 2020)673. Without direct 
support the diversity of Northern Irish agriculture could diminish, as 
currently economically challenging sectors such as the beef and pig 
sectors could contract. This could see the creation of what would 
effectively be a monocultural system in Northern Ireland based, for 
example, upon the currently commercially viable dairy sector.  
                                                                                             
668  European Commission COM(2008) 186 final - Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and to the European Parliament on the Report of the Northern Ireland 
Task Force (p3).  
669  NI Executive press release, 14 January 2016. 
670  For an assessment of the value of the Northern Ireland Task Force, see the Centre for 
Cross Border Studies’ Written Evidence to the Committee for the Office of the First 
and Deputy First Minister: Inquiry into the Barroso Task Force. 
671  DARD (2012) Statistical Review of Northern Ireland Agriculture 2012.  
672  Ibid 
673  Agri-Food Strategy Board (April 2013) Going for Growth, A Strategic Action Plan in 
support of the Northern Ireland Agri-Food Industry. 
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The issue of increased access to and development of export markets is a 
key challenge for the Northern Ireland agri-food industry. If the UK left 
the EU, Northern Ireland, along with the rest of the UK, might be able 
to negotiate more quickly and easily new or enhanced access to 
countries outside the EU. Questions do, however, remain as to whether 
these terms would be better than those that can be secured within the 
auspices of the EU. By leaving the single market, Northern Ireland could 
find it difficult to gain the access to many EU markets that is currently 
crucial to the industry’s profits. Being subject to import tariffs or 
conditions could increase the costs and reduce profits. These factors 
would present a particular challenge for Northern Ireland, as it is the 
only part of the UK to share a land border with another EU Member 
State, and as significant elements of the food supply chain effectively 
operate on an all-island basis.  
Many of the improvements to water quality in N.I. have been delivered 
by providing financial support to local farmers under agri-environment 
schemes funded under the EU Rural Development Programme. EU 
regulation has also increased the financial burdens on farmers, however, 
through the need to improve facilities. An EU exit might reduce, 
maintain or even enhance the level of environmental regulation. The 
loss of EU agri-environment scheme support may well see a reduction in 
overall environmental quality and biodiversity, as farmers move from 
environmental protection to production as a sole means of securing 
income. In addition, the loss of direct payments and agri-environment 
schemes could lead to land dereliction levels soaring. A reduction in 
environmental regulation or a more pragmatic approach to 
implementation and enforcement could benefit the local agri-food 
sector, however. The poultry sector in particular may well be able to 
expand significantly, as the storage and removal of litter required in EU 
regulations is currently a major limiting factor. 
Sea fishing  
In UK terms Northern Ireland’s sea fishing industry is very small, 
employing a total of 832 fishermen in 2014.674 In 2014 the total value 
of fish landed in Northern Ireland’s fishing ports amounted to £24.8 
million, with shellfish making up the most significant part of the overall 
catch. As a result of Total Allowable Catch (TAC) changes, the majority 
of the Northern Irish fleet has focused on catching prawns in the Irish 
Sea. The local industry could be characterised as being single species 
dependent. If the UK could set its own fisheries rules and restrict access 
to the UK EEZ by foreign vessels, the Irish Sea could potentially support 
a more species diverse industry with the potential for growth and 
development. A key factor would be the way scientific data was 
collected, analysed and used in relation to the management of stocks, 
and it is not clear whether this would be more effective if the UK left 
the CFP. 
The European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF), effectively the 
replacement for the existing European Fisheries Fund, is an integral part 
                                                                                             
674  Marine Management Organisation, UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2014, 2015. 
  Number 07213, 26 August 2016 182 
of the recently reformed Common Fisheries Policy. The Northern Ireland 
EMFF has been allocated a total of €23.5 million for 2014-2020. Brexit 
will mean Northern Ireland’s local fishing ports and their vessels losing 
access to this funding, which has been critical to the modernisation of 
the fleet and the facilities it requires.  
The prawn fishery within the Irish Sea is the main focus for the Northern 
Irish fleet and is also fished by boats licensed in the RoI. If with Brexit 
the UK decides to enforce the UK EEZ, there could be serious 
ramifications for the relationship between the local and RoI-based fleets. 
Determining who can fish where and when would present considerable 
difficulties for all the fisheries within the Irish Sea. Eel fishing is also a 
comparatively large industry in Northern Ireland. If the UK were no 
longer bound by the EU Regulation Establishing Measures for the 
Recovery of the Stock of European Eel, eel management could continue, 
although the Northern Ireland Executive might alter its obligations 
regarding monitoring, restocking and minimum catch sizes. Given that 
the Lough Neagh eel industry produces around 25% of the total EU 
wild eel catch, Brexit might have an impact on Europe-wide re-stocking, 
control and monitoring systems currently operated under EU law. If the 
UK is outside the single market, there might be an effect on the 
exportability of eels into European markets such as the Netherlands. 
Free movement of people and the Common Travel 
Area 
The 2011 census shows 45,331 people in Northern Ireland were born in 
another EU state (excluding the Republic of Ireland).675 Many of 
Northern Ireland’s agricultural and in particular food processing 
businesses rely heavily upon workers from outside Northern Ireland. Free 
movement of labour within the EU has been crucial to the growth of 
many of these businesses, and an EU exit could cause problems in terms 
of the ability of these businesses to prosper or develop further if access 
to labour was restricted. Around 900 migrant worker households in 
Northern Ireland, primarily Polish but also Portuguese, Lithuanian and 
Latvian, receive social housing.676 
The Common Travel Area (CTA) governs movement of persons between 
the UK and the RoI, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.677 As an 
EU Member State, Ireland could not restrict the entry of EU citizens, so if 
the UK wanted to increase controls on EU citizens entering the UK 
through the Republic, it might reconsider the operation of the CTA. Any 
such reconsideration would have to be undertaken within the new 
context created by the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. There is no 
settled opinion on how Brexit will impact on the continued existence of 
the CTA and both the UK and Irish governments have expressed 
uncertainty about its future. The new Northern Ireland Secretary James 
                                                                                             
675  2011 Census Table QS206NI Country of Birth: 
http://www.ninis2.nisra.gov.uk/Download/Census%202011_Excel/2011/Country%2
0of%20Birth%20-%20Full%20Detail_QS206NI.XLS.  
676  As at 31 July 2012.  Northern Ireland Housing Executive.  Equality Bulletin No. 41 – 
BME and migrant worker mapping update, February 2013. 
677  This is established in Section 1(3) of the Immigration Act 1971. 
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Brokenshire said on 14 July 2016: “Another huge challenge is to ensure 
that we make a success of the UK’s decision to leave the European 
Union. It is vital that Northern Ireland’s interests are fully protected and 
advanced including in relation to the border”. An opinion article in The 
Irish News, 18 July 2016, commented: 
Unfortunately, while every rational observer accepts that imposing 
what is ominously described as a hard border would be disastrous, 
it is difficult to see how the existing open arrangements can be 
left entirely intact if and when the UK proceeds with its deeply 
contentious plans to withdraw from the EU. 
Social security, welfare and education 
Brexit might impact disproportionately upon people in border areas, 
that is, those living in Northern Ireland but working in the RoI (and vice 
versa) in terms of the transferability of EU/EEA social protection 
entitlement, including social security, child maintenance and pensions. If 
the UK imposes restrictions on EU/EEA nationals’ access to the UK social 
protection system, it is likely that Northern Ireland would impose similar 
restrictions because of financial constraints.  
The EU has supported the development of cross-border projects and 
provided a legislative basis for cross-border access to services in specific 
circumstances. CAWT (Co-operation and Working Together), for 
example, aims to address the economic and social disadvantage that 
can result from the existence of a border and is part financed by the 
European Regional Development Fund through the INTERREG IVA cross 
border programme, managed by the Special EU Programmes Body.678 
CAWT is the managing partner for a range of cross-border health and 
social care programmes on behalf of both Departments of Health in 
Northern Ireland and the RoI,679 and for the period 2007-2013, £30 
million was attributed to funding a range of programmes680 separately 
from the core Departmental funding.681 
 
                                                                                             
678  CAWT website http://www.cawt.com/. 
679  Personal correspondence with Special EU Programmes Body 18.6.13. 
680  There are 12 EU INTERREG IVA funded cross-border health and social care themes, 
e.g. the development of cross-border acute hospital services and practical initiatives 
to enable health care staff to work more easily across both jurisdictions. CAWT, 
Project Overview, Cross-border Workforce Mobility, accessed 26/03/13.  
681  Personal correspondence with Special EU Programmes Body 18.6.13. 
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